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This thesis draws on practice-as-research (PaR) and its documentation to investigate 
experimental theatre as transdisciplinary performance. I include case studies from my 
practice with Fail Better Productions and consider multi-/inter-/trans-disciplinary 
methods in theatre studies. Examples of twentieth-century experimental theatre are 
studied to define ‘three problems’ in performance: the organic/mechanical, theatrical/scientific 
and playful/experimental. The concept of ‘entanglement’ further develops my 
understanding of PaR methodology. 
 
In Chapter 1, Samuel Beckett’s later dramatic works are explored as ‘theatre machines’, 
with a particular focus on George Devine’s 1964 production of Play. Following an 
analysis of the Fail Better’s Discords (2010), Beckettian embodiment is articulated as 
‘organic machinery’. The chapter concludes with a discussion of Beckett’s ‘corporeal 
hereditaments’ and ‘plasticity’ in performance. Chapter 2 investigates Artaudian ‘theatre 
laboratories’, in particular Peter Brook’s 1964 Theatre of Cruelty experiments. This is 
compared with Fail Better’s interdisciplinary project Endlessness (2011). The final section 
develops an analysis of ‘scientific’ theatre and experimentation–as–performance, focusing 
particularly on forms of ‘reflexivity’. Chapter 3 examines participatory performance, 
specifically focusing on corporeal movement within installations such as Fail Better 
Fragments (2012). Joan Littlewood’s experimental performance practices are analyzed, 
specifically her Fun Palace project (c.1961–8), for the influence of Rudolf Laban upon her 
work. The potential for community engagement within these ‘experimental playgrounds’ 
will be explored in relation to ‘permeability’ in performance and Laban’s ‘effort attitude’ 
of flow. 
 
Finally, the thesis re-articulates the ‘three problems’ in terms of play and discipline, which 
are interrogated via the concepts of failure, ludus, and embodiment. I will demonstrate 
how a historiographical approach to PaR can re-invigorate methodology, before 
considering transdisciplinary performance in relation to ‘playfulness’ and 
Csikzsentmihalyi’s ‘flow’. The thesis concludes by briefly developing an understanding of 
performances as ‘epistemic things’, PaR as ‘unfinished thinking’, and experimental 







Figure 0.1: Play Without a Title (2008) 
[See FBF video (edit) at 00m 45s on CD-Rom] 
 
This is not the theatre. 
(Garcia Lorca, Play Without a Title, 2008 [1936]) 
 
Trying to learning to use words, and every attempt / Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure 
 (Eliot, East Coker, 1963 [1940]) 
 
We are ourselves that performance; we perform and are performed every moment. 
(Hassan, Prometheus as Performer, 1977) 
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I.  A Different Kind of Failure 
My research began with a ‘formless hunch’ (Brook, 1987: 3) rather than the framing 
of a question. In response to Baz Kershaw’s definition of PaR as ‘a method and 
methodology in search of results across disciplines: a collection of 
transdisciplinary research “tools”’ (2009: 5), I conducted practical experiments that crossed 
disciplinary boundaries (including the arts, humanities, sciences and philosophy). My 
argument therefore engages with experimental theatre practice in order to address 
performance per se, specifically in relation to transdisciplinarity. While theatre has been 
one of the greatest resources for multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary encounters 
between the arts and the sciences (Shepherd-Barr, 2006), it has also failed to be 
systematically transdisciplinary. As I will demonstrate below, British theatre in the late 
modernist period has tended towards a disciplinarity that foregrounds mechanical, 
scientific and experimental process, while performance practice facilitated an organic, 
theatrical and playful approach to epistemology. Instead, performance ‘irritates’ theatre 
(Read, 2013), contesting disciplinarity through radical failure (Kershaw, 1999; Bailes, 
2011) while paradoxically asserting ‘the challenge to perform—or else’ (McKenzie, 2001: 
139). I will discuss the re-valorization of failure within ludic practice alongside PaR on 
Beckett, Artaud and Laban, which will allow the thesis to move beyond a straightforward 
distinction between theatre and performance.  
For Alan Read: ‘The canonization of performance as all that is “good”… was 
undoubtedly a necessary step to unsettle all that was normative in the orthodoxies of a 
dominant culture’ (2013: xvi). I will argue that both performance and transdisciplinarity 
enable cultural and epistemological transgressions through their focus upon practitioner 
knowledge, problem solving and failure as a form of resistance. As Sara Jane Bailes notes 
in Performance Theatre and the Poetics of Failure (2011): ‘Failure challenges the cultural 
dominance of instrumental rationality and the fictions of continuity that bind the way we 
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imagine and manufacture the world’ (2).	  With Bailes, I will use Beckett’s ‘failure’ as an 
example of radical failure from a performance studies perspective, but I will extend this 
notion to include arguments concerning failure within the construction of scientific facts 
and the reflexivity of laboratory experiments. In doing so, I will draw more carefully 
upon earlier observations about Beckett’s practice that foregrounded the corporeality of 
his theatrical embodiments (Pountney, 1976; Chabert, 1982) as well as more recent 
scholarship in Beckett studies (Maude, 2009; McMullan, 2010).	  
Within this thesis, I will trace an experimental corporeality even further back to 
the performance cultures of late modernism (e.g. Artaud c.1932, Laban c.1947 or Blin 
c.1953) by taking a historiographical approach to the PaR methodology. I will discuss 
some 1960s experimental theatres as a ‘scientific’ turn in performance practice, 
paradoxically combining ludic processes with laboratory reflexivity. I am therefore re-
reading the ‘theatre laboratories’ of the 1960s as a locus of exchange between modernist 
cultures and the contemporary technological age. In doing so, I am re-orientating my 
own practice in relation to this legacy and contributing to a process of historicizing PaR 
(Riley and Hunter, 2009; Fleishman, 2012). This line of inquiry will be particularly 
concerned with what constitutes a ‘laboratory’ after Grotowski’s influence, which for 
Riley: ‘can be seen as an attempt to theorize (perhaps legitimize – perhaps protect) 
theatre arts from a modern scientific perspective’ (2009: 140).	  
Another line of inquiry will concern the paradoxical qualities of performance, 
which emerge within the thesis as ‘three problems’. Each problem exposes a 
transdisciplinary phenomenon: the organic/mechanical, the theatrical/scientific and 
the playful/experimental. These polarities will enable a sustained analysis of experimental 
embodiment as a catalyst for transdisciplinarity across the practical case studies. While I 
will be trying to pin down shifting definitions of multidisciplinary practice (in Chapter 1) 
and interdisciplinary collaboration (in Chapter 2), I will privilege the ‘trans-disciplinary’ in 
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(Chapter 3 and the Conclusion). I am therefore using transdisciplinarity as an evolving 
epistemological position which, for Robert Frodeman: ‘[is] actually a more crucial term 
than interdisciplinarity in understanding our current situation’ (2014: 7). For Julie 
Thompson Klein:	  
 	  
Transdisciplinarity was defined as a common system of axioms that transcends the narrow scope 
of disciplinary worldviews through an overarching synthesis, such as anthropology construed as 
the science of humans… Piaget treated it as a higher state in the epistemology of interdisciplinary 
relationships based on reciprocal assimilations (Thompson Klein in Frodeman et al., 2010: 24) 
	  
Thompson Klein goes on to introduce ‘four major trendlines’ that anatomize 
transdisciplinarity. Firstly: ‘the contemporary version of the historical quest for 
systematic integration of knowledge’ (24), from ancient Greek philosophy to ‘unification 
theories’ in Physics. Secondly, ‘Transdisciplinarity is not just “transcendent” but 
“transgressive”… more often as a label for knowledge formations imbued with a critical 
imperative, fostering new theoretical paradigms [e.g. cultural studies]’ (25). Thirdly: 
‘overarching synthetic paradigms… that transcend the narrow scope of disciplinary 
worldviews [e.g. sociobiology or phenomenology]’ and finally: ‘trans-sector problem 
solving [in, for example] contexts of environmental research’ (25).	  
I understand Thompson Klein’s ‘trendlines’ as four entangled pathways towards 
transdisciplinarity, and I will echo Frodeman in suggesting that this represents a more 
sustainable approach to ‘knowledge production’ within the modern university. With 
Katri Huutoniemi, I acknowledge the critique that: ‘a complementary trend is the 
“transdisciplinarization” of knowledge, the erosion of the distinction between academic 
and non-academic contexts of research’ (315). However, Huutoniemi advocates: ‘a form 
of integrated societal values that emphasizes comprehensive knowledge responsive to 
political and social needs’ (315) by foregrounding practice.  
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Within this context, my PaR specifically engages with the locality of the Warwick 
campus environment, via three strands of inquiry: a) experimental theatre, b) 
transdisciplinary performance and, more generally, c) ludic practice. Each of these areas 
will be addressed in detail within the thesis, especially the ways in which they concern 
human embodiment. Specifically, these areas operate upon an inter-relationship between 
the disciplinary and the ludic, which I will articulate in terms of ‘flow experience’ (cf. 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). Ultimately, I will be interested in how these modes of human 
embodiment produce ‘flow experiences’ that challenge logo-centric epistemologies.	  
My thesis will argue that PaR enacts ‘a productive not-yet-knowing’ (Borgdorff, 2012: 
194) which I will articulate via three modes of human embodiment: 
 
a) Experimental theatre of the 1960s, including the practices of George Devine, Peter Brook and 
Joan Littlewood (in particular, their productive failures relating to theatrical aesthetics); 
b) Transdisciplinary performance processes influenced by Samuel Beckett, Antonin Artaud and 
Rudolf Laban (examples will be drawn from both the 1960s and contemporary practice); 
c) Ludic practice as a research method in PaR experiments conducted by Fail Better Productions 
in the 2010s (three projects that re-iterate the historiographical problems identified above). 
 
On the wider subject of failure, I will mobilize two academic traditions which can be 
broadly distinguished as ‘the philosophical’ (on failure and epistemology) and ‘the 
performative’ (on failure and aesthetics). In the philosophical tradition, there has been an 
understanding of failure as central to knowledge acquisition since the Pre-Socratics, 
which re-emerged as the scientific method in the seventeenth century and was later 
remodeled by Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn in the twentieth century. Popper and 
Kuhn spawned a reflexive movement within the 1960s study of science that insisted on 
the value of failure within experimental epistemologies, which has in turn influenced the 
work of Bruno Latour and Hans-Jorg Rheinberger. This philosophical tradition has 
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tended to view failure as progressive, deploying ‘falsifiability’ within scientific discourse 
and regarding ‘trial and error’ as central its research processes.  
In a counter – though not unrelated – tradition, performance studies scholars have 
drawn upon the avant-garde practices of late modernism to establish an aesthetic interest 
in failure as a subject of study and a critical strategy that foregrounds counter-hegemonic 
cultural experience. In a 1990s movement known playfully as ‘failure studies’, scholars 
and practitioners (e.g. Tim Etchells, Matthew Goulish, Adrian Heathfield, Sara Jane 
Bailes) emphasized performance events that privileged – and possibly encouraged – 
failure as a phenomenon in its own right. My argument brings these two traditions 
together, via Beckett, whose failure was ‘ever failed’ and ‘better worse’, as he wrote in his 
prose poem Worstward Ho (1983). I will conclude with a reflection upon laboratory 
processes (whether artistic, scientific or both) by developing Borgdorff’s ‘not-yet-
knowing’ (2012: 194)1 towards a model of experimental theatre as transdisciplinary 
performance. 
Each chapter of this thesis will therefore identify an experimental problem that 
will be explored through laboratory practice. The ‘theatre laboratory’ emerges as a core 
process for this thesis, in which mechanical rehearsal (Play/Discords), experimental 
practice (Endlessness/Theatre of Cruelty) and participatory performance (Fun Palace/Fail 
Better Fragments) will collectively be explored as laboratories. As Mirella Schino informs us 
in Alchemists of the Stage: Theatre Laboratories in Europe (2009): 
 
Theatre laboratories were a significant innovation of twentieth-century European theatre. This 
innovation was however merely a new face of the much older and more remote zone of theatrical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Borgdorff explains how ‘things we want to know (epistemic things) [can] at other times be objects through 
which we know (technical objects). Rheinberger speaks in this context of a synchronic intertwinement of the 
epistemic and the technical, and of a diachronic intertwinement of difference and reproduction’ (2012: 
190). I will be interested in the intertwinement (or entanglement) of the epistemic and technical in 
performance practice, e.g. how documentation can be technical, at first, then epistemic, much later. 
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creation: the space that exists between art and life, between the craft and the person. Right from 
the start, theatre laboratories were something of a paradox. (7) 
	  
This paradox will be further elaborated via my three problems – the organic/mechanical, the 
theatrical/scientific and the playful/experimental – across the three chapters that I will now 
introduce, before a final section on methodology. 
 
II. From Play  to Discords  
Chapter 1 investigates two specific instances of Beckettian experimentation, Devine’s 
British premiere of Play in 1964 and Fail Better Productions’ Discords in 2010.  It will 
respond to W2’s question in Samuel Beckett’s Play, articulating the performing body in 
terms of a reflexive mechanism, and M’s body as ‘a something machine’ (Beckett, 1964: 
12). This metaphor will be recycled across the chapter, to illustrate ensembles in rehearsal 
as ‘theatre machines’ and PaR scholars as ‘research machines’. In doing so, the enduring 
ephemeral/material binary will be examined in relation to scholarly materials including 
Diana Taylor’s The Archive and the Repertoire (2003). This discursive process will take 
account of theatre history (specifically Devine’s early productions of Beckett’s plays) and 
new performance experiments (specifically my own Fail Better projects). The 
methodology for this approach adapts the ‘textual genetics’ represented by critical studies 
such as Stanley Gontarski’s The Intent of Undoing (1985) and Rosemary Pountney’s Theatre 
of Shadows (1988), into a new model for Beckett Studies as ‘performance genetics’.  
The genetic study of performance, as advocated by Josette Feral et al. (2008), 
focuses upon: ‘the phases of the staging’s constructive work; the research carried out by 
the actor on his or her text; and the hesitancies, erasures, choices and discoveries 
generated by a collective work are fundamental to comprehending the representation’ 
(223). To establish a theatrical context for this analysis, I will first consider the 
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biomechanical body in performance, before a consideration of Beckettian rehearsal 
within this lineage. I am especially aware that ‘rehearsal in Beckett suggests a paradox’ 
(McCarthy, 1996: 150), a paradox first articulated by Anna McMullan as a tension 
between ‘authority and failure’ (1994), and elaborated upon by Jane Goodall: ‘Beckett’s 
plays don’t require a dry academic correctness of their interpreters, but they do demand 
this level of discipline and intensity. The paradox must enter the actor’s bones’ (in 
Gontarski and Ullman, 2006: 195). Writing more recently, McMullan revisits the 
Beckettian body ‘not as a stable historical entity’ (2010: 5), but rather as an embodied 
psychoanalytical and phenomenological subject. Her argument builds upon Edmund 
Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and most notably Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
to develop a new understanding of embodiment, inter-corporeality and ‘ontological 
doubleness’ (13). For McMullan, the body in Beckett: ‘is presented as both sign and site, 
engine or matrix of production (of stories, semblances, voice, footfalls or hiccups) and 
fabric to be composed and recomposed with limited materials’ (2010: 125). Viewing the 
body as ‘itself a matrix of embodiments… a site of production’ (126) has enabled my 
thesis to treat human embodiment as an experimental process, rather than a stable entity. 
Writing on The Player’s Passion: Studies in the Science of Acting (1985), Joseph Roach 
first recalls how seventeenth and eighteenth century authors constructed a modernist 
frame through which to view the paradoxical nature of theatrical embodiment. If the 
reflex is ‘the essential mechanism of organic response’ (199), then the paradoxical 
substance of performance is the human body as ‘reflex machine’; something that Roach 
proposes in his survey of ‘the science of acting’. His text draws upon Denis Diderot, 
Charles Darwin, Constantin Stanislavski, and Vsevolod Meyerhold; the latter positioned 
‘the human organism as an automative mechanism’ (202) in his 1922 ‘Program of 
Biomechanics’. Roach particularly focuses on Diderot’s ‘blunt thesis’ Le paradoxe sur le 
comedian from 1773, and re-articulates these paradoxes of sensibility: ‘the art of acting in 
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light of his vitalistic materialism… [the synthesis of] the vitalistic and mechanistic 
explanations of the actor’s body’ (1993: 117). Comparably, my specific inquiry into 
Beckett’s practice, via the archive and through the body in rehearsal, will alight upon 
Brook’s ‘theatre machines’ and Foucault’s ‘disciplinary mechanisms’. Roach’s treatment 
of Diderot is especially useful here: ‘he alternatively sustained and provoked both parties 
by using metaphors derived equally from machinery and organisms’ (117).  
There will follow here a meditation upon both mechanisms and organisms in order 
to introduce both the corporeality of Beckett’s Play (in the 1964 rehearsal process) and 
the materiality of Discords (in the 2010 devising process). Both processes explored the 
body as a pre-determined and behavioural entity, which Roach would call ‘a biological 
machine’ (160). In this sense both Beckett and his theatrical collaborators, as well as our 
experimental ensemble, were responding to modernist paradigms of theatrical 
embodiment, such as this notable example from Roach: ‘in The Actor and the Ubermarionette 
of 1908, Edward Gordon Craig insisted that the normal human body had utterly failed as 
the instrument of theatrical art’ (160). Roach also positions this work in relation to the 
late writings of Charles Darwin on human emotion (177), and Craig’s admiration for the 
rigour of rehearsal at the Moscow Art Theatre (194). Rehearsal in this model emerges as 
a highly disciplinary practice, routinely making use of experts in specific aspects of 
production (voice, movement, direction), conditioning the performer to enact prescribed 
actions, sometimes with instruction from a variety of disciplinary specialists.  
For Roach, ‘modern biology’ for Stanislavski and Craig, as much as for Diderot 
and Darwin before them, promised to finally resolve ‘the mystery of the player’s passion’ 
(1993: 194). Here, it can be argued that, in a parallel tradition, Artaud, Blin and Brook – 
practitioners of both cruel and holy theatres – seek to distill rather than decode this 
mystery. Their machines, unlike Roach’s machinery, are bound up in the manufacture of 
mystery and play, in order to expose an intensity of passion, the energy of discipline, 
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rather than a disciplinary mechanism. I will argue that the network of practice identified 
by Roach (from Diderot to Meyerhold) continued to evolve throughout the late 
modernist and contemporary periods of theatre. I will position my own practice as a way 
of constructing the body through its practical applications, with special reference to 
Beckett whose: ‘mimes and… dramatic fragments constituted laboratories in which [he] 
tried out the possibilities of staging the body or a series of bodies’ (McMullan, 2010: 57). 
These ‘laboratories’ create a process of embodied damage and repair, especially 
through the mechanisms of experimental theatre practice. If the body for Diderot and 
Roach enacted a metaphor of both ‘machinery and organism’ then this argument must 
also consider the modernist legacies of early neurology, when Santiago Ramon y Cajal 
identified the nervous system as ‘organic machinery’ (1904) as well as the influence of 
contemporary neurologists such as Antonio Demasio and philosophers of neuroscience 
such as Catherine Malabou. It is from these perspectives that I will position Beckettian 
performance practices as multidisciplinary (where many disciplines inform cultural practices).  
As I stated earlier, a paradoxical feature of the theatre laboratory (a tension between 
the theatrical and the scientific) will be explored in Chapter 2; however, I have found a 
comparable tension in Beckett’s ‘theatre machines’. Within the theatre machine, the body 
is ‘a matrix of embodiments… a site of production’ (McMullan, 2010: 126) where 
‘paradox must enter the actor’s bones’ (Goodall, 2006: 195). In Laban’s ‘movement 
analysis’ there is a similar tension - between free and bound flow - which I will explore in 
relation to participatory theatre in my third chapter. Each of these approaches combines 
the mechanical with the organic in order to experiment with theatrical form. I examined this 
paradox in my practical research on Beckett’s dramaturgy then I applied this work to 
original devised performance. The highly disciplinary nature of Beckett in performance 
therefore informed multidisciplinary PaR on Beckett, which has especially focused upon 




III. From Theatre  o f  Cruel ty  to Endlessness  
Chapter 2 investigates Brook’s practice during the ToC experiments (also 1964), as an 
example of the interdisciplinary theatrical/scientific problem. I will re-consider this problem 
through my PaR project Endlessness (2011) and make special reference to the influence of 
Artaud upon experimental theatre about science. I will compare and contrast two ‘theatre 
laboratories’: an archival process, using production materials held at the Shakespeare 
Birthplace Trust (SBT), and published texts by Marowitz and Brook; and a practical 
process, using experimental methods, digital documentation and audience feedback. The 
chapter will describe both laboratory processes in detail, so as to articulate 
interdisciplinary issues concerning the exploration of ‘scientific’ ideas in performance. 
Brook’s own ‘scientific research’ re-interpreted Artaud’s ‘Theatre of Cruelty’ (1932) as 
strictness, self-discipline and elimination. 
Brook made several attempts to highlight the importance of total subsidy for 
experiments of this nature (see Williams, 1988; Brook, 1998; Kustow, 2005). In the ToC 
programme note, the company positions its work as follows: ‘As with a scientific 
research project, an experiment like the ToC needs total subsidy; that is enough money to 
cover costs even if no tickets were sold. Only in this way can it work in relaxation and 
freedom’ (SMT/PROG/1964/40). There is a comparison to be drawn here between the 
subsidy of Brook’s experiments, and my own PaR within the academy. As I have made 
clear earlier, most of the practice discussed in this thesis was funded for the purposes of 
research and/or education (at the University of Warwick). The final section of this 
Introduction will address the problems of translating artistic practice into university-
based research, especially in relation to the complexity that this introduces to both 
practice and research. I will argue that this work has a radical potential to produce 
unexpected outcomes and, sometimes, transdisciplinary innovation. 
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I will be particularly interested in the ‘scientific’ orientation of Brook’s 
performances within an experimental context. In an essay in their programme, Brook 
and Marowitz write: ‘ToC is a collage, a form of surrealist revue composed of shots in the 
dark, shots at distant targets… Our hope is that this season will provide the conditions 
for experiment and trial-or-error [sic].’ (SMT/PROG/1964/40). ‘Contributors to 
experimental group presentations’ included Paul Ableman, John Arden, Antonin Artaud, 
Ray Bradbury, Peter Brook, Cyril Connolly, Jean Genet, Alfred Jarry, Charles Marowtiz, 
Alain Robbe-Grillet, William Shakespeare and, satirically, the Lord Chamberlain. 
However, the influence of Artaud on the event was deeply significant. Brook and 
Marowitz suggest ‘Artaud’s longing for a rediscovery of the terror and awesomeness of 
the original semi-religious theatre [was] a desperate attempt to find a way in which 
theatre could once more become necessary, an urgent presence in our lives’ (40). They 
propose to restore this necessity through experimentation, drawing upon the 
‘Elizabethan Example’:  
 
From one point of view, Artaud’s ‘cruelty’ can be seen as an attempt to recover the 
Shakespearean variety of expression by other means, and this Royal Shakespeare experiment, 
using Artaud’s work as a springboard rather than a model for slavish reconstruction, can also be 
viewed as a search for a theatre-language as agile and penetrating as the Elizabethans created. 
(SMT/PROG/1964/40) 
 
Indeed, the oxymoronic notion of a ‘Royal Shakespearean experiment’ began with ‘two 
landmarks: Jarry and Artaud… [and] the current of Cruelty is pursued into our own day 
either with the help of specially written texts, or by the presentation of rehearsal and 
exercise items’ (40). Brook positions Artaud as a visionary throughout his writing and his 
biographer Michael Kustow (also Literary Advisor on the ToC experiments), explains this 




The young Brook would have heard about Artaud in his trips to Paris in the 1950s, when in 
avant-garde circles Artaud had cast himself as a revolutionary martyr in the cause of modern art – 
Artaud Agonistes, surfacing from months of electro-shock therapy to write his late, hectoring 
texts and to have his final radio play, An End to the Judgment of God, banned by French state radio. 
(2005: 138) 
 
As I will show in Chapter 2, Kimberley Jannarone (2010) and others have disputed 
Brook’s faithfulness to Artaud. As Read notes: ‘Artaud and Grotowski cannot be blamed 
for the use of their work since the time they wrote it’ (2008: 58-9). He continues: ‘Instead 
of a “Theatre of Cruelty”, a question of cruelty, its distribution and arrangements might 
be posed; instead of aesthetically mimicking Towards a Poor Theatre, a question of poverty, 
its means and effects might be at issue’ (67). Borrowing this approach, I draw a 
distinction between Artaud’s theatre and Artaudian theatre, as I did earlier between 
Beckett’s theatre and Beckettian theatre. This allows me to consider how Artaud and 
Beckett’s projects are re-performed in the work of other practitioners, and how that may 
impact upon subsequent performance research. In order to identify these differences, I 
explore the specific material circumstances of theatre practice. For example, take 
Kustow’s account of the ToC experiments: 
 
They had twelve weeks in all for training and for a five-week showing of work in progress at 
LAMDA theatre in Kensington. They explored sounds, banging and scraping objects, seeing how 
much variety they could make; they worked with rhythms, both the rhythms of their percussive 
objects, and then their voices and bodies; they began to use a sound and a movement to respond 
to a new situation. Soon they ran into the limitations of purely formal experiments. “Very quickly, 
frighteningly quickly, actors became as glib with non-naturalistic sounds and movements as they 




This description identifies a problem that I explore in the second chapter. The difficult 
relationship between the scientific and theatrical will emerge as a paradox that characterizes 
theatre laboratories in particular. This ‘scientific’ turn in theatre practice can be traced 
back to the 1920s studios of Russian modernism, but its apotheosis was in the 
experimental theatre practices of mid- to late twentieth-century Europe.2 However, 
Brook’s laboratory was clearly a place where ‘purely formal experiments’ failed to convey 
the theatricality of Artaud that fascinated him. Brook had to find alternative ways of 
sharing the experiments with an audience. As Kustow also tells us: ‘Sometimes Brook 
and Marowitz went on stage to discuss why they were doing the whole thing, or Brook 
rehearsed a Shakespeare scene – one night a scene from Richard III’ (141). The founding 
principles of laboratory science (of making ‘things’ speak) may be betrayed if the 
experimenter feels the need to explain himself. As I will show with my own Endlessness 
experiments, the urge to explain the conditions of the laboratory can overwhelm the 
process of rigorous testing. 
The PaR experimentation discussed in this chapter contrasts Brook’s notion of 
‘elimination’ (2013) alongside Artaudian ‘cruelty’ in order to address the possibility of 
conducting ‘scientific research’ in performance. I will compare both the archival and the 
practical processes in order to explore the notion that a PaR methodology is ‘quasi-
scientific’ (in the sense that it mobilizes a discourse without its methods). I will also 
consider the ways in which the PaR makes use of scientific terminology and technical 
vocabulary in a performative, rather than epistemic, mode. I will also address the 
criticism that PaR privileges techne by considering the hybridity of its praxis and its 
paradoxical relationship with the scientific method (cf. Nelson, 2013). Within the context 
of twenty-first century ‘science theatre’, Chapter 2 will also develop ideas from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2See for example ‘The Laboratory Theatre Network’ of the Centre for Performance Research 
(Aberystwyth), which has recently convened a group that includes the Grotowski Institute, Odin 
Teatret/Nordisk Teaterlaboratorium, and the Hemispheric Institute (SCUDD, 2015).	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performance scholars including Sue-Ellen Case (2006) and Helen Nicholson (2011) to 
construct a more nuanced understanding of ‘scientific’ performance. This analysis will 
also draw upon ideas of ‘science on stage’ (Shepherd-Barr, 2006) and earlier accounts of 
the arts and sciences as ‘two cultures’ (C.P. Snow, 1959). These issues will be explored 
through my PaR project Endlessness (2011), especially its attempt to use scientific source 
material as stimulus for contemporary devised theatre.  
In their discussion about theatre laboratories, on the occasion of the fortieth 
anniversary for Odin Teatret, Schino et al. posed the question: ‘Why a theatre 
laboratory?’3 They have various answers: ‘Of course a laboratory theatre is different from 
a simple experimental theatre’ (2009: 28); ‘the laboratory, we said, is a parallel dimension of 
the theatre’ (29); ‘a theatre laboratory is a protected milieu where time is plentiful’ (29); ‘a 
laboratory is a place of pure research’ (30); ‘thus a laboratory is a theatre that says no to 
performance’ (30). However, Brook and Marowitz characterized their laboratory very 
differently indeed: 
  
Why are we showing this experiment to an audience? Because no theatre experience is complete 
without that third element, because we need their reactions, we want to see how far we stir their 
ideas. We need them to test their reactions just as much as we test our actions. 
(SMT/PROG/1964/40) 
 
The ToC laboratory was incomplete without an audience, and this element informed my 
own Endlessness project, although inviting observers into an experiment introduced yet 
more complexity into the process. As we shall see, the observation of phenomena affects 
the very same phenomena. For Henk Borgdorff: ‘an artistic “fact”, like a scientific, social, 
or historical fact, is what we make real with our epistemological undertakings’ (2012: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A conference on the same theme was sub-titled ‘Risks and Innovations in Europe 1898–1999’ and took 
place in Aarhus, 4–6 October 2004. 
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195). As he reminds us that: ‘Artistic and scientific research is about something real, 
while simultaneously transforming it into what it could be’ (196). In doing so, he reveals 
the interdisciplinary – arguably transdisciplinary – problem of practical experimentation, 
which is shared between the arts and sciences. His writing on the provisionality of 
experimental knowledge is drawn upon the work of others, from Bruno Latour to Hans-
Jorg Rheinberger. I will consider various ‘science studies’ perspectives in Chapter 2, but I 
would like to return to PaR here. For Borgdorff: ‘The condition of art as research is a 
condition of contingency. The openness of art is what invites us, again and again, to see 
things differently’ (196). He also positions artistic practice as ‘unfinished thinking’ (194), 
which is something that I will return to later. Endlessness will emerge as the strongest 
example of this ‘unfinished thinking’, where the theatrical and the scientific coalesce in 
‘work-in-progress’ performance. This will allow me to position my PaR experiments as 
critically interdisciplinary, especially when they exemplify the reflexivity of performance. 
 
IV. From Fun Palace  to Fail  Bet ter  Fragments  
Chapter 3 explores Joan Littlewood’s Fun Place project (c.1961–1968), positioning her 
‘laboratory of fun’ within an evolution of Rudolf Laban’s work on human movement. 
The transdisciplinary dimension emerges from this account of participatory performance 
and its influence upon my PaR project Fail Better Fragments (2012). By accentuating the 
influence of Laban on Littlewood, specifically his ‘effort’ attitudes, this chapter also 
considers human movement as transdisciplinary inquiry in its own right. Drawing upon 
‘ludic’ theories of learning (Huizinga, 1949; Sutton-Smith 2001; Bateson and Martin, 
2013), it analyses participatory performance as ‘knowledge gathering’. It deals with the 
evolution of Laban’s work on Effort (with FC Lawrence, 1947) in Littlewood’s practice, 
and in the subsequent work of Lisa Ullmann and Jean Newlove. From this analysis, 
specific questions emerge for research methods in performance concerning the shifting 
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definitions of ‘the archive and the repertoire’ (see Taylor, 2003), as well as Littlewood’s 
appropriation of university, laboratory and play spaces for the future of performance. 
It is important to my argument that the Fun Palace project is understood in 
relation to Littlewood’s later practice regarding playgrounds. This builds upon the 
research of Nadine Holdsworth, who begins her final chapter of Joan Littlewood’s Theatre 
(2011) with an anonymous Stratford Express article from 1967, quoting Littlewood: ‘I’ve 
finished with putting on plays. I don’t like the theatre… at the moment I’m more 
interested in my children’s playground’ (234). Having established that: ‘throughout the 
1960s, Littlewood battled to raise awareness of, interest in and financial support for the 
Fun Palace Project that Price estimated would cost two and a half to three million 
pounds’ (226), Holdsworth concludes that ‘her willingness to contemplate “spatial play” 
and her ethical concern with how cultural and educational processes might be activated 
within the community’ (233) still inform cultural practices in the twenty-first century.  I 
will also draw upon the work of Robert Leach, who describes this period as follows: 
 
Littlewood herself had become increasingly excited by the possibility of creating what she called a 
‘Fun Palace’, a kind of twentieth-century equivalent to the eighteenth-century pleasure gardens, 
but contained within an extraordinary changeable and changing building designed by the visionary 
architect, Cedric Price. (Leach, 2006: 201) 
 
As Mary Louise Lobsinger informs us: [when Littlewood met Price] ‘he was teaching at 
the Architectural Association, socializing within a circle of young aspiring architects with 
a penchant for technology, and was acquainted with the architectural critic Reymer 
Banham’ (2000: 119).4 Lobsinger variously describes the Fun Palace concept as ‘a machine 
capable of adapting to the needs of users… the quintessential anti-architectural project’ 
(120) and ‘a barrier-free venue for experimental theater’ (122). My focus in Chapter 3 will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Reymer Banham (1922–88) was influenced by the Futurists and associated with New Brutalism. 
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be on the Fun Palace as ‘a “university of the streets” with a strong community link’ 
(Leach, 2006: 201) as I will argue that the emphasis on learning through play is a Laban-
like aspect of Littlewood’s practice. While ‘the very word “fun”, deliberately used to be 
provocative by Littlewood, may have doomed the project’ (201), Laban’s generic focus 
on human movement as an inclusive practice, and his specific focus on human effort as 
an interpretative tool, allows ‘fun’ to be educative. His focus on playful movement as a 
human intelligence, positions the ludic impulse as pedagogically, and even 
philosophically, significant (see A Vision of Dynamic Space, Ullmann, 1984). 
As Dick McCaw notes: ‘Laban was not interested in the externally observed 
movement but rather the meaning – ethical, aesthetic, pedagogical – of that moment in 
relation to the person who is moving’ (2011: 333).5 While Laban’s influences on 
Littlewood’s theatre practice was well documented by Leach and others, less impact is 
noted regarding her ludic projects, other than in Holdsworth’s account. However, a 
strong connection between play and meaning can also be found by focusing on the 
flowing movement enabled by effort work. For Laban: ‘the flow of effort from the 
weightless, timeless, spaceless centre to the matter shaped and moved around is the 
binding link which carries life’ (Ullmann, 1984: 24). I return to flow later in the thesis. 
I will also make critical use the autobiographical Joan’s Book (1994), where Laban 
is the practitioner Littlewood turns to most readily; Stanislavski and Brecht are hardly 
mentioned at all. Across its copious pages, she demonstrates the indispensability of 
Laban and his teachings, although the chronology is sometimes confusing. Nonetheless, 
Laban clearly informs her practice from her brief spell at RADA to her final work on 
playgrounds. She seems impressed by Laban’s early years as ‘a crystallographer and a 
Dadaist’ (69) and concerned about his flight from Nazi-Germany, ‘what had happened to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Laban’s ‘ethical, aesthetic, pedagogic’ understanding of movement has a parallel with Cedric Price’s 
understanding of architecture as a social and ethical practice (see Holdsworth, 2011). 
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Rudolf Laban?’ (120). Following their first meetings after the war in Manchester and 
Blackburn – ‘the industrial north appealed to Laban’ (181) – she recalls the introduction 
of ‘Laban’s dancing star, Jean Newlove’ (215) to Littlewood’s company, who soon 
became ‘our new dancing mistress’ (219). The book also contains Gerry Raffles’ proposal 
for a new theatre school in Liverpool (‘Joan would head the project, assisted by Laban’, 
307) and Harry Corbett’s comment that Theatre Workshop was ‘the only company that 
trains’, leading to him being sent ‘on a Laban crash course’ (454) with Ullmann. In these 
memories of Theatre Workshop, Laban’s ‘mastery of movement’ is clearly one guiding 
principle (see Ullmann, 1984: 6). Howard Gooney, writing about the period 1948–50, 
states that: ‘many hard and useful movement classes were held in the Arts of Movement 
Studio in Oxford Road [Manchester] – the Laban Studios, run by Lisa Ullmann and 
Sylvia Bodmer, some of the classes being taken by Rudolf Laban himself’ (1981: 66). 
From these reflections, it can be safely assumed that Laban and his associates profoundly 
influenced the movement practice of Theatre Workshop and Littlewood’s subsequent 
projects.  
In Laban they had a found a researching practitioner who understood that:  
‘Man’s body-engine is constructed in a manner that in principle all imaginable effort-
combinations can be performed with relative ease and balance’ (Laban in McCaw, 2011: 
224). This compression of playful/experimental effort as one, allows practices discussed in 
Chapter 3 to inform my Conclusion, so as to elucidate theories of play and their 
relationship to ‘flow experience’ (Czikszentmihalyi, 1975). Within Chapter 3, I will 
discuss the oscillation both free-flow and bound-flow in relation to human movement. 
Therefore, I will explore the potential empowerment through corporeal movement in 
projects such as Fun Palace, Learn-to-Play and Everyone’s an Actor, Shakespeare Said (all 
relating to Littlewood c.1961–68). In these processes of empowerment, the participant is 
enabled to be simultaneously playful and experimental.  
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I will explore playful experimentation and experimental play through my PaR project 
Fail Better Fragments (2012) when we explored free-flow and bound-flow in performance. 
Like the 1960s Fun Palace (designed by Cedric Price), our structure (designed by Nomi 
Everall) created a performance installation for participation. Both Laban’s ‘flow’, 
Littlewood’s ‘fun’ and Fail Better’s ‘fragments’ combined to enable transdisciplinary 
research, especially when the permeability of performance extended playfulness. In Chapter 3, 
I will introduce a comparison between the experience of flow in playful behavior and the 
use of free/bound ‘flow’ in movement analysis.  
 
V. PaR, Methodology and Entanglement 
I will use this final section to articulate the reflexivity of PaR by developing my key 
terms and concepts in preparation for the chapters themselves. I will briefly explore how 
recent scholarly models have failed to move beyond the notion of ‘crossroads’ in theatre 
and performance studies (e.g. Pavis, 1992; Conquergood, 2002; Fischer-Lichte, 2003) and 
trouble binary separations between theoretical/practical, historical/contemporary, and 
artistic/scientific. By moving towards an understanding of PaR as transdisciplinary, I will 
argue that established metaphors confuse research methods in both problematic (e.g. 
‘crossroads’) and transformative (e.g. ‘entanglement’) ways. I will challenge metaphors 
that globalise theatre and performance studies, and instead develop a specific and 
localised imagery that articulates PaR through its specificity. This argument will 
emphasize the special reflexivity of PaR, which enhances the plasticity of creative processes 
(see Chapter 1) and the permeability of participatory praxis (see Chapter 3).  It therefore 
resists the temptation to objectify this research as ‘knowledge production’, instead 
arguing for an entangled approach to methodology that aims to take full account of its 
own complexity. Hence I hope to show that the plasticity/reflexivity/permeability of 
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performance (three concepts further developed in the chapters) can emerge from practical 
research methods through the analysis of their documentation as a discursive inquiry. 
Theatre studies has deployed the ‘crossroads’ metaphor for some time now (it 
has been waiting at this intersection for at least twenty years). If a metaphor is: ‘the 
application of a name or descriptive term or phrase to an object or action to which it is 
imaginatively but not literally applicable’ (OED, 1998: 856), then this example promotes 
inaction and indecision. When Dwight Conquergood urged us to refuse: ‘the deeply 
entrenched division of labor, apartheid of knowledges, that plays out inside the academy 
as the difference between thinking and doing, interpreting and making, conceptualising 
and creating’, he insisted that ‘our radical move is to turn, and return, insistently, to the 
crossroads’ (2002: 154). At the turn of the millennium, it seemed that PaR already had a 
response to this disciplinary problem:  
 
Conquergood’s full-frontal assault on the modernist traditions of knowledge-making may be an 
overstatement, but it does suggest something of what could be at stake through practice as 
research, and not just in performance studies. In all the disciplines represented here, we may be at 
a watershed, the negotiation of which might well determine their place and purposes in university 
for decades to come. (Kershaw and Piccini, 2004: 87) 
 
I suggest that PaR has responded to this problem over the last decade in two ways.  
 Firstly, the expectation that PaR would trouble ‘knowledge production’ has been 
exemplified by its impact upon new doctoral programmes, modes of scholarly 
publication and forms of university assessment. The reflexivity of PaR process has also 
complicated the temporal and spatial conventions normally placed upon doctoral 
candidates (the student may complete their thesis according to a different timescale and 
the outcomes may involve controversial formats). As predicted by Kershaw and Piccini, 
PaR is still radical in 2014: ‘These outcomes are characterized by significant levels of 
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reflexivity with regard to the epistemological, ontological and procedural dimensions of 
PaR, consequent upon its potentially radical approach to questions of knowledge 
production in the universities’ (2004: 87). Writing in connection with the PARIP project 
(2000-2006), they looked forward in the new century to when practice-based research 
may have equal status with theoretical-analytical models. They state: ‘PaR knowledges 
may – like all good research – be best conceived as context-specific and relational, in the 
sense of being created at the intersections of existing forms, through response to previous 
iterations within specific (and identifiable) webs of citation’ (89, emphasis added). PaR 
practitioner-scholars often emphasized the intersectional nature of their work, recalling 
Conquergood (2002) and deploying the metaphor of the ‘crossroads’ repeatedly (Pavis, 
1992; Conquergood, 2002; Fischer-Lichte, 2003; Brady and Walsh, 2009; Freeman, 2010; 
and ‘Practice and research at the crossroads’ at ResCen, Middlesex University, 2014). For 
example, Fintan Walsh and Sara Brady have argued for ‘the phenomenological value of 
being between states that is of special interest to performance studies’ (2009: 2) in 
relation to its ‘crossroads’ within Irish culture. This disciplinary obsession with the 
crossroads has emerged as one of its greatest clichés, which sometimes prevents scholars 
from engaging with specific flows and particular material conditions. I suggest that the 
‘intersection’ itself is a fairly unremarkable aspect of PaR and performance research. 
 Secondly, PaR has opened up more unpredictable outcomes since Kershaw and 
Piccini first acknowledged: ‘the contested role of documentation [for PaR] in the demand 
for an archive-friendly artefact from the funders of creative practices, rooted in the 
politics of accountability and transparency’ (2004: 89). PaR communities have focused 
their methodological discussions on the details of documentation (e.g. IFTR PaR 
Working Group, discussed below). This has proven, perhaps, to be the only shared 
concern of a very diverse community of researchers working across multiple media and 
in many parts of the globe. The hybridity of this methodology has been its greatest 
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problem since the late twentieth century. David Whitton, for example, has complained 
that PaR is solipsistic: ‘rather than constituting an identifiable methodology, PaR actually 
denotes an expansion in multiple directions simultaneously, in other words an expansion 
of the range of possibilities open to researchers’ (2009: 86). Whitton misses the point, I 
think, that this ‘expansion’ actually mimics the hybridity of theatre and performance 
studies since they began. In line with shifts toward interdisciplinary sciences and 
transdisciplinary practices, PaR represents a break from the false choice between 
theoretical and archival methods. It resists binary formulations (practice vs. research) and 
two-way traffic (‘at the crossroads’). Instead, it embraces a new conception of 
epistemology, which I will define as entanglement. 
 Entanglement can be interpreted as both metaphor and method in that it represents 
the knotted complexity of the routes (and ‘roots’) towards knowledge, while also being 
available as a research strategy. To entangle is to twist together, to complicate or simply to 
become tangled. A tangle, from the Middle English or Scandinavian, is ‘a confused mass 
of intertwined threads’ or ‘a confused and complicated state’ (OED, 1998: 1423). 
However, I offer the method-metaphor of entanglement in the specific and local example 
of my own PaR, rather than as a global metaphor for methodology itself. I am aware that 
I entangled my original practice, by documenting, discussing and disseminating it as research. 
That process created a ‘confused mass of intertwined threads’ that eventually led to a 
thesis about creative practice in performance. These knots have taken three years to tie 
and three more years to loosen. The ‘roots’ of practice and the ‘branches’ of research 
have therefore grown as one, through an entangled rhizomatic system. 
Of course, entanglement has a scholarly tradition of its own, and here I emphasize 
Gregory Bateson’s understanding of ‘the mind as an ecological “tangle”’ (1972). As 
Florence Chiew writes: ‘the word “tangle” is taken from the works of mathematicians 
Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, as well as semanticist Alfred Korzybski. 
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In particular, Russell’s theory of logical types, or the paradox of self-reference, caught 
Bateson’s attention’ (2012: 47). There is not space here to explore ‘entanglement’ across 
the disciplines but, importantly, it may constitute an emerging transdisciplinary field.6 For 
example, Karen Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
Matter and Meaning (2007) explains that: ‘To be entangled is not simply to be interwined 
with another, as in the joining of separate entities, but to lack an independent, self-
contained existence’ (iv). This thinking recalls Bateson’s work on mind and nature: 
 
Epistemology is always and inevitably personal. The point of the probe is always in the heart of 
the explorer: What is my answer to the question of the nature of knowing? I surrender to the 
belief that my knowing is a small part of a wider integrated knowing that knits the entire 
biosphere or creation. (2002: 82) 
 
Chiew notes that this is ‘an expanded notion of temporality and spatial awareness’ in 
which the individual: ‘is not simply bounded and located as a separate being from other 
beings. She is a general system of entangled relationality’ (2012: 48). For the PaR scholar, 
practice becomes a series of interrelated tangles, experienced as a network or web.    
   I will extend this model of the PaR methodology by briefly considering the IFTR 
Performance-as-Research working group, which has nurtured aspects of this thesis at 
five separate meetings (2009–14). Mark Fleishman, a former convenor of this group, 
emphasizes the ‘difference of PaR’ as: ‘a series of embodied repetitions in time, on both 
micro (bodies, movements, sounds, improvisations, moments) and macro (events, 
productions, projects, installations) levels’ (2012: 30). Fleishman’s two scales highlight 
the importance of using media and materials that can document micro- and macro-PaR. 
While this approach recalls the ‘multiple directions’ of PaR that alarmed Whitton, it also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Recent examples include Chris Salter’s Entangled: Technology and the Transformation of Performance (2010) and 
Ian Hodder’s Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships between Humans and Things (2012). 
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supports Kershaw and Piccini’s earlier emphasis on documentation. If we disentangle 
practical experiments, then digital (or analogue) documentation is crucial to achieving a 
method for explicating research. The IFTR working group devised a ‘participatory 
laboratory’7 as a form that could contain the complexity of diverse PaR presentations. 
This initiative drew upon the experimental histories and theatre laboratories discussed in 
this thesis, as a basis for re-iteration of the participants’ research through reflexive 
practice. The approach can involve workshops, installations, performances and 
interventions, with each being carefully framed analytically and documented by the 
group. The point of this participatory laboratory is not only to disseminate research, but 
also to entangle one’s work with that of others. In this (sometimes difficult) process, ideas 
are challenged and practice is critiqued, while new nodes in one’s epistemological 
network may be fused. To extend my method-metaphor, the knot is untied but then 
knotted again. On its own history, the group has reported that: ‘Jacqueline Martin (2002) 
and Baz Kershaw (2005) identified the need for a working group dealing with PaR given 
the increasing interest within the discipline in combining practice and research inquiry.’ 
(Barton et al., 2013: 1). Meeting for the first time in Helsinki (2006), this group has since 
evolved an intercultural model of scholarship that evokes collaborative performances:8 
 
So while other projects and processes like PARIP and the Artistic Research debate in Europe (led 
by Henk Borgdorff and others) have provided in-depth thinking on the subject, the discussion at 
the various meetings of this working group have occurred amongst a much wider range of 
international participants from a diversity of contexts, and in this sense the ramifications and 
resonances have extended well beyond Europe. The inclusion of African, Asian, Australasian and 
Latin American voices articulating different experiences in the discussions have challenged and 
enriched the mainstream Euro-American discourse on PaR. (2013: 1) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Devised by Baz Kershaw (with Anna Birch and Mark Fleishman) in 2009. 
8 ‘For the purposes of the Group, “performance” is understood to include a range of media, from theatre 
through dance to film/video/television, and interlocking research interests, from aesthetic through 




This description provides clear sources for entangled practices and the ‘laboratory’ 
functions as a venue for dis-entanglement and re-entanglement. As I have discussed elsewhere 
(e.g. Heron, 2015), PaR can be understood as a process of ‘dislocation’ (Kershaw, 2011) 
and ‘ontogenesis’ (Fleishman, 2012), but each of these method-metaphors generates new 
complexity in the realm of practice. As noted above, it is largely through the 
documentation of practice and its discursive analysis as research wherein original 
knowledge can emerge. For example, in Chapter 1, I initiate a theatre laboratory on 
Beckett’s drama (informed by archival materials); I then re-iterate this practice in the 
creation of new Beckettian performance, before using digital documentation of this 
practice as part of a scholarly writing process. I aim to demonstrate this procedure in 
each chapter, over three iterations of research through practice, and to conclude with a 
revised understanding of experimental theatre as transdisciplinary performance. I am 
particularly interested in how such experimental procedures can be shared with a wider 
public and with disciplines beyond the theatre. I conclude this Introduction with a brief 
reflection upon that cycle, by returning to Borgdorff’s The Conflict of the Faculties (2012). 
 So, I will argue that the PaR practitioner-scholar is always already entangled. Thus 
Borgdorff, discussing the indeterminacy of experimental processes – where we don’t yet 
know what we don’t yet know – draws upon the writings of Hans-Jorg Rheinberger 
(2006) to consider ‘artworks as epistemic things’ (193).  
 
To paraphrase Rheinberger, as long as artworks and their concepts remain vague, they generate a 
productive tension: in reaching out for the unknown, they become tools of research. In the 
context of artistic research, artworks are the generators of that which we do not yet know. They 
thereby invite us to think. Artistic research is the articulation of this unfinished thinking. 




I return to this statement repeatedly throughout the thesis, and ultimately reflect upon an 
ontology that Borgdorff calls ‘a productive not-yet-knowing’ (194); but I would emphasize 
here the significance of this ‘unfinished thinking’ to my own methods. I drew upon both 
PaR networks and ‘artistic research’ publications to inform specific methods of my own, 
using documentation to access the ‘unfinished thinking’ of performance practice. 
Alongside this process I have searched for the ‘unfinished thinking’ in theatre history 
through its material archive and critical traditions. Borgdorff’s notion of ‘art as research – 
creates room for what is unthought and unexpected’ (196) and my own PaR have 
functioned in the same way. Therefore, I no longer locate its methodology at a 
crossroads; rather it inhabits a dense tissue of entanglements between performance 
cultures and research methods. Regarding my own thought processes, which have been 
more ecological than technological, and therefore broadly ‘posthumanist’ (cf. Hassan, 
1977), I consider entanglement a useful metaphor for the reader of this thesis. The ensuing 
‘tangle’ of practice and research – as well as historiography and theatre making – is both 
deliberately designed and circumstantial, yet my aim throughout is to disentangle 







If you could see your way to re-humanising the text a little… 
(Tynan, 1964: 293) 
 
I. Organic  machines : on ‘re-humanising’ Beckett 
This chapter will address occasions when theatrical rehearsal breaks down, allowing 
the organic/mechanical problem to emerge through experimental performance. I will 
explore particular moments of breakdown in relation to Samuel Beckett’s drama. 
Beckett’s theatre will be considered as a mechanical practice, something that Tynan wanted 
‘re-humanising’ (1994: 293). In his riposte to Tynan, Devine described rehearsal as ‘an 
organic process’ (1964). As explained in my Introduction, the organic/mechanical problem 
has it origins within the modernist period, especially through biomechanics and 
neurology. In the four sections (I-IV) of this chapter, I first extend this analysis to 1960s 
British theatre practice then give a detailed example using Play (1964), followed by PaR 
materials relating to Discords (2010). The Section IV focuses on multidisciplinary 
perspectives for investigation on the organic/mechanical problem. Ultimately, I will discuss 
Beckett’s plays in performance as producing an experimental mode of human 
embodiment, specifically as ‘theatre machines’ (Brook, 1990: 65).  
As I have established in the Introduction, Brook does not direct Beckett’s drama 
until the 1990s, after which he writes in Threads of Time (1998) that ‘the search for a 
charge[d] simplicity and economy… [is] a “distillation” (1998: 224)’. I will argue later that 
‘the Beckettian’ in performance practice is a paradoxical synthesis of the mechanical 
(machine-like instrumentation) and the organic (corporeal embodiment) which is best 
understood in terms of distillation, e.g. paring down, emptying out, taking away, stripping 
bare, reducing down, not-acting. These methods were developed by Devine and Beckett 
during their 1964 rehearsal process and directly influenced my PaR process for Discords. 
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As I will show below, the London reviewers of Play and critical writing of the period 
frequently describe Beckettian production as a theatre of machines. In describing 
Beckett’s plays as ‘theatre machines’, Brook positions them alongside the theatres of 
Artaud and Grotowski, as examples of Holy Theatre: ‘pure inventions, fresh images 
sharply defined – and they stand on the stage as objects’ (Brook 1990: 65). Brook insists 
that these ‘objects’ refuse to mean something but only coming into being during 
performance, where they remain ‘critic proof’ (65). In positioning Beckett’s work in this 
way, Brook was partially recalling his own theatre-going in the late 1940s: ‘a theatre of 
colour and movement, of fine fabrics, of shadows, of eccentric, cascading words, of leaps 
of thought and of cunning machines, of lightness and of all forms of mystery and 
surprise’ (48). While Brook has a tendency to over-simplify Beckett’s writing in this essay, 
he more accurately positions it in a European tradition of performance traceable to the 
Parisian symbolists and, inspired by Jan Kott’s Shakespeare Our Contemporary (1965), to the 
early modern period. However, it is important to emphasize that Brook is interpreting 
the theatre of the 1960s as part of a wider network of contemporary performance, 
uncomplicated by political or temporal distinctions and taking place in new experimental 
forms, from Beckettian ‘machines’ to Artaudian ‘happenings’.  
Brook is particularly interested in Happy Days (1962), the first Beckett play he 
directed (in 1995), and this informs most of his writing on Beckett. In The Empty Space 
(1990 [1968]) he discusses Happy Days as an example of the ‘poetry, nobility, beauty and 
magic’ (66) that Beckett is bringing back to the theatre. Brook then describes how the 
play in performance works upon the audience in the same ways as it treats its 
protagonist. Brook sees a direct connection between Winnie buried in the sand and an 
audience member who ‘invents and prints every form of imaginary complaint as a 
mechanism to ward off the uncomfortable truth’ (66). Elsewhere, Brook writes of Happy 
Days as an exemplification of ‘Beckett at his finest [where he] seems to have the power of 
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casting a stage picture, a stage relationship, a stage machine from his most intense 
experience that in a flash, inspires, exists, stands there complete in itself, not telling, not 
dictating, symbolic without symbolism’ (Brook 1987: 31). Brook admires the 
objectification of subjectivity in Beckett’s drama and the creation of the ‘stage object’ as a 
total mechanization of the theatrical event. What seems absent from Brook’s engagement 
with Beckett is the ‘organic process’ that Devine emphasized when directing Play.  
Written within two years of each other, Happy Days and Play, are both ‘face plays’ 
(see Pilling, 2006) in which the human body is dehumanized and disembodied in order to 
emphasize the corporeality of the head. Whether buried up to the neck in sand or 
clamped at the neck in an urn, the performer in the second act of Happy Days and the 
only act of Play will experience stillness and stasis. In both cases, Beckett then restricts 
the expressivity of the face, eyes and mouth – ‘voices toneless and faces impassive 
throughout’ in Play – and in Happy Days he controls movement even more: ‘Her head, 
which she can no longer turn, nor bow, nor raise, faces front motionless throughout act. Movements of eyes 
as indicated. (Beckett, 1986: 160). In Play, there is the additional requirement to have three 
heads produce toneless voices and impassive faces throughout, which we explored in our 
PaR experiments. As I aim to show below, an initial theatre laboratory process created an 
original piece of devised performance, with an ensemble that was trained in Beckettian 
approaches to the body and bodily restriction over a series of months. Corporeal 
abstractions (disembodied heads, mouths or voices) were regularly employed in direct 
reference to Beckett’s Happy Days and Play, but also to Not I (1972) and That Time (1975). 
We identified physical restrictions for performers (e.g. heads fixed in scenographic 
structures, the use of recorded and strict vocal refrains) and then re-produced these 
forms within a ‘theatre machine’. The ensemble found that this ‘machine’ could be 
created physically, but that a theatrical set better replicated Beckettian restriction (like 
dustbins and urns). We therefore constructed a set that would ‘fix’ the performers in a 
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cabinet, with vents that opened to reveal their heads. The opening of these vents in the 
cabinet would simulate the same interrogative atmosphere as the light in Play. While the 
characters seemed initially unaware of the mechanism they were trapped within, the 
ensemble and the audience reported that the ‘machine’ presented an overall narrative for 
each head that would emerge and re-emerge at pace during the piece.  
I would like to recall Anna McMullan’s recent work on Beckett’s late theatre, where 
the body ‘is presented as both sign and site, engine or matrix of production (of stories, 
semblances, voice, footfalls or hiccups) and fabric to be composed and recomposed with 
limited materials’ (2010: 125), we can view the co-existence of mechanical and organic forms 
of embodiment with Beckettian performances. She continues, the body is ‘itself a matrix 
of embodiments . . . a site of production, Murphy’s “matrix of surds”’(126). This organic 
distribution of embodiment over a series of mechanized performance events has been 
articulated by many of Beckett’s later collaborators in a variety of ways. For example, 
what McMullan characterizes as ‘the extraordinary physical and vocal discipline needed 
for such an approach’ has has been expressed as ‘double vision’ by Frank Neumann or 
‘spiraling inward’ by Billie Whitelaw (128). Phillip Zarrilli’s notion of ‘bodymind’ (cf. 
2001: 2) evokes Pierre Chabert’s extended work on Beckett and practice, where: ‘The 
body becomes the sensitive receptacle upon which the voice engraves itself, a kind of 
human tape recorder.’ (1982: 28). In most oral histories on practicing Beckett, 
performers habitually use vocabulary that evokes the organic and the mechanical, which I 
would relate to the physical intensity of the work. From this perspective, Brook may 
have captured something very significant in his description of the plays as ‘theatre 
machines’ and, as already noted, this is a defining feature of the 1964 reviews of Play. 
This apparent contradiction in Beckettian performance – it is both compassionate and 
dehumanizing – led to a wealth of critical complaint. Consider, for example, this early 




Dark stage. From the shadows gleam three urns with a head visible above each rim. Potted scare-
crows [sic.]. Or turnips. Or coconuts to shy at. Whatever the contents, they have rotted. Pause. The 
mouths open not to speak, hardly to enunciate, but to bleep like electronic machines. 
(RNT/PR/4/1/4) 
 
This description provides a comical yet complex way of framing the condition of 
embodiment experienced by Rosemary Harris, Robert Stephens and Billie Whitelaw at 
the Old Vic. Turnips in pots, rotting contents, bleeping machines; these are bizarre 
images of Beckett’s ‘theatre machines’. Audience responses to Fail Better’s ‘machines’ are 
equally surreal; for example, ‘lovely cogs of man-machine’ and ‘reminds me of Beckett’ 
(Warwick, 2012). The following detailed analysis of the 1964 production aims to 
articulate a much fuller account of the organic/mechanical problem. 
 
II. ‘What do you take me for, a something machine?’9 
This section will consider archival materials relating to Devine’s staging of Play in 
1964 in order to consider Beckett’s presence in the rehearsal process, and the 
controversy this prompted at the National Theatre. Following a brief exposition of the 
collaboration between Beckett and Devine, it will focus on Beckett’s attempts to 
mechanise the performers. This involved the rapid delivery of text and toneless acting 
voices. The style was fully supported by Devine, which prompted an urgent request from 
Tynan: ‘If you could see your way to re-humanising the text a little, I’ll bet that the actors 
and the audience will thank you – even if Beckett doesn’t!’ (Tynan, 1994: 293). Laurence 
Olivier (then Artistic Director of the National Theatre) described this event as ‘a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 W2 in Play: ‘Anything between us, he said, what do you take me for, a something machine? And of course 
with him no danger of … the spiritual thing’ (Beckett, 1964:12). 
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detonation with an alarming sound-off’ (294) in a memo to Tynan where he also noted 
an extreme lack of tact from his literary manager.  
Since the late 1950s, Devine had emerged as one of the playwright’s trusted 
collaborators and ‘believed Beckett was the best guide to staging the plays’ (Wardle, 
1978: 207). As a result of Roger Blin struggling to fund the first staging of Fin de Partie, 
‘the E.S.C. set about acquiring this production to open the 1957 season and dispatched 
Devine to negotiate the world premiere’ with Beckett (1978: 204). Devine documented 
this first meeting – ‘half an hour with him in his flat in Paris’ – in almost religious terms: 
‘I felt I was in touch with all the great streams of European thought and literature from 
Dante onwards. The man seemed to have lived and suffered so that I could see’ (204). In 
Beckett, Devine had discovered ‘another master as austerely incorruptible as Michael 
Saint-Denis’ (204) and found another mentor in the process. The French language world 
premiere of Fin de Partie opened at the Royal Court as planned in 1957, soon followed by 
the English language version (with Devine himself as Hamm), for which ‘Beckett 
supervised the last two week’s rehearsals’ (206). This second production established 
Devine’s faith in the author’s creation, and as a performer ‘he was exceptionally nervous 
of his responsibilities towards it’ (206).  
Play had started life for Beckett as ‘a face play’ in 1961, when he wrote to Herbert 
Myron ‘that How It Is is still awaiting revision, but that he has had an idea for a new act, 
one hour, three faces (mouths) and lights’ (Pilling, 2006: 159). He was invited to the world 
premiere rehearsals in Germany in the summer of 1963, the year of the play’s 
publication. This practical engagement with the theatre was important for the textual 
process as evidenced by the fact that Beckett ‘tells Barney Rosset that he can’t establish 
the definitive text for Play without a certain number of rehearsals’ (160). Beckett had 
already spent time in rehearsal with Devine, under equally difficult circumstances. 
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In 1962 Beckett had travelled to London to help Devine on the Royal Court 
production of Happy Days, which included a last minute casting change resulting in 
Brenda Bruce playing Winnie. Beckett wrote to his friend Avigdor Arikha that: ‘It didn’t 
start any too well – voice and inflections wrong. But it’s already much better… She 
catches on very quickly and works very hard. Devine is very kind and there’s an excellent 
working atmosphere’ (Knowlson, 1996: 500). However, as Knowlson explains: 
 
A fortnight after his arrival, he wrote to friends that the production was heading for disaster and that 
he could do nothing to remedy the situation. In fact, the modest, insecure Brenda Bruce needed praise 
and encouragement, not criticism. And she was so shaken by Beckett’s reactions and by her inability 
to get it right in his terms, that she finally broke down in floods of tears. (501)  
 
Seeking a mechanically perfect rhythm from the actress, and prepared to go to any 
lengths to achieve it, his introduction of a metronome to rehearsal exemplified a 
paradoxical rift between ‘discipline and sensitivity’ (McCarthy in Oppenheim and Buning, 
1996: 150) in a Beckett rehearsal; it also indicated the insensitive and unsustainable 
methods he practiced at this time. A performer breaking down under the pressure of 
over-mechanized practice, something Whitelaw would later experience in 1973, 
represents a ‘stochastic’ moment in the process, where failure creates a feedback loop 
within the system of production (see Bateson, 1972: 266–7; McKenzie, 2001: 71). Within 
this context, the author in rehearsal was limiting the actor’s learning process, so Brenda 
Bruce could only proceed without Beckett in rehearsal. As Knowlson documents:  
 
Beckett went away into the country with George Devine and Jocelyn Herbert and her children. On a 
walk with Sam and the children, Jocelyn suggested to him, gently but firmly, that Brenda Bruce 




Herbert’s intervention recognized the delicate balance of what Devine would later call 
‘the organic process’ of rehearsal in contrast to the mechanical pressures of production. 
In 1962 Beckett was still serving his apprenticeship in theatrical production (he would 
not direct his plays alone until 1966–7 by which time he had observed both Blin and 
Devine on several occasions). However, Beckett stated simply ‘I’ve been kicked out of 
rehearsals’ and, according to Knowlson, ‘the damage had already been done’ (502). In 
Wardle’s account, ‘Devine had stopped directing and virtually handed the show over to 
the author. Jocelyn Herbert saw a disastrous run-through and gently suggested that Miss 
Bruce needed some time to herself’ (1978: 207). 
There is an important parallel to be drawn between Bruce’s experiences in 1962 
and Devine’s own nervousness during rehearsals for his 1957 Endgame. Conditioning 
bodies for the intense disciplinary rigor of performance, Beckett was not only providing 
the necessary material circumstances for production, but also discounting the special 
emotional needs of the actors and, as Tynan would later suggest (1994: 263), the 
audience’s experience too. In this period, before Beckett found the confidence to direct 
production processes in his own right, his presence in rehearsal was somewhere between 
an avant-garde autocrat and, at least for Bruce’s co-star Peter Dugaid, ‘a meddling 
amateur’ (Wardle, 1978: 207). Beckett’s next collaboration with Devine crystallized these 
problems, when the newly formed National Theatre brought author-director 
collaborations from the Royal Court to the Old Vic. Devine would direct Beckett’s Play 
in a double-bill with William Gaskill’s production of Seneca’s Philoctetes (adapted by Keith 
Johnstone). The Beckett-half of this double bill caused huge controversy in rehearsal. 
The 1964 ‘show reports’ in the NT archive record the timing of the performance 
as between seventeen and nineteen minutes in length. During this each performer has to 
repeat every line across the two main sections in response to the stage direction: ‘Repeat 
play’ (Beckett, 1964: 22). Commonly known as the ‘da capo’ ending, this required a 
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musical and mechanical discipline from the three actors (Harris, Stephens and Whitelaw), 
who were ‘toneless and impassive’ throughout. Furthermore, during the repetition, they 
were required to be so fast with the lines, that they were audibly gasping for breath (BL, 
Play 1964: NP739W). In a letter to Devine, Beckett reported his experience of the 
rehearsal process in Paris: 
 
The whole idea involves a spot mechanism of greater flexibility than has seemed necessary so far. 
The inquirer (light) begins to emerge as no less a victim of his inquiry than they and as needing to 
be free, within narrow limits, literally to act the part, i.e. to vary if only slightly his speeds and 
intensities. [Note: Perhaps some sort of manual control after all.] (RNT/PR/4/1/4) 
 
Indeed, Beckett had started to explicitly consider the technical elements of performance 
during this period and many of the reviews mention the operator, Tony Ferris, by name. 
Harris, Stephens and Whitelaw, were consequently working with a fourth performer, the 
human being at the other end of a tight spot light. This aspect of production introduces 
an additional mechanism to the process and the image of the spotlight-operator may 
provide a useful analogy when thinking through the organic/mechanical problem.  
Almost all of the reviews of the production allude to the mechanical nature of 
the performance style: the performers ‘bleep like electronic machines … like well-
regulated mechanisms’ (RNT/PR/4/1/4); in an piece entitled ‘Stamping on Mr Beckett’s 
verbal treadmill’ the reviewer describes the ‘uninflected monotone’ and a performance 
which is ‘motionless, impersonal and sterile’; in another with the headline ‘The three 
faces of Beckett’s contempt’, the play is ‘short, weird and compulsive’ with ‘swift, 
staccato sentences’ as well as ‘purposeful monotony and repetition, with the ritualistic 
insistence of a litany’; Bamber Gascoigne writes ‘the rhythmic staccato effect is like a 
litany recorded at 33 and played back at 45, or one of those relentless machines at 
country stations which click out morse codes – whichever is more irritating’; and Peter 
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Lewis of the Daily Mail uses his description ‘they speak mechanically, like speeded-up 
tape recorders, as they recite the course of their eternal triangle’, to justify his conclusion: 
‘as an experiment, justified. But I see no hope that it leads anywhere’ (RNT/PR/4/1/4). 
Only a fortnight before opening, Tynan sent his infamous letter to Devine, 
demanding the immediate ‘re-humanisation’ of the piece: ‘I trust the play completely, and 
I trust your production of it. What I don’t especially trust is Beckett as co-director’ 
(Tynan, 1994: 293). He takes particular pains to emphasize the unprofessionalism of the 
playwright: ‘as we know, Beckett has never sat through any of his plays in the presence of 
an audience: but we have to live with that audience night after night!’ He reveals the 
institutional risks associated with this production:  
 
Play is the second new play the National Theatre has done… our first experimental work… it 
may jeopardise our future plans for experiment and put a weapon into the hands of those 
people… who think the NT should stick to the popular classics and not cater for minority tastes. 
(Tynan, 1994: 293) 
 
Ironically, Tynan wanted to produce the show in such a way that it would reflect well 
upon the newly established NT, and especially its bearing upon the future funding of 
new writing. However, as representatives of the Royal Court, directors Devine and 
Gaskill fiercely supported writers’ wishes and felt Tynan profoundly misunderstood the 
significance of this. Reflecting on this period, Gaskill writes:  
 
George … came under pressure from Tynan, who understood nothing of responsibility to a 
writer, to play the piece at a more normal speed than the breakneck pace demanded by Beckett. 





Devine did certainly not sell out on this occasion. In fact, an audio recording (BL, Play 
1964: NP739W) of this production reveals an extraordinarily fast paced delivery and 
monotonous mechanised speech from all three characters, sounding somewhere between 
a machine-gun and a linguistic-drill. The presence of laughter throughout the recording 
demonstrates not only that the fast pace was intelligible to an audience, but also that 
there was no need to ‘re-humanise’ the play. Indeed, Beckett’s ‘something machine’ was 
made all too human by the audience laughter, and arguably this was only achieved 
because of the highly surreal and restrictive performance style. Even so, the theatrical 
mechanism produced an organic response and the audience brought their own 
compassion and humour to Beckett’s theatrical experiment. Just as the reader completes 
prose with her own imagination, so the audience member completes the drama with her 
own embodied reactions. As Devine wrote in his programme note: ‘we have to surrender 
to the experience which the poet has prepared for us in order to enjoy ourselves or to 
criticize it’ (RNT/PP/1/1/26). From these events – and in particular, the audience 
laughter – it is possible to state that the piece was ‘re-humanised’ in performance.  
Furthermore, Devine had responded to Tynan: ‘I’m afraid you’ll have to have a 
bit more guts if you really want to do experimental works, which, nine times out of ten, 
only come off for a “minority” to begin with’ (Devine in Wardle, 1978: 208). This 
exchange concluded with a memo from Olivier who warned Tynan that sometimes: ‘you 
can be too fucking tactless for words’ (Tynan, 1994: 294).    
 
III. ‘What do you take me for, a research  machine?’ 
This section deals with my own PaR experiments for Discords, which incorporated 
Beckettian aesthetics of production into a contemporary devising process. These 
experiments will reveal plasticity in performance, by revealing instances of ‘flow 
experience’ (Czikszentmihalyi, 1975) in stark contrast with physical restriction (of 
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material objects and the actors’ bodies). This tension between the organic flow of the 
performer’s process and the restrictive machinery of production can be understood as 
plastic (malleable, adaptable, formative). For Pierre Chabert: 
 
In Beckett’s theatre the body undergoes metamorphoses. It is worked, violated even, much like 
the raw materials of the painter or the sculptor, in the service of a systematic exploration of all 
possible relationships between the body and movement, the body and space, the body and 
objects, the body and light and the body and words. (1982: 23) 
 
The plasticity of the Beckettian body is something I will return to in the next section, 
regarding ‘brain plasticity’ where ‘the machine learns, differentiates itself, reconstructs 
itself’ (Malabou, 2008: xii). However, for the purpose of the PaR experiments in this 
section, I would like to emphasize that the plasticity of practice itself (where bodies can be 
formed and reformed through repeated experiments under the same material conditions). 
The organic/mechanical problem will therefore emerge as an observable phenomenon 
through methods including, but not limited to: suppression of naturalistic detail, removal 
of superfluous detail, extreme physical restriction, and flexible scales of intensity. These 
formal qualities will be accentuated by repetitive action (e.g. durational games) and 
practical variation (e.g. extended pauses). The organic process of the actor will be 
contrasted with the mechanical aspects of rehearsal to produce new devised material 
from Beckettian dramaturgy. In the examples that follow, I re-value failure in 
performance, so that the ‘flow experience’ of the participants could be heightened 
without the immediate pressure of public performance. There will be an important 
distinction between the three phases of this project, from the initial experiments, 




 In planning this process, I was keen to conduct ‘practical’ research on Beckett at 
a time when his work has been subjected to a particularly ‘archival’ turn in Beckett 
Studies (see Heron and Johnson, 2014). My hunch had been that historical controversies 
(e.g. Devine’s Play, JoAnne Akalaitis’  1984 Endgame, or Deborah Warner’s 1993 Footfalls) 
could be better understood through practical engagement with the source texts and 
rehearsal methods. In doing so, I was working with the idea of ‘Beckett’s DNA’ 
informed by Josette Feral’s notion of ‘performance genetics’ (2008: 223) and drawing 
upon contemporary theatre practice, such as Complicite’s 2009 Endgame, directed by 
Simon McBurney, who stated the following: 
 
I was insistent that everybody should feel the rhythm that Beckett creates on the page as a 
starting point, and not decide what we should do until that was really within our bodies. From 
that sensation within your body you can begin to let go and allow your own imagination to travel 
and somebody begins to arrive and then as that person arrives as an actor, as a character, so 
gradually you unfold and almost like a plant from the seed, the seed being the words and the 
rhythms and the accuracy of what I would call ‘Beckett’s DNA’, from that can grow a character, 
which is almost like a plant. But it comes slowly. If you apply somebody too quickly to the 
material, it all starts to disintegrate. You have to go from the very very inside and then something 
happens. (McBurney in Campbell, 2010) 
 
So our research question was: can you isolate ‘Beckett’s DNA’ in a theatre laboratory (as 
part of a process of generating performance material)? 
 
i. Exploring ‘theatre machines’ (Phase 1) 
Our BeckettLab process was characterized by weekly four-hour workshops at the 
CAPITAL Centre, University of Warwick, with Fail Better’s Student Ensemble. Tasks 
involved vocal warm-ups, textual work on Beckett’s plays, devising exercises based on 
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the plays, and movement work focusing on restriction. These activities were documented 
through notation, video and photography (see Figures 1.1 & 1.2). 
 
Figures 1.1 & 1.2: BeckettLab (2009)  
 
We set about isolating ‘Beckett’s DNA’ from the play-texts (Play, Not I, and prose), 
extracting ‘genetic’ material for devising and pushing beyond false starts, mistakes and 
errors. The ‘DNA’ emerged through devised fragments that featured stream-of-
consciousness spoken text, physical restrictions involving stasis, or corporeal 
abstractions. We judged some of these experiments as too restrictive to make their way 
into production, however other experiments produced results that did not evoke the 
highly regulated style of ‘Beckettian’ performance. We returned to Brook’s notion of 
Beckett’s plays as: ‘pure inventions, fresh images sharply defined – they stand on the 
stage as objects… theatre machines’ (Brook, 1990: 65). This concept was something that we 
could explore tangibly and through practical movement tasks. We devised a series of 
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durational games (10-15mins in length) that could re-produce the physical restrictions of 
late Beckett plays such as Quad (1982) or What Where (1983). These exercises often led to 
failure or exhaustion, but they were perhaps the most productive in terms of creating the 
bodily affects of ‘doing Beckett’ (see Figure 1.3).  
 
Figure 1.3: BeckettLab (2009)  
 
In this example, four performers devised rules for movement around a central point that 
required them to reshuffle their own bodies in a particular order. Each new movement 
produced rules for each subsequent movement and the ensemble had to solve the puzzle 
of unlocking their bodies through repeated action. Figure 1.3 shows the performers 
towards the end of their game, which failed to produce the expected outcome. In fact, 
the ensemble became locked in a durational system of movement, where the only escape 
would be through re-iteration. In the event, they collapsed in an exhausted heap and 
ended the game as the rules had defeated them. Such movement tasks recall Beckett’s 
earlier pieces such as Act Without Words I&II (1956), or unfinished fragments such as J.M. 
Mime, evoked in McMullan’s description of a ‘continual reworking of the vulnerable body 
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caught in a system beyond the control of the conscious’ (2010: 66). For Fail Better, 
‘Beckett’s DNA’ became shorthand for a performance technique produced from these 
material conditions. We became especially interested in the strict mechanisms that 
enacted repetitive movement, which McMullan describes as ‘a laboratory where Beckett 
explored the dramatic and compositional possibilities of the performer’s body’ (66). 
Our experimental process explored these conditions of Beckettian embodiment 
as a laboratory, though workshops that promoted self-reflexivity and meta-theatricality. I 
use these terms here to suggest that our practice produced a feedback loop for 
performance, from performance. This produced a special awareness for the ensemble that 
isolated ‘Beckett’s DNA’ as raw material for devising new work. As part of the 
workshops, I would first focus on practical devising tasks for the ensemble, and then 
interweave materials from performance archives. This process allowed us to explore 
theatre history experimentally, internationally and inter-culturally. In ‘Lucky’s Energy’, 
Jane Goodall emphasizes that Beckett’s plays ‘demand this level of discipline and 
intensity… paradox must enter the actor’s bones’ (2006: 195). Likewise, McMullan notes 
the ‘the extraordinary physical and vocal discipline needed for such an approach’, 
recalling Whitelaw’s description of ‘spiraling inward’ and Chabert’s focus upon ‘bodily 
posture’ (2010: 128). During the BeckettLab workshops, we developed exercises that 
specifically used restriction and removal (through repeated physical action) to expose a 
comparable state of static self-reflexivity.  
 
ii. Devising ‘organic machinery’ (Phase 2) 
We chose to conclude the BeckettLab process in order to begin a devising process for 
Discords, and this break in the overall process became highly significant. It enabled a 
smaller group of performers to transform our findings into new material for 
performance. We were particularly keen to maintain the disciplined focus on physical 
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restriction and repetitive action. Our intention to extract ‘Beckett’s DNA’ and create a 
new ‘theatre machine’ was a stated aim and we searched for text that could be used as 
raw material. We found this in Shakespearean verse, but other textual sources were 
considered and have been sampled in subsequent practice at Warwick (i.e. Gogol, 
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Darwin, Woolf, Spicer, Kane). So our new work recycled the 
Beckettian dramaturgy and added raw materials from Shakespearean tragedy. Working in 
the Shakespearean context of the CAPITAL Centre, we decided to recreate scenes from 
King Lear and Macbeth as if they were plays by Beckett. This produced the vocal rhythms 
and physical restrictions that we needed for devising, and created a mood of meta-
theatricality. This was re-enforced by the choice of textual fragments, for example: ‘This 
is not Lear’ (see Discords script on CD-Rom). The first Discords performances moved 
through nine iterations during fifteen minutes, and this was repeated every half hour for 
three separate audiences over a one-and-a-half hour intensive period. 
We isolated the performer’s heads, as if they were emerging from a cabinet of 
curiosities (or an archive of disembodied heads), inspired by the Nietzschean ‘discord’: 
 
When creatures like us appeared, which had bodies and conscious minds, they were, as Nietzsche 
called them, “hybrids of plants and ghosts”, the combination of a bounded, well-circumscribed, 
easily identifiable living object with seemingly unbounded, internal, and difficult-to-localize 
mental animation. He also called those creatures “discords”, for they did possess a strange 
marriage of the clearly material with the apparently insubstantial (Damasio 1999: 143).10 
 
This quotation from Antonio Damasio’s The Feeling of What Happens (1999) recalls our 
practical work on theatrical ‘machines’, in which we re-created ‘organisms’ through 
repetitive movement and physical restriction. By isolating ‘Beckett’s DNA’, and using it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 F. Nietzsche, in the prologue to Thus Spake Zarathustra. Some translations refer to “phantom” for 
“ghost”, and “disharmony” for “discord”. (Damasio 1999: 37 fn.5) 	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to devise performance, we developed a conception of the body as ‘discord’ (after 
Nietzsche). The ‘discord’ became a vessel for ‘Beckett DNA’ in our imagination, and its 
hybridity as biological certainty and a ghosted entity (a phyto-phantom, if you will) appeared 
to give form to our creative work. We also admired the way in which these ‘discords’ 
could appear through a vent (in the set) as if from nowhere.  
Prior to taking their place on set, the ensemble performed several intensively 
physical warm-ups (shown as blurred figures in front of the set in Figure 1.4) in order to 
generate enough energy to ‘fuel’ to the ‘theatre machine’. From our BeckettLab 
experiments, we knew that the actor’s body could be restricted only in relationship to 
stage materials or scenographic structures that contain its movement (e.g. the dustbins in 
Endgame, the urns in Play, the rocking chair in Rockaby, etc.). This encouraged us to 
collaborate closely with the designer (Nomi Everall) in order to produce a Beckettian 
‘landscape’ for performance. This could be treated as a mechanism from which the 
‘discords’ could emerge like plants on a wall or ghosts in a machine (see Figure 1.5). 
 
 





Figure 1.5: Discords (2010)  
 
Comparing Figures 1.4 & 1.5 is useful in demonstrating both the restriction of the 
material structure and head-sized vents through which the performers focused their 
energy. I use the word ‘vent’ to describe these openings as it conveys both ‘aperture’ 
(through which light can pass) and ‘outlet’ (for the expulsion of waste).11 This unique 
synthesis of physical restriction and corporeal abstraction produced an experimental 
‘splicing’ of Beckett’s ‘DNA’ with Shakespearean ‘proteins’ in performance (see Discords 
video on CD-Rom). Although I am playfully using the language of biological science 
here, I will consider the theatrical/scientific problem seriously in the next chapter. That 
chapter will show that interdisciplinary outcomes are possible through performance. For 
now, I would like to return to the elements that re-produced the organic/mechanical 
problem in Discords.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




For one audience member (Warwick, 2010), Beckettian echoes were felt in 
performance, even though no specific Beckett play was being staged. This capacity to 
experience Beckettian affects in the theatre, via the re-embodiment of his dramaturgical 
restrictions, becomes a practical way of responding to the controversies of theatrical 
production (where radical interpretations have been censored). I would suggest that my 
approach constitutes a covert mode of experimentalism within ‘Beckett Studies’. This 
strategy is part of a wider interdisciplinary approach that draws upon the research of 
Nixon and Van Hulle (BDMP, 2011–), McMullan et al (Staging Beckett, 2012–15) and my 
own collaborations with Nicholas Johnson (Beckett Laboratory, 2013–). This work in 
enriched by Johnson’s idea of: ‘a performative Beckett who is not a deceased artist, but a 
living idea that goes on, incessantly to be accessed and apprehended by audiences, 
students, scholars and the general public’ (2012: 39).  
In the same way that Beckett was ‘kicked out’ (Knowlson, 1996: 502) of the 1964 
rehearsal, we chose to kick him out of our rehearsals in 2010. By this I mean that his 
work was ‘genetically’ present but textually absent, it had provided a ‘genomic’ structure 
for our work, a score for performance that made use of restriction to produce a devising 
method. From Beckett we had drawn the disembodied heads, the textual rhythms and 
numerical scales, and this led to the devised piece Discords. The decision to use early 
modern text, from King Lear and Macbeth, as our dialogue had been informed by Brook’s 
1962 King Lear at the Royal Shakespeare Company (under the influence of Jan Kott). The 
1970 film version, also directed by Brook, creates a Beckettian atmosphere for 
Shakespeare aided by the casting of Patrick Magee (as Cornwall) and Jack MacGowran 
(as the Fool). I made constant reference to this during the PaR experiments, as an 





iii. Reviving a ‘mechanical organism’ (Phase 3) 
The opportunity to revive Discords at the Warwick Arts Centre (WAC) brough a new 
set of experimental procedures in 2011. This allowed us to test if the Laban ‘efforts’ 
system (discussed in Chapter 3) could be used to standardize the movement and 
mechanize the speech of the ensemble. This protracted experiment scored all transitions 
within the piece (using Laban ‘efforts’ such as moving from a ‘Press’ to a ‘Punch’). The 
experiments were informed by my own research on notation practice in Beckett and 
Laban as well as Goodall’s pithy observation that ‘as a director, Beckett evidently had 
notations of his own reflecting a spatial and temporal exactness that would have made 
Laban blanch…’ (2008: 117). As explored below, we returned to Discords as a music score 
or choreographic sequence that we scored as tightly as possible in order to heighten the 
subsequent release in performance. Moving this small experimental piece from a private 
studio (CAPITAL) to a public venue (WAC) was a difficult process that revealed some 
limitations of the original piece. For example, its short running time allowed our original 
audience to attend once or remain for the full durational cycle.  
However, Discords was placed in a completely different context when it was 
programmed alongside our adaptation of Gogol’s Diary of a Madman in the WAC Studio. 
While attempts were made to place the two pieces ‘in conversation’ through 
choreographed transitions between them, the Gogol was a professional touring 
production and Discords was an open-ended experiment. Upon reflection, I compromised 
some of the latter’s experimental status by positioning it as finished work for a paying 
audience. Indeed, the mechanical approach of Discords in an entertainment venue 
paradoxically seemed to expose both sterility and fragility in the piece (see Figure 1.6). In 
this image, the increased distance between the ‘discords’ looked visually striking but it 
sacrificed some of the intimacy of its first staging. Also, the experimental piece had been 
extended in length in order to justify its inclusion within the double-bill. Upon reflection, 
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this was an error as it was much more effective as a short ‘theatre machine’ in the spirit 
of Beckett’s Play or Not I. I had forgotten the simple guiding principle that ‘less is more’ 
(and mistakenly thought that ‘more is more’), when moving experimental work into the 
theatrical marketplace. This is an interesting parallel with the 1964 pairing of Beckett’s 
Play in double-bill with Seneca’s Philoctetes. 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Discords (2011) 
[See Discords video at 22m30s on CD-Rom] 
In the PaR experiments that followed Discords, I would focus on a specific physicality 
drawn from Beckett, and less on his representational aesthetics. As the reader may 
discern from Endlessness (2011) and Fail Better Fragments (2012) the practice shifted as a 
result of the research, emphasizing the experience of the participant and the corporeality 
of the performer. In making this shift, I have processed the Discords digital 
documentation alongside oral histories of practitioners and performers. For Whitelaw, 
there is a corporeal immediacy in practicing Beckett: ‘Right, let you skin fall off, let your 
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flesh fall off, let the muscles fall off, let the bones fall off, let everything fall off’ (1995: 
127–8). This account related to her performances of Not I, a play that often creates a 
visceral response and demands a disciplined player. This apparent oxymoron will be 
explored in the next section, where I will be interested in the inherited corporealities 
across generations of performers. 
 
iv. ‘Corporeal laboratories’ (Overview) 
In this final sub-section, I would like to position our PaR experiments within wider 
understandings of embodiment that echo McMullan’s description of Beckett’s ‘corporeal 
laboratories’ (2010: 57). The experimental performances at the CAPITAL Centre (2010), 
where a small audience had sat beneath the ‘theatre machine’ with the ‘discords’ 
appearing above their heads created an intimate encounter.  However, in the WAC 
Studio (2011) the piece stood as a ‘stage object’ (cf. Brook, 1990) that introduced both 
physical and emotional distance. Some audience members expressed their bafflement or 
hostility to the piece, somewhat reminiscent of the reviewers for the 1964 production of 
Play. In overemphasizing the mechanical attributes of the piece, we had neglected the 
organic factors or improvised elements. To some extent, this perpetuated the 
organic/mechanical problem, rather than providing a solution through devised performance. 
For example, the laughter in the 1964 Old Vic audience seemed to emerge as a result of 
the pace of delivery (which Tynan had tried to censor), and our 2010 audiences sat at 
close proximity to the ‘discords’, which seemed to excite our younger spectators. In both 
of these examples, the audience responses need to be viewed as part of the experimental 
processes. As this thesis moves on, the reader may notice different strategies for 
audience engagement, such as ‘work-in-progress’ performance (Endlessness) and 
participatory installation (Fail Better Fragments). 
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To explore this shift in our practice, I will first interrogate the archival elements 
in the Discords experiments by drawing on materials from Beckett studies. According to 
The Theatrical Notebooks of Samuel Beckett Vol. IV (Gontarski, 1999), Beckett’s ‘post-Play 
plays’ formed a ‘late style’ when he was ‘re-creating his dramatic corpus, reinventing 
himself as a dramatist, rewriting history in effect during this mid-1960s period’ (xv). As 
Gontarski notes, this is largely ignored by pre-millennial theatre history, and so our 
experiment self-consciously responded to this lacuna, by emphasizing Beckett’s legacy as 
a practitioner. As part of the PaR experiments, the Notebooks were not only consulted, but 
actively ‘workshopped’. For example, early in the process the sub-divisions of Lucky’s 
tirade in Warten Auf Godot (dir. Beckett, 1975) were used as a devising activity where 
Beckett’s own handwritten notes were used for new physical action (e.g. creating the 
‘abode of stones’). In the case of Play, the ‘red notebook’ for Spiel (dir. Beckett, 1978) was 
used to inform the devising systems for Discords, especially the geometric approach to 
physical action and the use of musical conventions (e.g. scoring the chorus). This was a 
surprising feature of the experiments, as it had been hoped that the minimalism of 
Beckett’s style would inform the dramaturgy, rather than his practical strategies for 
scoring text or his highly disciplinary approach as a theatre practitioner in his own right. 
 My conception of ‘the archive’ included practitioners’ oral histories and other 
records of performers’ experience (an approach that evolved early on in the process). As 
explored above, important examples of actors’ experiences with Beckett in rehearsal 
featured heavily in the laboratory process, and two films were screened for the ensemble: 
Not I (BBC, 1975), performed by Billie Whitelaw, and Play (RTE, 2000), performed by 
Alan Rickman, Kristen Scott-Thomas and Juliet Stephenson. The point of these 
screenings was to identify a specific ‘energy’ for performance, as each demonstrates the 
pace, delivery and intensity required to achieve a particular ‘Beckettian’ aesthetics of 
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production. The earlier experience of performers became as significant to our practice as 
the scholarly work of historians and theorists. 
To take Whitelaw as example, her Not I was used throughout the PaR process as 
reference point, archival object, and creative stimulus. I undertook archival research that 
focused on her contribution to Beckett’s ‘late style’ and her involvement in Play (BL, 
1964: NP739W). Not only does Whitelaw have another history as a non-Beckettian 
performer (from child actress, to Theatre Workshop and film acting) but she insists on 
underplaying her own importance in relation Beckett’s cultural significance. For example, 
she describes an accidental – even unhappy – first encounter with Play: 
 
I was presented with this short, extraordinary piece. I went home to read it. My first thought was: 
what the hell am I going to do with this? My second thought: what a pity the Lope de Vega [Devine’s 
first choice] fell through. I had no idea what Play meant. (Whitelaw, 1995: 76) 
 
She openly acknowledges that: ‘I’d hardly heard of Samuel Beckett’ but her instinct, upon 
a second reading, demonstrated her sensitivity for his work; ‘don’t worry if you don’t 
understand it, but do it fast’ (76). It would seem that her tacit knowledge, regarding the 
pace of the performance, became an object of indulgence for Tynan and a matter of 
principle for Devine. For Beckett and Whitelaw, it was simply ‘a specific human 
condition’ (76).  
This anecdotal evidence produced a counter-weight in our experimental process, 
especially the contrast with Beckett’s theatrical notebooks which opened up a valid 
interpretative space for the performers’ own subjective responses. Whitelaw articulates a 
‘sneaking feeling about where we had to get to with Play, which was to go very, very fast, 
almost incomprehensibly fast. I therefore wasn’t particularly interested in an analysis of 
the play or the characters’ (77). Whitelaw’s description of the rehearsal process confirms 
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my own reading of the archival materials (production records, financial administration, 
show reports etc.). In her autobiography, she recalls: 
 
At rehearsals Sam continued to say very little. What he had to say he said very concisely: ‘You can’t go 
too fast for me,’ was one note via George. ‘Don’t act out the story,’ was another. Later, when we 
worked together on other plays, he would reiterate over and over again: ‘No, no, that’s too much 
colour, too much colour,’ clearly a euphemism for ‘please don’t act’ (1995: 80). 
 
While Beckett’s practice has built up a history of censure, his methods were radically 
collaborative. This will be explored further in the next section, as it informed our PaR 
experiments directly.  
Ultimately, the main value of our experiment was claiming a freedom to devise 
with a range of theatrical materials, but guided by Beckettian aesthetics. This included the 
creating a performance text specifically for the devising ensemble, which I drafted and 
edited (see Discords script on CD-Rom). Perhaps the most significant point of 
comparison between Play and Discords is the ‘Repeat play’ stage direction where ‘the 
element of variation’ became the territory for our subsequent Beckettian experiments: 
 
MOVEMENTS 7-12 repeat the same text in the same sequence but with different Laban 
variations. (Discords, 2011) 
 
[Cf. REPEAT: The repeat may be an exact replica of the first statement or it may present an 
element of variation. (Beckett, 1964: 24)] 
 
Seeking an experimental strategy that used Beckett to experiment – rather than 
experimenting on Beckett – our process made use of archival materials to create new 
work, as it were, after Beckett. In doing so, it applied Beckett’s dramaturgy to new 
environments: durational performance, pedagogic activities, festival contexts and revival 
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as experimentation. A visceral performance score animating a series of disembodied 
heads became our response to the organic/mechanical problem, as exemplified by the 1964 
Devine rehearsal process. However, I also had a responsibility to protect the practice 
from mere historical re-construction (i.e. non-reflexive repetition). In order to achieve 
that, I aimed to ensure that the experiments themselves were indirectly informed, rather 
than directly influenced, by the archive. The plasticity of this approach ensured that the 
practice was reflexive and open to flux. Our ensemble had to be aware of the material 
conditions acting upon their bodies and, to borrow from Echo’s Bones, the ‘dense tissue of 
corporeal hereditaments’ (Beckett, 2014: 4) that preceded them. 
 
IV. ‘Corporeal hereditaments’: on repeating Play  
In this final section I will position the organic/mechanical problem within its wider 
context in order to develop an understanding of Beckett’s ‘corporeal hereditaments’ 
alongside his ‘corporeal laboratories’ (McMullan, 2010: 57). As explored in the 
Introduction, the modernist body in nineteenth-century performance was imagined as a 
‘reflex machine’ that stages a problem between ‘machinery and organisms’ (Roach, 1993: 
117). Furthermore, early-twentieth century neurologists imagined the brain as a machine 
constructing organic consciousness, with Santiago Ramon y Cajal being the first to 
describe the nervous system as ‘organic machinery’ in 1904 (Salisbury and Shail, 2010). I 
will use this biological imagery to re-consider the ‘performative laboratory of Samuel 
Beckett’s theatre of the body’ (McMullan, 2010: 141) a way of articulating the 
embodiments in Play and Discords. I will also use contemporary scientific writing 
(Damasio, 1999; Malabou, 2008) to create a bridge to Chapter 2. First, however, I will re-
consider this chapter’s practical research and its status within a contemporary 
understanding of Beckett in performance.  
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The problem of experimenting with Beckett in performance has been of central 
importance to my analysis, and Catherine Laws has noted that: 
 
[To] the considerable, obsessive machine of “Beckett Studies” Beckett seemed at one and the 
same time too difficult and too experimental, still, for the mainstream, but somehow too passé 
for explicit consideration by those at the “cutting-edge” of contemporary practices (2007: 1) 
 
This chapter has responded by offering a new approach, one that is influenced by ‘the 
archive’, but open to formal experimentation through practice. While particular examples 
of 1960s British theatre history were my key reference points, other options were 
available. Joseph Chaikin, for example, working with the Open Theater in New York, 
conducted experiments in form that have an important place in laboratory theatres of the 
post-war period. Chaikin’s work on Beckett is also particularly significant; especially his 
Endgame (1970) and the late piece what is the word (1989). He articulated Beckett’s 
contribution as follows: ‘His world acts on you. It enlarges you. It reduces you. It 
mechanizes you’ (Chaikin, 1972: 137). This apparently paradoxical statement has a 
particular resonance in a ‘live art’ context. For example, Derval Tubridy has argued that: 
 
Thinking about Beckett in the context of Performance Art enables us to reconsider elements vital 
to his theatre: the experience of the body in space in terms of duration and endurance; the role of 
repetition, reiteration and rehearsal; and the visceral interplay between language and the body’ 
(2014: 49–50).  
 
Placing Chaikin’s statement alongside Tubridy’s argument raises a further point about 
embodiment in Beckettian performance. Within these embodied conditions, one can 
simultaneously enlarge and reduce, endure and repeat, affect and systemize: all apparent 
contradictions. However, within the ‘performative laboratory’ of Beckettian embodiment 
there is often an internal logic. Paradoxically ‘the body’ (that difficult object of study) 
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becomes an experimental subject for theatrical mechanisms to affect performing 
organisms. I suggest that Play and Discords reproduced a specific condition of human 
embodiment that was at once highly controlled and radically collaborative. To explore 
this claim in more detail, I will reconsider both experiments using Ramon y Cajal’s 
concept of the nervous system as organic machinery12, especially its implications for 
performance. The 1964 review describing the ‘rotted’ heads of Play as ‘bleeping like 
electronic machines’ has a parallel with Ramon y Cajal’s ‘ingenious machines’: 
 
All syllables are programmed to have the same value, quite like an oscilloscope I once met in 
Jerusalem [sic.]. End of sensation. They still bleep ten, twenty, thirty minutes later, by which time, 
like well-regulated mechanisms, they have come round to the beginning once more. 
(RNT/PR/4/1/4) 
 
For Salisbury and Shail: ‘accounts that confirmed and popularized the image of the body 
as suffused with an intricate one-directional electrical circuit’ (2010: 25) and this affected 
theatrical production in the modernist period. In parallel, the theatre was revolutionized 
through technologies of lighting and sound, used most notably by Adolphe Appia (1862-
1928) and Edward Gordon Craig (1872-1966). As Mark Taylor-Batty has shown in Roger 
Blin (2007), Beckett’s own exposure to theatre during this period included an engagement 
with ‘fin-de-siècle’ forms (i.e. the Parisian symbolists and surrealists). Lighting, sound and 
stage technology remain a particularly important feature of Beckettian production to this 
day.  Furthermore, Beckett’s own fascination with the technology of embodiment has 
been extensively covered in recent Beckett scholarship (see Maude, 2009). The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In the Histology of the Nervous System of Man and Vertebrates (1904), Ramon y Cajal writes: ‘the organic 
machinery of the nervous system is indeed comparable… to such ingenious machines as the music box, 
camera, phonograph, and so on, where simple finger pressure on a spring, or the weight of an inserted 
coin, activates the whole series of coordinated events the machine was designed to carry out’ (in Salisbury 




technological innovations within stagecraft during Beckett’s dramatic career were seismic, 
and by the 1980s he was experimenting with the new possibilities of televisual media as a 
practitioner. Seen from this perspective, his earlier experiments in the 1960s reveal the 
electrical charge of ‘organic machinery’ in performance. 
 While exploring this paradigm as part of the PaR process for Discords, we were 
preparing to work directly with psychiatrists and neurologists (see Beckett and Brain Science, 
2012). This collaboration led to my reconceptualization of highly regulated rehearsal as 
an organic/mechanical system, rather than a ‘de-humanising’ system. When Tynan wrote to 
Devine, asking him to ‘re-humanise’ Play for the Old Vic audiences, he fundamentally 
misunderstood the experimental processes at work. In the same way, when we imagined 
Discords as a ‘theatre machine’ we initially misconceived the project as a disciplinary 
process (exploring meta-theatrical drama on stage), rather than a multidisciplinary event 
(beginning collaborations with university scientists). It was through the discursive re-
iteration of PaR documentation that I have been able to reposition a theatre project as a 
piece of performance research with transdisciplinary applications. 
 This has been made possible as a result of considering Beckettian embodiment as 
a transdisciplinary research process rather than a multidisciplinary object of study. 
Therefore, I will be drawing upon biomedical and ‘scientific’ studies, as much as theatre 
and performance research. Karin Knorr Cetina, in her Epistemic Cultures (1999), makes an 
important distinction between the fields of biology and physics in her study of 
laboratories: ‘one transforms machines into physiological beings [physics]; the other 
transforms organisms into machines [biology]’ (1999: 4). I would consider the dramatic 
equivalence of this as the distinction often made between theatrical production (where 
mechanical systems coalesce during an organic event) and performance process (where 





We should always engage the open-ended dialogical question of how our knowledges ‘about’, 
‘for’, and ‘in’ continuously inform each other, and are not simplistically dichotomized. Our 
problem is to keep this dynamic dialectic constantly ‘alive’, to have artists and scholars of 
performance join those scientists who are rigorously exploring the ‘biological and 
phenomenological’ and thereby building bridges ‘between mind in science and mind in 
experience’ [Varela, 1991: xv]. 
(Zarrilli, 2001: 44) 
 
I have also found it rewarding to consider the organic/mechanical problem in relation to 
neuroscience where consciousness can be studied as ‘the embodied mind’. Embodied 
cognition is rooted in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and developed by subsequent 
thinkers (including Bateson and Valera). Damasio is also associated with this idea and he 
makes an important distinction between the organism and the object: ‘That the organism is 
involved in relating to some object, and that the object in the relation is causing a change 
in the organism’ (133). Damasio’s emphasis on the relationships between organism and 
object is particularly helpful here in that it focuses on a material network beyond the 
organism itself. As I have shown with Devine’s production of Play and Fail Better’s 
experiments with Discords, the human body (organism) is placed in a mechanical 
relationship with stage technology (object). For example, the light in Play emerges as an 
antagonist – a goad – that reduces the protagonists’ agency to a series of reflexes. The 
characters themselves are cast as Pavlovian dogs (or laboratory rats) and the relationship 
between their own organism and the object/light constructs their consciousness as a 
series of embodied minds (‘Am I as much as being seen?’). In the case of Discords, the same 
material conditions were replicated, though with nine (as opposed to three) disembodied 
heads. Our experiments also explored the characters’ agency in moving from vent to 
vent, but each head was ultimately trapped within the ‘theatre machine’ and condemned 
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to ‘repeat play’. Before I conclude, I would like to explore one further perspective from 
the neurosciences. 
 In his preface to Catherine Malabou’s What Should We Do With Our Brain? Slavoj 
Zizek writes that Malabou employs: ‘a Hegelian reading of the neurosciences, based on 
the concept of plasticity, and she reflects upon the uncanny parallels between the model of 
human mind proposed by neuroscientists and the structure of today’s capitalism’ (2008). 
Malabou’s translator Marc Jeannerod also notes that ‘the brain has always been described 
in terms of technological metaphors… in the digital age, as a computer running its 
programs’ (xi). In a parallel to Foucault’s ‘discipline-mechanism’ (1991[1977]), this 
concept invites us to view the machine metaphor suspiciously, for it mimics authoritarian 
models of human power, a criticism often associated with Beckett in the theatre (cf. 
Connor, 1988). However, Malabou offers us an alternative to the ‘machine brain’ in her 
notion of brain-plasticity whereby: ‘the machine learns, differentiates itself, reconstructs 
itself’ (2008: xii). If we extend this thought into the realm of performance, it is possible 
to argue that the plasticity of ludic practice offers an alterative to mechanical re-
production. The elasticity of production and the fixity of its representational practices are 
closed to the more radical elements of creative process (i.e. the plasticity of PaR). For 
Fleishman, PaR: ‘expresses itself through a repeated, though flexible and open-ended, 
process of ontogenesis’ (2012: 34) and is therefore open to flux.  
The plasticity of performance (in its PaR mode) enables a mechanical operation to 
reconstruct itself through organic process. I would suggest that Fleishman’s ontogenesis 
(the development of an organism) has a parallel in Malabou’s plasticity (the capacity to be 
altered) when we consider human embodiment. That both of their arguments are broadly 
phenomenological is also worth mentioning here. Malabou’s opens up new distributions 
of power by observing that the brain is not ‘a control center’, but that ‘the biological and 
the social mirror in each other this new figure of command’ (33). Her elision of organism 
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and mechanism into one embodied mind has enabled me to re-think Beckettian 
embodiment in relation to neuroplasticity. This idea has currency within contemporary 
neuroscience as the: ‘capacity of neurons and neural networks in the brain to change 
their connections and behaviours in responses to new information, sensory stimulation, 
development, damage or dysfunction’ (Encyclopedia Britannica website, 2014). In Malabou’s 
hands, this scientific concept becomes a political challenge: ‘we must insist on this 
natural identity in returning to the notions of network, delocalization and adaptability, 
and in observing how these operate in the two domains – cerebral and socioeconomic’ 
(2008: 42). In the same way that Fleishman argues that PaR proceeds organically in 
‘variable and indeterminate directions’ (2012: 34), Malabou imagines new practices for 
the human brain and new plasticities for human embodiment.  
I conclude this chapter by returning to Beckett’s treatment of the 
organic/mechanical problem in performance. For example, the way light in Play constructs 
the organisms’ consciousness through mechanical interrogation:   
 
W1: Weary of playing with me. Get off me. Yes.  
Spot from W1 to M. 
M: Looking for something. In my face. Some truth. In my eye. Not even. 
Spot from M to W2. Laugh as before from W2 cut short as spot from her to M. 
M: Mere eye. No mind. Opening and shutting on me. Am I as much – 
Spot off M. Blackout. Three seconds. Spot on M. 
M: Am I as much as … being seen? 
Spot off M. Blackout. Five seconds. Faint spots simultaneously on three faces. Three seconds. Voices faint, large 
unintelligible. (Beckett, 1964: 21–2) 
 
Beckett’s infamous stage direction to: ‘Repeat play’, immediately after this dialogue, 
reinforces the ‘organic machinery’ of the heads in urns. WI, W2 and M are reduced to 
fleshy protrusions in a re-iterative system of embodiment, and the cyclical quality of the 
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piece suggests that their tormentor (Light) will never ‘weary of playing’ with them. As 
with the Auditor’s movements of ‘helpless compassion’ in Not I (1972) or May’s 
disrupted pacing in Footfalls (1976), the experimental corporealities of Beckett’s late 
theatre have proven rich stimuli for thinking about the organic/mechanical problem in 
performance. By adopting multidisciplinary perspectives from neurology (Ramon y Cajal, 
1904; Damasio, 1999; Malabou, 2008), I have been able to re-imagine my PaR 
experiments as transdisciplinary vehicles for archival problems (i.e. Play, 1964) through 
practice (e.g. Discords, 2010). This thought process has opened up another important 
strand of inquiry for the thesis, namely the relationship between the theatrical and the 
scientific in performance. The next chapter will address this problem by using an archival 





An experiment like the Theatre of Cruelty… 
(Brook, SMT/PROG/1964/40) 
 
I. Theatre  laborator ies : on ‘betraying’ Artaud 
This chapter considers the theatrical/scientific problem in performance with reference 
to Peter Brook’s Theatre of Cruelty (ToC) season in 1964 and Fail Better’s Endlessness in 
2011. It draws upon archival materials and practical experiments to articulate this 
problem as highly significant to: a) theatre historiography on the 1960s, b) the 
interdisciplinary potential of contemporary PaR and c) the ways in which scientific 
experiments are theatrical within themselves. Fundamentally, I am interested in what 
constitutes experimental research through performance practice, especially when artists 
explicitly claim their work to be ‘scientific’. My first example will explore the relevance of 
Antonin Artaud’s first ‘Theatre of Cruelty’ manifesto (1932) to the ToC experiments at 
the Royal Shakespeare Company (RSC). My second example is from my own practice at 
the Pegasus Theatre Oxford where Fail Better Productions aimed to transform scientific 
writings into experimental theatre. Finally, the chapter will approach the theatrical/scientific 
problem in performance via a close analysis of ‘scientific’ theatre. I have defined this 
problem in relation to a complicated interdisciplinary category that consists of theatre 
about science, which exploits the performativity of the scientific method in order to 
produce a ‘scientific’ theatre. However, when Brook and Charles Marowitz conducted 
their ToC experiments, they mis-appropriated Artaud’s writings, including ‘Theatre and 
Science’ (1947), where ‘any idea of theatre and performance is ruled out’ (in Schumacher, 
1989: 216). I will show how Brook ‘betrays’ the Artaudian conception of both the 
theatrical and the scientific, in order to regenerate his RSC projects. I will also attempt to 
investigate the relation between theatre and science in my own PaR work. 
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Social scientists and philosophers of science have contested the so-called objectivity of 
the scientific method.13 They have also critiqued the sciences and technologies of power, 
for example: ‘the Panoptican functions as a kind of laboratory of power. Thanks to its 
mechanisms of observation, it gains efficiency’ (Foucault, 1977: 204, emphasis added). In 
this chapter, I will respond to these tensions by exploring interdisciplinary accounts of 
scientific experimentation including Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Fact (Latour 
and Woolgar, 1979) and The Play of Nature: Experimentation as Performance (Crease, 1993). I 
will also be informed by ‘scientific’ texts from theatre and performance studies, such as 
Science on Stage: From Dr Faustus to Copenhagen (Shepherd-Barr, 2006) and Performing Science 
and the Virtual (Case, 2007). However, there has been a robust field of ‘science studies’ 
within the academy since the 1960s (Thomas Kuhn et al.). While the history of studying 
scientific inquiry extends back to the early modern period, many scholars, including 
Bruno Latour, have discussed the contemporary notion of ‘science studies’ at length. In 
fact, these social scientists have made use of drama and storytelling in their descriptions 
of the field: 
 
In opening the black box of scientific facts, we knew we would be opening Pandora’s box. There 
was no way to avoid it. It was tightly sealed as long as it remained in the two-culture no-man’s-
land, buried among the cabbages and the turnips, blissfully ignored by the humanists trying to 
avoid all the dangers of objectification and by the epistemologists trying to fend off all the ills 
carried by the unruly mob. Now that it has been opened, with plagues and curses, sins and ills 
whirling around, there is only one thing to do, and that is to go even deeper, all the way down to 
the almost-empty box, in order to retrieve what, according to the venerable legend, has been left 
at the bottom – yes, hope. (Latour, 1999: 23) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This has in turn been contested by research scientists, e.g. Alan Sokal’s Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward 
a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity (1996) of which he states: ‘One of my goals here is to make a 
small contribution toward a dialogue on the Left between humanists and natural scientists’ (1998: 268). 
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Latour’s evocation of classical mythology here is another example of how theatrical the 
study of science can be, and how human emotion can drive scientific discovery. I will 
avoid grandiose statements such as the discovery of hope at the bottom of this thesis, 
but would like to use this chapter to find the scientific in performance. At the bottom of 
this chapter’s box will be not hope, but reflexivity.14 However, I would now like to 
formally introduce the theatre practice under investigation in this chapter.  
To fully understand the 1964 RSC experiment, it is necessary to elicit alternative 
perspectives from those working with Brook during this period. Ensemble member 
Glenda Jackson reflects upon Brook’s method thus: ‘someone once asked me what was 
the word that was most synonymous in my mind with working with Peter Brook, and the 
word is “No”’ (Kustow, 2005: 143). Jackson was one of the few actors to take part in the 
ToC as well as its culmination in the RSC production Marat/Sade. Her comment is 
indicative of Brook’s censorial approach during this period. He has subsequently re-
formulated his directorial method as ‘elimination’ (e.g. National Theatre Platform, 29 
April 2013), which clearly had its roots in this period as Artaudian ‘cruelty’ or ‘self-
discipline’ (Brook in Hunt and Reeves, 1995: 75). These alternative viewpoints, from 
both Jackson and Marowitz, demonstrate Brook’s censorial approach within a 
rhetorically ‘scientific’ process.  In his 1964 RSC programme note, Brook notes that 
these experiments were like ‘a scientific research project’ (SMT/PROG/1964/40). David 
Williams has described this phase in Brook’s career as: ‘a period of reappraisal, 
maturation and proactive research’ (in Hodge, 2000: 175). 
Brook deployed the Artaud’s cruelty as self-discipline, strictness and elimination. 
As Artaud wrote in 1932: ‘the word cruelty must be taken in its broadest sense, not in the 
physical, predatory sense usually ascribed to it’ (in Schumacher, 1989: 119); similarly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 I am aware that the term reflexivity has diverse interpretations and has been repositioned by philosophers 
of science, such as Karl Popper, plus sociologists including Anthony Giddens and historians of ideas, in 
particular Michel Foucault. Here, I will mean practice-about-practice. 
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Brook’s use of the word ‘elimination’ has no murderous intent. Rather, Brook’s 
retrospective description of his process as ‘elimination’ has more in common with the 
mathematical or medical sense of the word as an intended omission or removal (OED, 
1998: 438).15 He focuses on the practical exercises undertaken and then discarded, but 
still assimilated by the actor in rehearsal. This suggests an alternative approach to 
theatrical production, implying a process of erasure and deletion, as opposed to creation 
and invention. Therefore, I use ‘elimination’ as an experimental principle in performance 
(assuming that ‘less is more’), a dramaturgical convention that implies: ‘strictness, 
diligence, unrelenting decisiveness, irreversible and absolute determination’ (Artaud in 
Schumacher, 1989: 119). Kimberly Jannarone’s Artaud and His Doubles (2012) argues that 
this marks a betrayal of Artaud as a performative invention of 1960s fringe theatre, 
which in turn influenced Brook’s experiments with ‘small means, intense work, rigorous 
discipline, absolute precision’ (1990: 60). I will argue that Jannarone is correct to note 
Brook’s misappropriation of Artaud’s theory in his own work, but that her argument 
does not fully engage with the intense discipline and strict approach of Brook’s practice 
in the 1960s. 
As this chapter aims to demonstrate, the use of scientific terminology in this 
period of theatre practice was both problematic and paradigmatic, establishing new 
practices for experimental performance and creating new tensions within the British 
theatre. The British ‘alternative theatres, 1946–2000’ (Kershaw 2004: 349) represented a 
further evolutionary step between the ‘mainstream’ practices of the 1960s and the 
emergence of PaR by the 1990s. So, this chapter will suggest that contemporary PaR can 
respond to these gaps in theatre history by re-embodying theatrical problems in 
laboratory environments. Brook’s use of Artaud (and my own use of Brook) is an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 ‘Elimination’ implies expulsion (from the body), exclusion of clearance (from ‘out’/ex  & 
‘threshold’/limen). (Online Etymology Dictionary website, 2014).  
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example of the theatrical/scientific problem in performance, an inquiry into experimental 
practices that claim to explore the scientific method through performance (see Shepherd-
Barr, 2006; Case, 2007; Nicholson, 2011). 
In the fifty years that separate Endlessness from the ‘scientific research’ of Brook, 
there has been a ‘postdramatic’ turn in some areas of theatre practice, leading Shepherd-
Barr to notice that: ‘a second wave of recent science plays is quietly changing the ways 
we think about science on stage, linking performance techniques and science in 
innovative ways that move away from the literary and historical’ (2006: 199). For 
Endlessness, Fail Better created a devised performance style that would mix the 
literary/historical with the scientific/philosophical and we started testing this approach 
throughout the project. As Shepherd-Barr writes: ‘many of these newer, alternative plays 
share theatrical approaches and methodologies. They also stretch traditional notions of 
time and space in the theater’ (214). For Shepherd-Barr, these specific ‘science-
performance pieces’ can be differentiated from generic ‘postdramatic works’, and they 
emerge as a healthy and thriving genre’ (217) in their own right. Some time before this 
(in 1947), Artaud recommended a ‘true theatre… in which any idea of theatre and 
performance is ruled out, as well as any idea of science, religion and art’ (in Schumacher, 
1989: 216). In his final years, Artaud imagined replacing theatre with a practice that ‘aims 
at the true organic and physical transformation of the body’ because ‘theatre is not a 
scenic display’ but a crucible where ‘bodies are renewed’ (216). However, Artaud’s 
writing can only be applied to new ‘postdramatic’ and interdisciplinary practices through 
a process of betrayal (as in transformative application). In this way, contemporary PaR 
shares some features with Brook’s 1960s experiments. 
 I will extend this inquiry by recalling other occasions when theatre practice stood 
in for ‘scientific research’. Although I will be focusing upon Brook and Marowitz in 
1964, I will also be informed by research on Grotowski’s ‘Teatr Laboratorium’ (see 
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Schino, 2009; Flaszen, 2010), which had already influenced Brook by this time (see 
Brook in Grotowski, 1968). By exploring these experiments as well as scientific writing, 
this chapter positions theatre practice as research in a historical context, making use of the 
performative discourse of other disciplines, but treating history, philosophy, and even 
science, as reflexive practices (each with their own storytelling traditions, as Latour and 
Woolgar have documented in Laboratory Life, 1979). For example, in 1963 Peter Hall 
(then Artistic Director of the Royal Shakespeare Company) enabled Brook to create an 
ensemble with full subsidy for twelve actors to explore theatrical technique. Although 
this ‘experimental group’ was absorbed later by the repertory company, Hall had taken a 
huge risk on practice as research, even within the 1960s ‘urge for renewal’ (Fowler, 2005: 
119).  
In the programme distributed at LAMDA for the ToC season, Brook argues that 
‘an experiment like the ToC needs total subsidy; that is enough money to cover costs 
even if no tickets were sold’ (SMT/PROG/1964/40). At the RSC, Brook’s theatre 
laboratory had functioned ‘mainly in private’, although various iterations of these 
experiments were shown in front of an audience. Paul Ableman contributed four texts 
for performance, Brook had written two, John Arden’s Ars Longa, Vita Brevis (1964, with 
Margaretta D’Arcy) was a regular part of the event, as were Marowitz’s adaptation of 
Hamlet and the UK premiere of Artaud’s Spurt of Blood (1925). According to the prompt 
book in the RSC archive, the Arden text would be substituted for scene fifteen of 
Genet’s The Screens, which initiated the process of the company preparing to stage this 
play in full production (later abandoned for Marat/Sade). Although Brook’s experiments 
claimed to be ‘scientific research’, they were in fact highly text-based in performance 
although there is evidence that improvisation featured alongside scripted dialogue. 
Furthermore, Brook was being somewhat disingenuous about the ‘purity’ of his 
experiments, as this process was initially driven by the need to train a group of 
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performers to work on Genet’s play. Even though the Lord Chamberlain had denied 
permission to perform this work, Hall was keen that this period of investment should 
lead to a production with box office income. These unusual circumstances lead to 
Brook’s satirical inclusion of ‘Letter from the Lord Chamberlain’ as a theatrical sketch 
within the ToC evening, and to a premature announcement in his programme notes: ‘The 
climax, after more public performances at LAMDA in the spring, will be a full-scale 
production of Jean Genet’s “The Screens” at the Aldwych Theatre in June’. This 
tendency to over-promise recalls other criticisms of Brook as a ‘second-hand genius’ 
(Mitter, 1992: 5) whose professional identity hovers between ‘Brook the showman’ and 
‘Brook the scientist’ (Hunt and Reeves, 1995: 76). As Declan Donnellan has noted: ‘the 
actual moment of showmanship is the moment of profundity… The thing that’s 
completely unique about Peter is his possession of both those poles [the sacred and the 
profane]’ (in Kustow 2005: 293). As I have introduced above, this chapter is focused 
upon the polarities of the theatrical and the scientific in the Brook’s Artaudian practices as 
well as contemporary PaR. 
 
II. ‘Observe us at play’: crue l  experiments 
I will now begin to consider the details of the ToC experiments, especially those 
aspects that draw attention to the ‘scientific’ and experimental features introduced above. 
One of the dramatic fragments used in the 1964 experiments was Spine by Paul Ableman 
containing the lines: ‘Observe us at play/Kindly watch us at play.’ In the promptbook in 
the RSC archive, there is the hand-written addition ‘Watch us at play’, inserted between 
the two lines. While this was no doubt a late textual amendment during rehearsal 
(perhaps for rhythmic purposes), the lines have a special resonance in relation to the 




 4. Observe us at play. 
3. Watch us at play. [Insert] 
4. Kindly watch us play. 
(RSC/SM/1/1964/THC1) 
 
These lines could describe Brook’s laboratory itself; a playground observed 
‘scientifically’. As Alan Read has noted, the theatre itself can be understood as a ‘human 
laboratory’ (2008: 2), but in the process of a theatre laboratory there is a specific condition 
of human experiment; an interplay between observation and embodiment constructing 
research evidence. In short, the human observes itself, studies its own behaviours and 
decodes its own languages, a process which was under investigation in Brook’s logocentric 
research questioning: ‘Is there a language of actions, a language of sounds – a language of 
word-as-part of-movement, of word-as-lie, word-as-parody, of word-as-rubbish, of 
word-as-contradiction, of word-shock or word-cry?’ (Brook, 1990: 55). He had ‘instituted 
[the ToC] to investigate these questions and to try and learn for ourselves what a holy 
theatre might be’ (55) and apparently it needed an authorial label. However 
problematically, Brook and Marowitz cited the writings and practices of Artaud, as did 
many other experimentalists of this period (e.g. Julian Beck and Judith Malina’s Living 
Theatre). ‘The title was by way of homage to Artaud,’ states Brook, ‘but it did not mean 
that we were trying to reconstruct Artaud’s own theatre’ (55). 
 The following section aims to articulate a paradox of the theatre laboratory, 
which is that it is neither completely theatrical nor coherently scientific. The application of 
scientific discourses and methods to the performing arts has a diverse and complex 
history, from the fin-de-siècle, when Stanislavski and associates developed a richly 
psychological naturalism (see Pitches, 2009) to the quasi-scientific prose that Artaud 
applied to theatre (‘Theatre and Science’, 1947) and Laban applied to movement (Effort, 
also 1947) in the period immediately after World War II. I will argue for a third way, 
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where the fallibility of experimentation itself will enrich both artistic and scientific 
epistemologies. By taking this synthetic approach I hope to show that the rigorous 
observation of ludic activities can yield interdisciplinary knowledge through reflexive 
practice. I will pay special attention to practitioners’ records, exemplified here by 
Marowitz’s ToC notes: 
 
No two audiences saw the same show, and so no two people from different audiences could 
recount the same memories. Towards this end, roles were swapped (frequently at the last 
moment); bits altered or dropped, and one piece (written by Paul Ableman) completely unstaged 
[sic.] and unrehearsed, played out each night as the spirit happened to move the actors. (1988: 47) 
 
Marowitz describes the ‘self-delusion’ (46) that Brook and he imagined would protect the 
performances as laboratory demonstrations, keeping them somehow immune from a 
critical response. The list of activities that constituted ‘experiment’ during this process 
could seem almost conventional to the present-day practitioner. That said, these 
improvisations were extremely challenging to performers trained in naturalism, described 
by Marowitz as: ‘a grounding in Stanislavski techniques as attenuated and distorted by 
English drama schools… [undone by] plunging a group of twelve young actors and 
actresses into the swirling waters of Artaudian theory’ (36).  
More specifically, Marowitz documents areas of practice that constituted ‘a 
completely new audition technique’ including: “disrupted set piece… text and sub-text… 
object associations… [and] discontinuous improvisation” (34–5). In fact, discontinuity 
emerges as ‘a style of acting… which corresponded to the broken and fragmentary way 
in which most people experience contemporary reality’ (38). Jackson, in contrast, recalls 
this process as: ‘an oasis in a desert… essentially he was looking for something that was 
not rooted – as I think British theatre was at that time – in a literary exposition of 
emotion’ (Kustow, 2005: 139). Marowitz challenges this understanding of the process 
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with reference to Stanislavski and Artaud, before claiming: ‘there is no fundamental 
disagreement between the Method actor and the Artaudian actor’ (1988: 43). Arguing 
that both types of actor are seeking the unconscious, and ultimately locating this beyond 
the scientific, Marowitz notes that Artaudian acting also needs Method acting: ‘in order 
to verify the nature of the feelings he is releasing… even Artaud’s celebrated actor-in-
trance is responsible to the spirit that is speaking through him’ (43).  
Some years later, in the second of only two references to Artaudian acting in his 
1998 memoir, Brook repeats Artaud’s metaphor of ‘the victim at the stake desperately 
signalling through the flames’ (1998: 196). Yet, in an earlier reference, he plays down the 
central significance of Artaud to the LAMDA project: 
 
We called it ‘the Theatre of Cruelty’ as a salute to Antonin Artaud, for although theatre theory 
had never interested me much and I found in Artaud’s extreme visions very few of the specifics 
that practical work demands, both Marowitz and I admired the burning intensity of the positions 
Artaud took in relation to the safe theatre of his day (134). 
 
In fact, Marowitz goes even further in dissociating from the resonances of the 
‘unfortunate’ title, and he re-positions his Stanislavski-Artaud binary as one between 
traditional actors and modern actors. He argues that the former, ‘academy-bred, rep-
orientated’, and the latter, ‘who have passed through the Royal Court, Theatre 
Workshop, and the ferment of the last ten years’ (1988: 44), differ in a series of ways, 
best summed up with the distinction: ‘Trads: My many years of professional experience convince 
me that…/ Mods: Nothing is ever the same’ (45). 
The experiments of the ToC claimed to address this rift, creating a developmental 
space for this new kind of actor. In this respect, one wonders if the outcomes of the 
process were pedagogic rather than scientific. For example, Jackson went on to perform 
in The Screens and the Marat/Sade, where both productions demanded this new open 
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approach. Brook was calling for a seemingly paradoxical incarnation of both rough and 
holy qualities in a process that was neither theatrical nor scientific. This emerges as one of 
the aspects of practice where Brook is channeling an ahistorical Artaud. As he would 
argue in The Empty Space, the actor should ‘communicate his invisible meanings’, adding, 
‘this is what some theatres call magic, others science, but it’s the same thing. An invisible 
idea was rightly shown’ (1990: 57).  
As Marowitz notes: ‘trance itself is arrived at methodically. The medium’s secret 
is knowing when to let go of the mechanisms that have produced it, in order to 
transcend them’ (1988: 43). Brook seemed to be seeking a laboratory theatre based on 
Grotowskian experiment, shaped by his reading of Beckett’s plays as ‘theatre machines’ 
and his understanding of Merce Cunningham’s dance practice as ‘holy’. In his preface for 
Towards a Poor Theatre (1968) Brook writes: ‘[Grotowski] calls his theatre a laboratory. It 
is. It is a centre of research… as in all true laboratories the experiments are scientifically 
valid because the essential conditions are observed’ (1976: 11). Giving ‘each actor a series 
of shocks’, Grotowski had worked for two weeks with the same group that emerged 
from the 1964 experiments, but this process is considered untranslatable, ‘such work is 
only free if it is in confidence’ and it is also ‘essentially non-verbal’ (11).  
 Describing the Living Theatre’s laboratory practice, Brook describes the problem 
of 1960s experimental theatre practice as: ‘a rich but dangerous eclecticism’ (1990: 70). 
However, this is especially apparent with his own (mis)use of Artaud during this period 
which I will now deal with explicitly. Indeed Brook’s statement that ‘Artaud applied is 
Artaud betrayed’ (1990: 60) suggests that his own ToC experiments were deeply flawed 
from the outset and Marowitz reports Brook ‘plunging a group of twelve young actors 
into the swirling waters of Artaudian theory’ (in Williams, 1988: 36). The short time-scale 
of the ToC experiments was the main rationale for this ‘plunge’, and Marowitz suggests 
in 1965 that the Artaudian title was overblown. According to Michael Kustow: ‘Brook 
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does not recall when he had first read Artaud’s texts’ (2005: 138). He also records the 
influence of Joseph Chaikin: ‘an ex-Living Theatre actor who had started his own 
company, inspired by Artaudian ideas’ (138). Brook also discusses Malina and Beck’s 
Living Theatre – ‘exemplary in so many ways’ (1990: 70) – in his ‘Holy Theatre’ essay, 
where he also identifies an ‘essential dilemma’ for this group: Searching for holiness 
without tradition, without source, it is compelled to turn to many traditions, many 
sources – yoga, Zen, psychoanalysis, books, hearsay, discovery, inspiration – a rich but 
dangerous eclecticism. (70) 
This hybridity of practice informs Shomit Mitter’s criticism of Brook’s ‘unity of 
indiscriminate amalgamation’, which makes him ‘a second hand genius of formidable 
synoptic power’ (1992: 5). Building on this critique, I would suggest that Brook was 
guilty of the very same problem that he observed in the work of the Living Theatre: ‘For 
the method that leads to what they are seeking cannot be an additive one. To subtract, to 
strip away can only be effected in the light of some constant. They [the Living Theatre] 
are still in search of this constant’ (1990: 70). Indeed, Brook was searching for this 
constant also, as Mitter demonstrates in his comprehensive account of a restless artist 
imitating and discarding first Stanislavski, then Brecht and finally Grotowski. Although 
Brook’s ‘rich but dangerous eclecticism’ is quite literally his own problem, Mitter does not 
fully articulate Brook’s strategy of elimination and its role in shaping his ‘multi-faceted 
ontology in performance’ (1992: 135). In my view, Brook did this, not by ‘uniting rough 
and holy in Le Mahabharata’ as Mitter suggests, but much earlier in his 1964 RSC 
experiments, which prepared the ground for his ‘seminal’ work, such as Marat/Sade on 
stage in 1965 or King Lear on film in 1970. By these later productions, Brook has re-
purposed Artaud’s cruelty as ‘elimination’. 
For the remainder of this section, I would like to consider social and political 
problems associated with Brook’s experiment and prepare the reader for my own PaR 
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project. The specific interdisciplinary problem of the theatrical/scientific in tension with 
each other in performance will emerge as a ‘rich but dangerous eclecticism’. This 
eclecticism will productively blur distinctions between the arts and the sciences, and 
move towards Latour’s aspiration that we might locate hope at the bottom of the ‘black 
box of scientific facts’ (1999: 23). 
Taking the lead from Artaud’s original writings, especially ‘The Theatre of 
Cruelty’ (1932) and ‘Theatre and Science’ (1947), my argument recalls Jannarone’s thesis 
that: ‘for all his anti-rational, anti-individual, anti-democratic thinking, [Artaud] has been 
canonized – sanctified, even – by artists and intellectuals who strive toward a more 
progressive, liberal, and democratic society in which informed, empowered, and tolerant 
individuals play a key role’ (2012: 189). Jannarone’s ‘examinations situate Artaud in his 
historical moment, one in which aesthetic fantasies translated far too easily into 
calamitous politics’ (28) and her argument has a strong revisionist thrust. While Brook 
emerges as one in a series of misappropriating practitioners, my case study reveals him as 
far more of a disciplined and strict taskmaster than most realize. From the point of view 
of the 1960s shift, during which time Jannarone claims that Artaud was misunderstood, I 
would argue that the practitioners ‘betraying’ Artaud had far more cruelty (as self-
discipline, strictness or elimination) than the established narratives have shown (e.g. 
Williams, 1988, Mitter, 1992, Kustow, 2005). This point requires further elaboration, 
especially in respect of the detail in Jannarone’s account of the 1960s ‘Artaudians’. 
While Jannarone identifies a tension between the ‘anti-democratic’ Artaud and 
the ‘progressive’ artists that followed, I would emphasize instead the interdisciplinary 
value of this difference. She takes on this contradiction directly, locating the problem in 
the 1960s: ‘a time when all limits were considered bad limits, and the urge to lose oneself 
in something bigger paradoxically accompanied a dedication to self-discovery’ (2012: 
190). She particularly notes the appropriation of Artaud in the work of Schechner, Brook 
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and Sontag who were: ‘effectively keeping him in the realm of the spiritual “other” and 
reinforcing the sense of him being uniquely out of time’ (195). However, the movement 
to make theatre more ‘scientific’ has undoubtedly been influenced by Artaud, where he 
intended this or not. From the Living Theatre (see Jannarone, 2012: 195) to Odin Teatret 
(see Schino, 2009: 26), the ‘theatre laboratory’ has frequently been positioned in relation 
to Artaud. Although, ‘Artaud was notoriously alien to theatre experimentation, the avant-
garde and pedagogy, even more so in his last years’ (Ruffini in Schino, 2009: 99), he 
nonetheless inspired a ‘scientific’ paradigm in performance practice. His own ‘Theatre 
and Science’, for example, talks of a ‘total physiological revolution’ (see Schumacher, 
1989: 220).  
Jannarone is correct to identify political risks in Artaudian practices. She devotes 
a significant part of her thesis to crowd theory and the surrender of selfhood implicit in 
Artaudian work. Her approach exposes flaws in the claims of 1960s practitioners when 
positioning the ecstatic freedom experienced by the crowd/ensemble as 
liberated/progressive. She argues that it is either aesthetically fetishized, ‘by those such as 
Judith Malina and Julian Beck’ (197), or ethically fetishized, for example, by Richard 
Schechner, in ‘seeking the “right” kind of theatrical ecstasy at the time’ (2012: 194). I 
would suggest that ecstasy (and other extreme human energies) could be contained by 
the laboratory and re-formulated in new experimental ways, as Ludwik Flaszen explains:  
 
In the case of Artaud or Grotowski, a transformer and a catalyst of ‘cosmic’ energies, latent in the 
human being in potential state. Their controlled explosion makes the actor become a holy man, a 
priest of maybe forgotten today but eternal rituals of initiation… What Artaud and Grotowski 
proposed was archaic and innovative at the same time. (2010: 191) 
 
Jannarone spends a significant proportion of her argument warning us about the violence 
of Artaud’s writing and practices. However, the ToC found its ultimate venue in the 
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theatre laboratories of the 1960s. These were places that could control explosions and 
contain highly volatile energies, in safe and secure ways. As Eugenio Barba explains: ‘the 
laboratory is the place bombs are patiently tested; this is especially true for a theatre 
laboratory’ (Schino, 2009: 31). It is the experimental rigour of laboratory processes where 
the most difficult and challenging performance problems can be explored. Grotowski, 
Brook, Chaikin, Barba et al. were therefore creating the most appropriate environment 
for their understanding of Artaud’s ToC, rather than inflicting its extremes on the general 
public. What I would like to add to Jannarone’s analysis, therefore, is that Artaud only 
failed in relation to the theatre of the 1920s–1940s. In fact, it would take theatrical 
innovations from the 1950s–70s, but the interdisciplinary practices of the 1960s in 
particular, to find a form for his ‘total physiological revolution’ (1947). As Flaszen writes:  
 
A theatre conceived by Artaud is an appropriate point of departure for discussing the actual 
nature of the theatre laboratory: a laboratory that builds a human being liberated from automatisms, using 
the tools of the theatre and starting off from the body alone.  
One might argue Artaud is an extremist. That is true. (2010: 100) 
 
Jannarone positions Brook’s application/betrayal of Artaud as a justification for 
reversing Artaudian politics (i.e. from ‘right’ to ‘left’). However, Brook’s betrayal is also 
an artistic compromise. Earlier scholarly accounts have dealt with the impact of Artaud’s 
radical politics (see Schumacher, 1989; Kershaw, 1999; Sheer, 2004), while Jannarone is 
astute in exposing the chasm between Artaud’s own practices and his influence on 
others. The alleged fascism in his writing and its influence on 1960s ‘progressive’ 
practitioners has a parallel with the influence of Nietzsche on the psychoanalysts, 
poststructuralists and phenomenologists. These concerns would have been palpable for 
Brook and Marowitz as the RSC Experimental Group moved towards Artaudian 
thinking. Their presentation of work to the public under the ToC title implied a series of 
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ideological assumptions, although they had intended a kinder cruelty and a more scientific 
Artaud. 
 Brook and Marowitz’s writing about Artaud in practice repeatedly emphasized 
the discipline (rather than the cruelty) that this approach demands of the actor. The 
experimentation that was made possible in the name of Artaud by the 1960s laboratory 
theatres could not have occurred if cruelty had simply meant brutality. The Artaudians 
apparently fell into a trap characterized by Jannarone as ‘disingenuous’ (199), especially in 
relation to the simplistic notion that cruelty implies discipline, strictness or rigour. Yet 
Marowitz argued: ‘In my view, radical theatrical experiments need to be justified, if at all, 
only when they fail’ (1978: 13). This account of the ToC experiment implies that 
laboratory processes might best isolate and fragment artistic works in order to expose 
knowledge (they are cruel to be kind). Marowitz is also on record (in Hunt and Reeves, 
1995) stating that he (rather than Brook) was more influenced by Artaud at the time of 
the ToC experiments. Brook has also stated a problem with the title:  
 
[which] was much misunderstood, although the work itself was presented with a quotation from 
Artaud which established absolutely precisely his extraordinary definition of cruelty as being a 
form of self-discipline, and therefore cruelty meant cruelty to oneself.  
(in Hunt and Reeves, 1995: 75).  
 
Brook goes on to imply that critics missed the masochistic nuances of this work, and 
became obsessed by the sadistic implications of the title. Jannarone notes that ‘a few 
sentences’ – added at the insistence of Artaud’s editor to the manuscript of Theatre and Its 
Double (1938) to justify the ToC title – have stripped out the real sadism of Artaud’s 
practice. As noted above, this addendum repositions cruelty as ‘self-discipline’. If cruelty 
is “above all lucid, a kind of rigid control and submission to necessity”, then all the 
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implied sadism is suspended in what Jannarone characterizes as ‘existential abstraction’ 
(2012: 199).  
Barba’s notion of the theatre laboratory may help us here: ‘A laboratory is first 
and foremost a mental place, a workshop inside us’ (Barba in Schino, 2009: 31). Unlike 
Artaud’s (psychiatrically disturbed) vision, where the cruelty has to be immediately 
imposed on the universe, the more nuanced applications of Artaud in Grotowski and 
Brook evoke Barba’s notion of ‘a workshop inside us’. In this way, the theatre laboratory 
becomes an incubation space for scientific or philosophical reflection upon practice. As 
Schino continues: 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century the theatre laboratory was the place for such 
paradoxical observation and practice… A theatre laboratory is a theatre that also raises theatrical 
problems not directly related to actual performance… Laboratoriality is thus the work that, in 
addition to an artistic process, also emphasizes a cognitive process. (2009: 32–3) 
 
This capacity for the theatre laboratory to ‘raise problems not directly related to actual 
performance’ is something that my own PaR will directly explore, by identifying 
interdisciplinary areas of inquiry. The word ‘laboratoriality’ is used by Schino ‘to indicate 
everything that is going on in theatre laboratories, as well as the propensity to create new 
laboratories recognizing their value and importance’ (Schino, 2009: 24). I would like to 
draw particular attention to the self-reflexivity that this word implies. In the next section, 
the theatre laboratory will emerge as a profoundly reflexive process where I will investigate 







III. ‘Watch us at play’: theatrical experiments 
This section will analyze PaR experiments that use theatrical process to interrogate 
scientific writing. Primarily, I will be interested in how experimental theatre adapts the 
scientific method into laboratory process, especially its foregrounding of error, mistake 
and failure. In doing so, I will be drawing upon Brook’s ToC experiments and 
constructing my own ‘scientific research’ through performance. While the ‘thought 
experiments’ explored during the Endlessness process were carefully selected in 
collaboration with science educators and academic researchers, and the audience 
feedback demonstrated a strong connection between the practice and the source 
material, the theatrical/scientific problem re-emerges here (especially in Nietzsche extracts 
below). I have defined this problem as an interdisciplinary tension between theatrical 
performance and scientific process, which I have exemplified using the historical example 
of Brook’s ToC. In the PaR material that follows, I will position Endlessness as practice in 
search of a hypothesis, not unlike Pirandello’s six characters and their author. Each 
practical experiment was a step towards a hypothesis about the theatrical/scientific problem, 
and as such they should be considered in terms of ‘unfinished thinking’ (Borgdorff, 2012: 
194). The value of returning to this ‘unfinished thinking’ via digital documentation of 
practice and the performance script/score (see Endlessness script on CD-Rom) has been 
to make the experiments more fully thought.  
I begin by exploring the experiments with scientific writing and how each textual 
extract became performance fragments. To understand how the stimuli was selected, I 
will consider one of Nietzsche’s more playful ‘thought experiments’: 
 
In some remote corner of the universe, poured out and glittering in innumerable solar systems, 
there once was a star on which clever animals invented knowledge. That was the highest and 
most mendacious minute of ‘world history’ — yet only a minute. After nature had drawn a few 
breaths the star grew cold, and the clever animals had to die.  
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One might invent such a fable and still not have illustrated sufficiently how wretched, 
how shadowy and flighty, how aimless and arbitrary, the human intellect appears in nature. There 
have been eternities when it did not exist; and when it is done for again, nothing will have 
happened. (Nietzsche, 2015 [1873]) 
 
This philosophical fantasy created a mood for performance, an atmosphere that we 
could inhabit. It evoked a wider corpus of philosophical (and poetical) writings on human 
knowledge within vast cosmology. In order to respond to this body of work, we initiated 
a series of conversations with academic philosophers and historians of science.16 These 
conversations led us to a different passage from Nietzsche: ‘How the “Real World” at 
last Became a Myth: History of an Error’ (1889). In collaboration with university 
chemists, I found early accounts of atoms, which led me to On the Nature of Things by 
Lucretius (1st Century BC). From our previous work on performance and myth, I 
returned to Ovid and ‘The Teachings of Pythagoras’ in the Metamorphosis (8AD). These 
classical texts were contrasted with a publication from Matthew Broome: ‘Suffering and 
the Eternal Recurrence of the Same’ (2005). This article dealt with disturbances of 
temporality in disorders of the self, such as depression and schizophrenia. It also 
responded to modern psychiatric discourse in the context of Western philosophy – ‘the 
neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy of time’ (Broome, 2005: 187) – which 
allowed us to consider all four texts in terms of the poetics and philosophies of scientific 
knowledge. We imagined this stimulating a week of theatrical experimentation to create 
the same atmosphere as Nietzsche’s ‘clever animals’ inventing knowledge ‘in some 
remote corner of the universe’.  
Some of our experiments failed, but the process itself was instructive. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This group included Matthew Broome (Psychiatry, Warwick/Oxford), Eileen John (Philosophy, 
Warwick), Peter Sadler (Chemistry, Warwick), Chris Ponting and Kirsten Shepherd-Barr (Oxford). 
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i. Theatre trying to be scientific (Phase 1) 
The first experiments took place August–September 2011 at the Pegasus Theatre, a 
month before our work-in-progress showing, and they established a series of practical 
tasks for adapting the four texts into physical action. One protracted exercise used blank 
postcards as a method for adapting scientific writing into theatrical text as dialogue. 
These dialogues then created exchanges between scientific periods and isolated rhetorical 
or poetic refrains from the four texts. One task juxtaposed Ovid’s Pythagoras with 
Lucretius, by selecting fragments from both texts transcribed to the postcards. These 
were selected at random to create a dialogue between historical periods. These tasks 
evolved into a method for creating a structure for performance. Using improvised action 
based on the fragments (e.g. enacting Lucretius in a fictional dialogue with Pythagoras), 
they produced units of physical action, for re-iteration of the script/score (see CD-Rom).  
This task created a parallel between the Atomism of Lucretius’ poem and the 
treatment of Pythagorean flux by Ovid. Taken together this juxtaposition between the 
‘void’ at the centre of all matter and the fluidity of ‘all things’ produced a starting point 
for our work. From this philosophical tension we devised a series of fragments and then 
composed haiku, to try and compress the complexity into a minimalist literary form: 
 
I. 
The sum of the dark? 




The body in shades 
Casting webs of fixity 





Measuring the void. 
Real spacetime, this spacetime is no spacetime. 
I scribe and transcribe. 
 
I incorporate these haiku as they capture the theatrical mood of our initial experiments 
while showing the difficulties we faced in communicating the full complexity of the 
material sciences. One particular difficulty was making a valid comparison between 
quantum accounts of the universe and historical scientific writing. While we were 
specifically interested in the human body in relation to scientific knowledge (i.e. how the 
embodied mind of the researcher affects the research), the critical focus became the 
human measurement of empty space (‘the sum of the dark’). This enabled us to play with 
dark studio space as a metaphor for a cosmological void in which the protagonist 
measured cells of ‘nothingness’ with a lamp.  
While the haiku produced a greater clarity in our thought process, the 
experimental outcome was a ‘scientific’ piece of theatre, rather than science-theatre itself. 
Through our search for tangible and playable aspects of the scientific material we had 
moved far beyond the initial experimental focus. In fact, we were now devising theatre in 
response to the scientific writing, as opposed to constructing participatory practice that 
would elucidate the material. It turned out that our creative urge to make theatre was in 
this context a slippage that unsettled our results. On reflection, there should either have 
been more participation from the outset of the experiments or no public performance at 
the end of the process. As with Brook’s ToC, I had made the mistake that laboratory 
experiments are theatrically engaging in and of themselves. However, our instinct as 
trained theatre-practitioners was to produce a performance from a script as an appropriate 
offering to a work-in-progress audience.  
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The textual fragments (Figures 2.1 – 2.4) demonstrate how this problem produced 
more material than we were able to use. The postcards (Fig. 2.1), the haiku (Fig. 2.2), the 
stimuli (Fig. 2.3) and the adaptation (Fig. 2.4) demonstrate the material traces of the 
devised work across this first phase of experimentation. Once those initial decisions had 
been made, the first experimental phase had finished and a production process started to 
emerge. This was the moment when we moved from ‘scientific’ theatre to experimental 
performance.  
 





Figures 2.3 & 2.4: Endlessness process (2011) 
 
ii. Science trying to be theatrical (Phase 2) 
We extended the theatrical experiment with scientific writing into a second week of 
devising at the University of Warwick during September 2011. By this time, a sequence 
of physical action had been set using the structure of ‘History of an Error’ (1889), where 
Nietzsche proceeds through several stages of human error in failing to understand the 
‘real world’. This developed our work on his 1873 thought experiment (clever animals 
inventing knowledge) but provided a tangible sequence for physical action. It generated 
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five stages, as follows: 1) confirmation of work: happy and proud, 2) reward promised: 
shocked then relieved), 3) work simply a duty: shocked but respectful, 4) purpose 
unknown: desperation and mania, 5) work useless: abolished. These stages were used by 
the performer as ways to transmit his ‘findings’ to a higher authority, which resulted in 
different degrees of radio static (as confirmation of his submission). This strategy 
represented the philosophical and psychological complexities of gathering research data 
without knowing the scientific rationale or experimental hypothesis. 
By this second phase we developed the script/score (see CD-Rom), and we 
followed the sequence of physical action with a final monologue composed from all four 
scientific texts, thus incorporating writing from different periods: 1st Century BC, 8AD, 
1889 and 2005. In performance, this monologue proved unsustainable, and the actor 
struggled to find the appropriate sequence of lines, forcing him to improvise from the 
fragments themselves. Upon reflection, this monologue’s failure became a valuable 
experimental outcome of the highly pressurized physical action that preceded it. 
However, this did cause the theatrical narrative to break down and forced the performer 
‘out of role’. Treating the scientific writing as raw material for our performance text had 
proven impossible, so we adapted the texts into an dramatic interplay between ‘all things’ 
and ‘a void’ (key ideas in the Lucretius text). One way this was expressed theatrically was 
to suspend inscribed paper materials from the lighting grid, as word-clouds in a dark 
void. Within the logic of the piece, the character’s discovery of these overhanging objects 
generated the stimulus for his stream-of-consciousness monologue: 
 
One. Thing. Ever. One thing. Nothing. One thing from nothing. Nothing from nothing. Nothing 
from nothing ever yet was born. Nothing returns to naught; but all return at their collapse to 
primal forms. Nothing is permanent in all the world. All things are fluid; every image forms, 
wandering through change. There’s in things a void – lifeless, changeless, endless – (2011) 
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Although our 2011 text was composed from textual fragments from classical antiquity 
through to contemporary science, this opening section re-works sentences on ‘nothing’ 
and ‘void’. The effect of this in performance was to show a human mind trying to 
process generations of philosophical thought (‘nothing from nothing’ vs. ‘nothing 
returns to naught’). This re-edit of Lucretius, Ovid and Nietzsche produced a vocal 
tapestry of devised fragments and allowed the protagonist to demonstrate his thought 
process. This was informed by Nietzsche’s 1889 ‘History of Error’ and his 1873 On Truth 
and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense, where ‘clever animals invented knowledge’ in an ‘aimless 
and arbitrary’ moment of eternity. As the monologue built towards its imperfect 
conclusion, the protagonist confronted his knowledge falling away as the contradictory 
thrust of inherited thought overpowered him. 
 
Figures 2.5 & 2.6: Endlessness performance (2011) 




The word-clouds (shown in Figures 2.5 & 2.6) generated a new vocabulary that the 
protagonist can use as an additional experimental tool. They emerged as materials found 
in the void, during the performance, having realised that there was a full constellation of 
(previously unseen) materials above his head (see Figure 2.5). The materials were made 
out of paper, and contained prescribed words, such as ‘no’ or ‘none’ (see Figure 2.6). This 
suspended ‘dark matter’, as it were, allowed the protagonist to play with each of the 
word-clouds and create an alternative to his only other spoken utterance in the piece (i.e. 
‘nothing’ instead of ‘zero’). This had been informed by additional scientific writing, 
including John D. Barrow’s A Book of Nothing (2001), which covers ‘nothingology’, ‘the 
origin of zero’, ‘darkness in the ether’ and ‘empty universes’. At one point, Barrow writes 
that: ‘in modern times, it is the artist who continues to explore the paradoxes of Nothing 
in ways that are calculated to shock, surprise or amuse’ (5).  
 In our attempts to render the nothingness of void as theatrical, we had introduced 
material objects for the actor to play with, disrupting our initial experimental aims and 
process. These material objects became ‘epistemic things’ (cf. Borgdorff, 2012: 193) as a 
result of our re-iterative experimental process. While they had initially functioned as 
theatrical props, they soon emerged as laboratory equipment. For example, the lamp 
ceased to be a light source and became a research tool. Using the lamp in this way altered 
its technical function and disrupted its materiality to produce different meanings for the 
audience. In reaching for new objects to disrupt our experiments, we found an 
experimental way of working with existing materials. Our instinct to make sense for an 
audience had forced our work out from the ‘private laboratory’ of the studio (Chaikin, 





iii. Neither science nor theatre (Phase 3) 
During this process we experienced a shift from performing experiments (‘scientific 
theatre’) to experimental performance (‘theatrical science’). The Endlessness protagonist 
attempted to measure the void with intense physical precision, using his body to observe 
cells of light in the darkness. Each time he used the lamp to create a new section of the 
void, he explored different measurements with his physical dexterity. For example, his 
used his feet and fingers on the first inspection, then his heel and palms on the second. 
At the third and fourth act of measurement, he could be observed using his arms and 
legs in a variety of capacities. At the fifth, he allowed his entire frame to enter the void 
and inhabit the space completely. These early experiments on size, dimension, 
proportion, magnitude, mass, bulk, volume, capacity, expanse, quantity, depth and range 
appeared to show scientific measurement through theatrical means.  
Ultimately, this physical action prompted a useful discussion between scientists 
and artists at the work-in-progress event in October 2011. However, the ‘pure’ 
experiments, using only the body to measure void, had been lost in favour of public 
performance. Aesthetic values had taken over, and our new objective became to share a 
constructed experience with an audience, rather than produce experimental data through 
performance. In hindsight, I would not have shaped these results into a theatrical 
narrative; I would rather have simply staged these experiments with the audience. That 
could have enabled a more open discussion between the scientists and the artists that 
would have moved us beyond the theatrical/scientific problem, rather than perpetuating it.  
As it turned out, the audience (see Figure 2.7) seemed unperturbed by the 
experimental approach we had taken and engaged in open discussion after the 
performance. For example, paradox in the performance was emphasized by an audience 
member: ‘one distinctive thing about doing science is that actually you often don’t have a sensation of 
reporting a finding to a greater authority and then getting the feedback… just wondering whether you 
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explored other ways of having the character check the findings or try to verify?’17 At the beginning of 
the process, we hoped that the physical action of measuring the void and reporting the 
findings might have evoked this anticlimactic experience, often reported by scientists 
(e.g. The Life Scientific, BBC Radio 4). Another audience member asked: ‘was the intention 
partly to highlight the big leap that language represents? If so, it worked; the gap between the silent body 
and the speaking voice was striking’. This question recalls our earlier work on textual 
fragments and scientific writing. For example, we wanted to demonstrate the leap from 
observation of phenomena to the articulation of affect in scientific literature. 
Another audience member focused on the material objects on stage and their role 
in the construction of narrative: ‘like the pieces of paper, where the actor put them together like a 
puzzle. Will you use this to question life and the answer to the meaning in life (by pieces of life together)?’ 
This response responded to the specific performance conditions where material objects 
(pieces of paper) stood in for philosophical ideas (e.g. Nietzsche, 1889) and scientific 
publications (e.g. Broome, 2005). Furthermore, the audience’s presence during our 
‘experimental’ performance, in contrast to their absence when we performed our initial 
experiments, was highly significant, because I had neglected to include the audience in 
the experimental design of the performance process. This was an unfortunate omission. 
When they came to watch our work, the work had changed. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Endlessness audience (2011) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This audience feedback (and below) was gathered as written feedback on 1 October 2011. 
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iv. ‘Postdramatic’ performance (Overview) 
I would like to suggest that these PaR experiments constitute a form of 
‘postdramatic’ theatre (cf. Lehmann, 1999), where anti-theatrical forms of performance 
have replaced traditional representational practices in the theatre. To some extent, this 
shift can be understood within the ‘performative turn’ in theatre studies (see Davis, 
2008), but I would also position it alongside the ‘science studies’ movement (see Latour, 
1999). My own initial reading in the quantum sciences (e.g. Barad, 2007) shows that the 
scientific observation affects phenomena in complex ways. This signals a form of 
experimentalism that is open to the event of performance, acknowledging the role of 
bodies and environments within ‘epistemic cultures’ (see Knorr Cetina, 1999). I would 
like to draw a parallel between the way in which audiences affect performance, and the 
way scientists change data through experimental interaction. Not only are laboratories 
spaces for ‘the construction of scientific facts’ (Latour and Woolgar, 1979), but also 
scientists have a habit of staging their experimentation as performance (Crease, 1993). As 
Knorr Cetina would have it: ‘Laboratories recast objects of investigation by inserting them 
into new temporal and territorial regimes’ (1999: 43). I will deal with the implications of 
this in the final section of this chapter. However, within the PaR analysis, I aim to focus 
on the significance of human embodiment, and specifically bodily emotions, within 
scientific experimentation. I will position the Endlessness experiments as an example of 
‘postdramatic’ performance that uses the theatrical/scientific problem as example of 
Shepherd-Barr’s ‘eclecticism of postmodernism’ (2006: 214). 
In the Endlessness examples above a dramaturgy of elimination (distilling, cutting 
and erasing) was used to shape the performance. In the first example, the postcards were 
a means of distilling the core content from scientific writing (Lucretius and Nietzsche). 
As co-devisors we privileged theatrical or aesthetic instincts over historical or 
philosophical concerns, meaning that certain refrains were selected for their 
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form/content, while entire other sections were disregarded. The development of an 
atmosphere for performance drove the selection of material, rather than producing the 
conditions for experimentation. This process of ‘elimination’ facilitated radical textual 
adaptation with stylistic and tonal criteria (cf. Brook’s 1962 King Lear). The use of 
‘elimination’ in this way recalls 1960s experimentalism that subsequently ushered in a 
postmodern turn in theatre practice (e.g. Robert Lepage, Tadeusz Kantor, Heiner Muller 
and Robert Wilson). In this ‘postdramatic’ register, cutting and collage were as much part 
of the creative process as making and devising, and experimentation became theatrical. 
 In Phase 3, as described above, the stylized approach to measurement and data 
suggests that Endlessness may have adopted too much of a scientific register. This may have 
influenced another audience member to write that the piece has produced the feeling of 
‘powerlessness’ in her body. While it had been a feature of the process to eliminate 
sentiment where possible, some of the audience wanted more emotion, more awe, more 
wonder. Some comments suggest it would be ‘more like real science’ if the piece 
conveyed a wider emotional register for the scientific process. Our focus had been on 
conveying the physical struggle of experiments themselves. Furthermore, the elimination 
of all light sources – except the portable lamp – enabled the performer to make the void 
tangible and to capture the labour of measurement. This particular aspect of the material 
environment created ‘void’ (i.e. the actor’s body and the lamp alone together created a 
sense of endless dark space), while the audience (in their feedback) appeared to become 
aware of a bound ‘infinity’ within the studio. In achieving that, this aspect of the 
experiment enabled us to play with scale, and make certain adjustments to the physical 
conditions surrounding the imaginative ‘void’ (i.e. curved audience seating extending into 
the distance, total blackout prior to the performance, no latecomers policy decision, the 
use of radio static and voice-over, using the lamp rather than standard theatrical lighting).  
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Some final observations on language and style in Endlessness conclude this section. 
The initial experiments, but not the performance event, required the elimination of all 
vocabulary except ‘zero’, ‘nothing’, ‘none’ and ‘never’. The protagonist’s stream-of-
consciousness monologue began to feel relentless in performance, blurring boundaries 
between rehearsed action and spontaneous improvisation. My view is that this emerged 
from the performer’s physical experience of enacting such a ‘cruel’ piece of theatre, 
which systematically denied the traditional expressiveness of the actor (we avoided 
characterization or spoken dialogue). Although there were markers (e.g. repeated phrases 
on ‘nothing’ and ‘void’) in the script, set by technical cues, the performer’s lapse in 
delivery can be viewed experimentally. This moment breakdown of characterized the 
‘postdramatic’ style of the performance, and contributed a scientific outcome. 
Shepherd-Barr’s Science on Stage: From Doctor Faustus to Copenhagen (2006) describes 
a new form of performing science: ‘[where] rather than developing a character, mentally 
fleshing out the character’s story and motives as most actors in traditional theater are 
trained to do, the actor in the alternative science play is primarily a vessel for ideas’ (212). 
The ‘alternative science play’ is, for Shepherd-Barr, a new convention where: ‘a great deal 
more emphasis is placed on the body in what is intensely physical theater’ (212). 
Endlessness can be seen as an ‘alterative science play’ under these criteria, and it also 
responds to Shepherd-Barr’s description of such works as ‘postdramatic’, in that ‘they 
also stretch traditional notions of time and space in the theater’ (214). In ‘providing a 
series of extended moments’, Endlessness can be characterized within what Shepherd-Barr 
describes as an ‘eclecticism of postmodernism’ because: ‘recent science plays defy C.P. 
Snow’s pessimistic forecast of a widening rift between the two cultures and instead 
encourage each culture to learn about the other through the interactive and persistently 
experimental medium of performance’ (218). Within this paradigm, the performer’s lapse 
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in Endlessness (his monologue falling apart at the seams), exemplifies theatre’s inability to 
contain the full complexity of experimentation.  
I would consider this a scientific outcome, as it was not unexpected. All of the 
theatrical elements were in place to repeat the same physical action (scripting the 
monologue, choreographing the movement, setting the audio, plotting the lighting, 
rehearsing the sequence etc.). However, in performance, something fell apart as a result 
of the experimental conditions. Rather than viewing this outright as a representational 
failure, which shattered traditional values of character and plot, the Endlessness failure 
occurred within the context of a theatrical/scientific process. I can only conclude that the 
actor’s body had been affected by the repeated attempts to make the void tangible by 
measuring it with his body, where the character’s failure became his own in performance. 
Although the actor had accomplished this sequence of actions with the monologue in 
perfect synchronicity with the recorded audio (during rehearsal), when the public 
experiment took place, the monologue overflowed and exceeded itself.  This rupture in 
the artifice of theatre became a revelation in the event of performance.  
I make this distinction to show that the theatrical/scientific problem can only 
manifest itself through the excessive nature of performance, rather than within 
controlled mechanisms of theatrical production. In the event of performance, the artifice 
gave way to experimentation in unpredictable ways. If the monologue had been 
performed exactly as written, its status within an experimental performance could be 
called to account. Instead, the actor’s lapse saved the performance from its own 
theatricality, and enabled ‘laboratorial’ phenomena to emerge. As a result, we were able 
to sit in front of the audience as three collaborators (see Figure 2.7) having simply 
presented a theatrical/scientific problem that constituted a ‘postdramatic’ experiment in 




IV. ‘Kindly watch us at play’: performance experiments 
In this final section I will consider the reflexivity at the core of laboratory process. 
Knorr Cetina insists that: ‘we need to conceive of laboratories as processes [and] we have 
to expect different types of laboratory processes in different areas, resulting from 
cumulative processes of differentiation’ (1999: 45). Knorr Cetina emphasizes the diversity 
of laboratories in various ‘epistemic cultures’ globally, making a particular comparison 
between biomedical research and high-energy physics. From her argument, I would like 
to draw the socially situated nature of laboratories – within ‘the knowledge machineries 
of contemporary sciences’ – and their capacity to ‘display the smear of technical, social, 
symbolic dimensions of intricate expert systems’ (3). Ultimately, she argues that this 
‘disunifies the sciences’ (3) and extends the ‘current transmutation of modernity into new 
institutional forms’ (5).  
Knorr Cetina begins her analysis of experimental cultures in non-scientific 
laboratories: ‘the psychoanalyst’s couch, the medieval cathedral, and the war game’ (33). 
By contrast, Read notes that: 
 
The root of the word ‘laboratory’, a word first used in English in 1608 around the time that 
Shakespeare was contemplating The Tempest, the ‘labour of oratory’, forcing things to speak, is a 
reminder of the violence inherent to all demonstrations of discoveries. (2013: 22) 
 
I will consider the implications of rendering performance as scientific through laboratory 
processes, and compare this will ‘violence of demonstration’ in science-theatre practices. 
Taken together, the historical materials (ToC) and the PaR experiments (Endlessness) 
convey a problem shared between the arts and the sciences in relation to observation. 
Each case study reveals an experimental problem, when observation is expanded too 
widely or inaccurately defined. Brook and Marowitz’s problem was how to apply Artaud 
without betraying him. This problem was exposed in the act of performance, when their 
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highly subsidized ‘scientific research’ failed to deliver a show, so that Genet’s play 
seemed unstageable at that time. The fact that this period of experimentation directly 
informed the success of Marat/Sade (1965) and Brook’s subsequent RSC productions 
(e.g. A Midsummer Night’s Dream, 1970) provides a useful model for understanding how 
values and practices emerge from ‘laboratory’ theatres. For example, Endlessness also 
failed to deliver a ‘show’, but directly informed our choices for Fail Better Fragments and 
some elements of Beckett and Brain Science (both 2012). While there is always a risk in 
showing theatre experiments too early, it is the open observation of these phenomena 
that constitute the laboratory status of these projects. The co-investigators had to be 
prepared to un-learn their theatrical instincts to ‘make a show’ in order for trandisciplinary 
performances to emerge through the interdisciplinary collaboration.  
Helen Nicholson argues in Theatre, Education and Performance (2011) that ‘new 
epistemologies are developing as a result of collaborations between theatre-makers and 
scientists that redefine the relationship between theatre, performance, public engagement 
and experiential learning’ (177). She also notes that: 
 
Theatre not only has the potential to dramatize bioethical debates, but that collaboration enables 
scientists and artists to challenge outdated perceptions that the arts are intuitive, emotional and 
empathetic whereas sciences are, in Tim Ingold’s words, built on ‘the sovereign perspective of 
abstract reason’ and the ‘cold logic’ of scientific judgment [2000: 25], a view that became 
entrenched in twentieth-century educational discourse. (2011: 177) 
 
Nicholson is particularly attuned to the relationship between scientific knowledge and 
‘structures of power’, and her analysis develops this argument towards a question: ‘how 
might the relationship between science and theatre education be reconceptualised for the 
twenty-first century?’ (182). My own response to this question has been outlined in the 
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PaR accounts above, but I will now draw these ideas together by thinking about the 
reflexivity of experiments in practice. 
In positioning reflexivity as a feature of PaR experimentation, I am also 
acknowledging its relationship to scientific research. Latour and Woolgar’s notion of 
reflexivity in relation to ‘the construction of scientific facts’ is most relevant here, 
particularly their nuanced account of its function: ‘reflexivity is thus a way of reminding 
the reader that all texts are stories. This applies as much to the facts of our scientists as to 
the fictions “through which” we display their work’ (1979: 284). Latour and Woolgar 
explain what reflexivity does, but not how it is defined. The reflexive, in grammar, is a 
linguistic state of ‘referring back to the subject of a clause’ (OED, 1998: 1154). From this 
status of ‘language about language’, I would like to consider ‘practice about practice’ as a 
new category for my own PaR18. This can also be related back to Brook’s experiments, 
which were often meta-theatrical in nature. This conception of laboratory process as 
reflexive turns experiment back on itself to create practice-about-practice. For example, 
the Endlessness performance functioned as a demonstration of the earlier experiments and 
re-iterated their material conditions. This kind of closed experimentation in a private 
laboratory (briefly open to the public) is something that I believe characterized Brook’s 
ToC process also. This differs from the open experimentation that I will discuss in next 
chapter, where Laban’s movement praxis and Littlewood’s Fun Palace imagine a public 
laboratory without a bound timescale.  
 For Nicholson, these issues relate to the ‘social conditions in which knowledge is 
produced, translated, transformed and disseminated’ (2011: 195), and she goes on to 
summarize the problem historically: ‘one of the arguments [in this chapter] is predicated 
on challenging the two culture divide that is a legacy of the Enlightenment separation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This is especially true of Fail Better Fragments (2012) in performance, but a notable aspect of both 
Endlessness (2011) and Discords (2010) during the respective devising processes. 
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between reason and emotion, value and aesthetics’ (195). In addressing my own position 
as practitioner within an interdisciplinary research process, I would like to suggest that 
C.P. Snow’s ‘two cultures’ problem did not heavily feature in our collaborations, as the 
scientists had been selected because of their interest in the cultural and pedagogic 
benefits of their research. As Nicholson points out: ‘science, as well as the arts, is 
inspired by emotion and passion, shaped by intuition, and finds expression in narrative 
and aesthetic forms’ (196). It is worth returning to Latour and Woolgar briefly here (‘all 
texts are stories’) where reflexivity has a narrative function as well as an epistemological 
value. It was an important feature of Endlessness, as with Discords, that narrative emerged 
from the adaptation of texts, rather than the interpretation of texts. This emphasized our 
agency as creative artists (making performance), rather than interpretative artists (staging 
drama). I would like to develop these ideas comparing them with Crease’s The Play of 
Nature: Experimentation as Performance (1993). 
 Crease imagines scientific experimentation as a theatrical performance, and the 
scientific laboratory as: ‘constructed for the purpose of facilitating the performance and 
witnessing of a specific kind of action therein’ (104). This ‘theatron’ contains ‘a process 
that involves bringing something materially into being… the laboratory itself is a space of 
action’ (106). He continues: ‘laboratories themselves are socially negotiated outcomes of 
the reconstructions of problematic situations’ and ‘experimenters are in the role of 
producer-directors’ (106). Although Crease falls short of imagining his experimenters as 
performers in their own right, he takes pains to position the performance as the 
experiment itself. This understanding of reflexivity is important for my analysis, and its 
emphasis on the sociology of laboratory structures recalls Latour and Woolgar. However, 
Crease insists that there is an ‘artistry of experimentation’ which he relates to Michael 
Polanyi’s ‘tacit knowledge’, Evelyn Fox Keller’s ‘dynamic objectivity’ and Barbara 
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McClintock’s ‘feeling for the organism’ (108). Furthermore, Crease emphasizes the 
materiality of experimentation thus: 
 
Like artists, experimenters are restricted by the limits of their equipment and materials, they push 
these limits and must wait and see what works… An artistic performance begins with a 
performative play-space that is not infinite… A performer allows such things to function as 
organic parts of the performance as event… apparently inessential details spelled the difference 
between success and failure. (110) 
 
I will consider 1960s theatre laboratories, specifically Brook’s ToC, in light of Crease’s 
discussion. Brook’s description of the ToC as ‘scientific research’ is useful to place 
alongside his judgment on the application of Artaud as betrayal (1990: 60). Both remarks 
imply that Brook’s experiments failed (in their immediate objectives) yet produced a 
radical sense of renewal within the companies themselves. Furthermore, their historical 
significance resides in their capacity to train a new ensemble and produce theatrical 
innovations that led to his productions of Marat/Sade (1965), MSND (1970) and, 
eventually, his CIRT/CICT experiments in Paris. The experiments failed to deliver his 
intended full production of Genet’s The Screens (aborted in 1964), but they began the 
process of constructing a new theatrical language that can be traced even to recent CICT 
productions such as The Valley of Astonishment (2014).  
 Likewise, the experiments of the Living and Open Theatres also failed to ‘apply 
Artaud’ to the politics of the 1960s New York avant-garde. As Chaikin wrote 
retrospectively: ‘All prepared systems fail. They fail when they are applied... Process is 
dynamic: it’s the evolution that takes place during work. Systems are recorded as ground 
plans, not to be followed any more than rules of courtship can be followed’ (1972: 21). 
Chaikin wrote that: ‘very early in our meetings, even before we started calling ourselves 
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the Open Theater, we were a formless group. The initial form came about as a result of 
the people who originally made up that group’ (54). He continues, 
 
Julian Beck said that an actor has to be like Columbus: he has to go out and discover something, 
and come back and report on what he discovers. Voyages have to be taken, but there has to be a 
place to come back to, and this place has to be different from the established theater. It is not 
likely to be a business place. (54) 
 
Were it not for the final sentence, we might imagine such a place as a university or a 
laboratory. However, as both types of environments are run as businesses in the 
contemporary moment, I would like to re-imagine Chaikin’s place of return as a ‘theatre 
laboratory’, which is formed of people, not physical structures or financial systems. In 
some ways, this corresponds to Crease’s thesis, where there is: ‘relatedness between the 
act and those witnessing it… from an observed co-working of elements’ (112). Chaikin 
imagined in 1965 that ‘one of the good things is that we’re willing to fail; it helps us go 
beyond the safe limits and become adventurers (56). By contrast, Crease concludes that 
‘the artistry of experimentation, like that of the theatre, is often accompanied by a feeling 
of joy and celebration’ (120). For Chaikin, the joy is to: ‘experiment with what the teacher 
doesn’t know. But working with the “don’t knows” is perhaps more important than 
teaching the “knows”’ (57). 
 Within this logic of performative experimentation is the valorization of both risk 
and failure. While these particular topics have been extensively covered elsewhere (see 
Ridout, 2006; Bailes, 2011; O’Gorman and Werry, 2012), they are worth re-emphasizing 
here in relation to experimental histories of performance. Within interdisciplinary 
collaborations, such as the ‘science theatre’ experiments of this chapter, there is a necessary 
risk of failure. This is especially apparent in the willful abandonment of closed expertise 
in favour of an open experimentalism. As the collaborators, and especially the 
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performers themselves, are particularly vulnerable in these conditions, it should be noted 
that each process requires its own pedagogy for participation. Historical ‘pedagogic’ 
strategies for experimentation can be found in Chaikin’s Presence of the Actor (1972), 
Barker’s Theatre Games (1977) and Marowitz’s Notes on the ToC (1988 [1965]). These texts 
document ‘laboratory’ processes with a focus on participation. While this aspect of 
experimental process will be explored further in Chapter 3, it should be noted that any 
laboratory process must be carefully monitored by those responsible. Chaikin discussed 
this implied vulnerability as follows: ‘when the Open Theater started we were only a 
private laboratory. We did performances, occasionally, but basically we were a laboratory 
performing unfinished work’ (1972: 104).  
In this chapter, I have addressed the ToC experiments and my own PaR in order 
to re-examine ‘theatre laboratories’ and scientific performance. I have shown that these 
laboratories were closed for private experimentation, and that the interdisciplinary 
theatrical/scientific problem has been a feature of each process. The need for artists and 
scientists to experiment, sometimes in collaboration with each other, has been a defining 
feature of this work and will inform the next chapter on making those processes public. I 
will explore the idea that experiments can become open-ended participatory events, as 
opposed to closed disciplinary mechanisms. It is through such a re-conceptualization of 
laboratory process that arts-based methodologies such as PaR can blur distinctions 
between ‘epistemic things’ and ‘technical objects’ (Borgdorff 2012: 190). In the reflexivity 
of practice-about-practice there is an important distinction between the ‘things we want to 
know (epistemic things) and […] objects through which we know (technical objects)’ (190). 
The next chapter will extend the epistemic and the technical into the public laboratories 





We shall know that to dance is also to think. 
(Littlewood: 1968)19 
 
I. Science playgrounds : on ‘evolving’ Laban 
This chapter adapts the historiographical PaR model from the previous chapters, but 
extends the argument to the play/experiment problem. From the organic machinery of 
Play/Discords to the scientific theatre of ToC/Endlessness, I would now like to consider the 
ludic experimentation of Fun Palace/Fail Better Fragments via 1960s performance cultures 
and their relationship to contemporary movement praxis. By foregrounding human 
movement in this way, especially Laban’s eight ‘efforts’ (Press, Punch, Glide, Dab, Flick, 
Wring, Slash, Float), I will interrogate how performance practices can inform critical 
pedagogies for participation.20 In contrast with earlier chapters, this work will move 
towards a trans-disciplinary approach (practice producing knowledge across/beyond 
disciplines) as opposed to the earlier examples of multi-/inter-disciplinarity through 
performance. However, the chapter follows the same structure by extending my analysis 
from histories of practice into contemporary PaR, which imagines a participatory future 
for performance.  
Littlewood herself, as a theatre practitioner shaped directly by Laban’s work, 
imagined a performance culture in which: ‘the theatre will became a university of the 
streets and people who start to play this game… without knowing where they’re going, 
not particularly knowing what the objective is, [and] find different forms in different 
places’ (BFIB1064). Elaborating on this, in a 1968 interview, she stated: ‘I think 
education will go on to the streets – will need to – you can connect street corners and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Joan Littlewood interview (1968, 21 min) accompanying Everyone’s an Actor Shakespeare Said (BFIB1064)	  
20 By ‘critical pedagogies of participation’ I am referring to Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Freire 1968) and 
drawing upon earlier educationalists such as John Dewey and David Kolb.	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literally… people might stop being self-conscious and start to really dance… we shall 
know that to dance is also to think’ (BFIB1064). These spoken thoughts demonstrate her 
visionary and democratic idealism for a post-1960s theatre, which was only partially 
achieved within her lifetime. I will position Littlewood’s visionary thinking in relation to 
Laban’s general movement praxis (via Lisa Ullmann and Jean Newlove) and show how 
they found form in indeterminate structures such as Cedric Price’s Fun Palace and 
Littlewood’s Learn to Play projects.  
 I will begin by introducing Littlewood’s use of Laban within her own practice. 
The constant reference to Laban in her work is positioned by Robert Leach in the 
following terms: ‘her ‘style’ was rooted in 1930s agit-prop, experiments with commedia 
dell’arte, German Expressionism and profound work with the ideas of Stanislavski and 
Laban. Consequently, it had all the hallmarks of the hybrid’ (2006: 186). Leach places 
heavy emphasis on Littlewood’s practice as having been drawn from both Stanislavski 
and Laban simultaneously. Earlier in his study he argues that: ‘Littlewood and MacColl 
were the first in Britain to attempt seriously and consistently to apply Stanislavski’s 
system to their work’ (92). The opportunity to combine this system with Laban’s came 
through the body, and focused on movement, as centrally important to the acting 
process. Leach reminds us that: ‘it is the emphasis on what precedes action which unites 
Stanislavski and Laban’ (93). For example, drawing upon archival materials held at the 
University of Texas at Austin, he shows that a typical rehearsal week for ‘the theatre 
workshop actor’ would include multiple movement calls. In one such example, ‘a 
timetable given to actors for a week in 1948’ (123–4), the record shows six rehearsals 
calls with Jean Newlove specifically, and four additional general movement calls, on top 
of the voice calls and scene work across six days. This regular focus on movement would 
have been unusual for British theatre companies at this time (in contrast to the 
voice/text work of Devine and Brook discussed in earlier chapters). Within these 
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movement sessions, the practitioners were reworking Laban’s ‘efforts’ for the specific 
needs of Littlewood’s company:  
 
Jean Newlove had the actors rehearsing with closed eyes. What were the movements? Not a light 
as a dab nor as heavy as a thrust; consequently she invented the ‘dab-thrust’. Only when the 
physical actions were telling the truth did the actors begin to consider the scripted lines.  
(Leach, 2006: 126) 
 
This evolution of Laban’s system of eight ‘efforts’ (by splicing two together) 
demonstrates that this is an open system, malleable in practice. In order to elucidate this 
point, it is necessary to reference a table (below) that ‘demonstrates the incredible 






Punching (direct, strong, quick) Fighting against Weight, Space and Time 
Pressing (direct, strong, sustained) Fighting with Weight and Space, Indulging in Time 
Slashing (flexible, strong, quick) Fighting with Weight and Time, Indulging in Space 





Dabbing (direct, light, quick) Fighting with Space and Time, Indulging in Weight 
Gliding (direct, light, sustained) Fighting with Space, Indulging in Weight and Time 
Flicking (flexible, light, quick) Fighting with Time, Indulging in Weight and Space 
Floating (flexible, light, sustained) Indulging in Weight, Time and Space 
 




McCaw’s table shows how this vocabulary of movement can function as a system, and 
Leach’s account of Newlove’s ‘dab-thrust’ [the ‘Punch’ is sometimes called a ‘Thrust’] 
reveals its potential for practical application and future evolution. In the Theatre 
Workshop context, Leach makes a clear distinction between mime and ‘the practical 
application of Laban’s dynamic system’ (126). This distinction is also important for this 
chapter, as a particular focus will be the impact of Laban on contemporary research 
methods. Laban recommended his methods ‘for all the manifold purposes in which 
mastery of movement might play a practical role: education, industry, recreation and, as I 
think, science’ (Ullmann, 1984: 6). This is a statement that starts to introduce the 
transdisciplinary application of Laban’s methods, which I want to argue is evident in 
Littlewood’s Fun Palace and our own Fail Better Fragments. By focusing on movement in 
terms of FLOW, SPACE, TIME and WEIGHT, I want to explore how we were able to 
blur distinctions between performers and participants in order to create a series of open 
performance experiments. This marked a change in our practice, from the restricted 
structures of Beckett and Brook to the movement systems of Laban and Littlewood. 
As will be shown below, the evolution of theatrical systems is something under 
investigation in the Fail Better Fragments material, where Laban’s ‘efforts’ intermingled 
with earlier Artaudian and Beckettian experiments. Fundamentally, the free use of 
Laban’s ‘efforts’, as advocated by Newlove at Theatre Workshop, emerges as an 
evolutionary step in performance practice. It has proven to be an accessible system for 
movement with both professional artists and public participants, as it has the potential to 
open up a transdisciplinary dialogue across the subject areas. It also allows movement to 
be free and fun, an aspect of Laban that Littlewood advocated. Furthermore, the thinking 
on ‘stillness and stir’ (Laban in Ullmann, 1984: 68) allows non-movement-in-movement to be a 
valid form of participation. We shall see that Littlewood imagined rest and recuperation 
an acceptable mode of engagement within the Fun Palace. However, the structure was 
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also designed by Price to include a ‘science playground’, which would contain forms of 
human movement that promote scientific learning through play. 
 
II. ‘A university of the streets’: Littlewood’s laboratory 
The practices of Laban and Littlewood have produced knowledge through ludic 
action. In doing so, they trouble binaries between arts/sciences, work/play and 
public/private. Laban’s scientific movement analysis has since informed medical and 
industrial practices (see McCaw, 2011) and Price’s design for the Fun Palace would have 
created a ‘university of the streets’ for Littlewood to devise hybrid performances for 
London. An extended historical case study follows, in order to explore the value of this 
process (c.1961–68) for an improved understanding of Laban’s influence on Littlewood’s 
vision. I will begin with her own words, drawing from her infamous Joan’s Book (‘as she 
tells it’), which comprises 762 pages, even before its hefty Appendices (one of which 
focuses entirely on Laban). Regarding the Fun Palace, Littlewood begins her account 
with a physical location, the Lea Valley, and a collaborative relationship: 
 
1961 was the year I met Cedric Price, the young architect with the keen mind and an interest in 
accommodating change. When I’d blown off steam about the current vogue for quaint old theatres, he 
hadn’t said much, but he had gone away and designed the ‘Fun Palace’. The first time I saw the plans 
was when I dropped in on him at his office… The drawing was almost inexplicable. I could make out 
filigree towers, varied areas at different levels, there were galleries, gantries and escalators – it looked 
airborne. (1994: 701) 
 
However, by this point the geography had already shifted, as Littlewood states that ‘I’d 
found the ideal site for the Palace, Glengall, on the Isle of Dogs… land, by a tidal river – 
and that river the Sweet Thames’ (702). By 1963, two sites were being considered, the 
Lea Valley and the Isle of Dogs, and Price’s involvement created interest from the design 
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communities and journalists of the time. Both Littlewood and Price were summoned 
before ‘top-level London County Council officials and questioned closely’ (703), and 
while this resulted in a rejection of the Isle of Dogs proposal, they showed a willingness 
to assist in finding an alternative site. However, ‘the possibility of finding riverside land 
of the area required, in that part of London, seems to be remote and the cost would be 
exorbitant’, Littlewood reports before concluding, ‘so goodbye to the perfect site. We 
would never find such another.’ (703). 
Intriguingly, Littlewood claimed that they ‘were gaining support among the scientists: 
Professor Rotblat, who had helped us with Uranium 235, was for us; so was Lord Ritchie 
Calder. Dr Gordon Pask of Systems Research joined forces with us’ (703). The Fun Palace 
would offer an opportunity for artists and scientists to engage in research through 
performances, debates and experiments. As the previous chapter demonstrated, this 
precarious relationship can produce quasi-scientific performances that fail to open up 
experimentation to a wider public. Nonetheless, in abandoning theatre for a more 
inclusive cultural practice, Littlewood had engaged a series of diverse collaborators. Her 
new project was, emphatically, ‘not theatre’: 
 
Described as both a ‘university of the streets’ and ‘a laboratory of pleasure', Littlewood envisaged the 
Fun Palace as a multi-use space housing a series of short-term, frequently updated activities that could 
provide an ever-changing focus for people’s leisure time. (Holdsworth, 2011: 211) 
 
An emphasis on participation, democracy and stimulation created new ‘opportunities to 
experiment with different modes of entertainment and education’ (212). While this still 
seems radically transdisciplinary even today, the impermanence of the venture can be 
seen as its major downfall. The emphasis in Price’s designs on ease of movement and 
maximizing flow through ramps and escalators were important to its structural 
indeterminacy. In fact, the entire structure was permeable and fluid, even temporary and 
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demountable. This aspect of the architecture was an important parallel for Littlewood’s 
vision for human movement within the building, and its material contents would trouble 
the ‘two cultures’ notion of the arts and sciences. Rather, Littlewood and Price blurred 
public leisure activity with cybernetic research, prefiguring contemporary phenomena 
such as haptic screens in public spaces or ‘learning machines’ built into civic architecture. 
Littlewood’s emphasis on movement, as both playful and experimental, recalls Laban: 
 
From his first writings, he was concerned by the deadening effect that machine-work in factories 
was having on workers, and he was keen to bring together the worlds of artistic movement and 
industrial movement (witness his massive pageant of trades and crafts in Vienna in 1929). 
(McCaw, 2011: 333–4) 
 
As McCaw notes, Laban’s Effort (with F.C. Lawrence, 1947) contradicts F.W. Taylor’s 
highly influential The Principles of Scientific Management (2005 [1911]) and: ‘happiness is a 
value for Laban – whether it be in education, recreation or work – this is not simply 
about celebration, it is also about the best use of human energy’ (2011: 334). From this 
value, there emerges an ethical praxis for human movement, whether that takes place in 
the theatre, classroom or factory. Across Laban’s practice and writings there are a series 
of pedagogic statements, not dissimilar from Littlewood’s own: ‘she has an extraordinary 
power of being able to get out of an individual the one spark they possibly had in them’ 
(Ben Ellis quoted in Leach, 2006: 186). For the remainder of this section, I will continue 
to describe the Fun Palace project, but will do so with these particular values of physical 
health and wellbeing in mind. Alongside the ‘entertainment’, the structure would 
facilitate public protest or personal reflection, as well as ‘scientific gadgetry… learning 
machines… laboratories…’ (Holdsworth, 2011: 213).  
 The re-purposing of a laboratory as ‘science playground’ (213) would not only 
have collapsed traditional boundaries between the arts and sciences, but also distinctions 
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between work and play (or work/life in contemporary parlance). This has the strongest 
bearing upon Laban where the public and the private coalesce in human movement. In 
fact, Laban’s influence was also apparent as: ‘Littlewood regarded fun as an integral part 
of the learning process and encapsulated this in the interactive tests and games planned 
for the “science” and “fun” areas’ (217-8). Embedded in this approach, is the interwoven 
idea that ‘the mastery of movement’ (Laban’s term) can both celebrate and shape human 
energy, which promotes ‘happiness as a value’ (cf. McCaw, 2011). The influence of these 
ideas upon Littlewood had already found their expression in the practices of Theatre 
Workshop, but now they could be shared with a wider public at the Fun Palace. As 
Holdsworth makes clear: 
 
Certainly, the project is interesting for the way it respected pleasure as polymorphous – activated 
in numerous ways from a bombardment of the senses to the excitement of intellectual curiosity, 
the application of practical skills, the process of learning, the feel of unfamiliar objects, the active 
participations in a public or communal event or simply the joy of doing nothing. (2011: 218) 
 
The ludic aspects of this project are worth further consideration, and will be directly 
addressed in my Conclusion, which draws upon a century of ‘play studies’ from Homo 
Ludens (Huizinga, 1949) to A Philosophy of Sport (Connor, 2011). Indeed, Littlewood’s own 
writing about the Fun Palace, for the New Scientist in May 1964, revealed her profound 
commitment to the pedagogic capacity of play:  
 
In London we are going to create a university of the streets – not a gracious park, but a foretaste of 
the pleasures of the future. The ‘Fun Arcade’ will be full of the games that psychologists and 
electronics engineers now devise for the service of industry, or war. Knowledge will be piped through 




One extraordinary thing about this historical vision of the future is how familiar it feels 
to contemporary individuals immersed in the digital cultures of 2015. With recent 
developments in open-access content (e.g. Future Learn) at UK higher education 
institutions and the numerous digital platforms on which contemporary drama and film 
is now disseminated (e.g. NT Live), the Fun Palace designs were almost prophetic. 
However, one could also argue that the cybernetic revolution of the post-war period has 
finally found its apogee in the distributed applications of contemporary digital systems. 
Even so, Littlewood’s vision collapsed scientific research and popular entertainment 
together, in ways that contemporary public engagement programmes have attempted in 
the early twenty-first century (see Nicholson, 2011); ‘in the science playground the 
wondering scholars of the future – the mystics, the skeptics and sophists – can dispute 
till dawn’ (704). Furthermore, the claim that an: ‘acting area will afford the therapy of 
theatre for everyone… and perhaps find stimulus in social research’ (704) may be 
strongly associated with later traditions of applied theatre, especially the practice of 
Augusto Boal.21 However, Littlewood’s space has a different kind of politics to the 
‘theatre of the oppressed’, she states that: ‘the essence of the place will be an informality 
– nothing obligatory – anything goes’ (704). The impermanence of Littlewood’s structure 
is its unique asset: ‘with informality goes flexibility’ (705), and there is an emphasis on 
pleasure, not politics.  
 However, the Fun Palace would transcend mere hedonism as a leisure space, by 
offering ‘social observation’ (through direct experience or television screens) and the 
participant is imagined as a performer, ‘there will be no rigid division between 
performers and audience – a generalization of the technique used in Theatre Workshop 
for many years’ (705–6). While Littlewood does not make the connection specifically to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Of course, Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed (1979) responds directly to Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1968) 
and these practices are roughly simultaneous with the Fun Palace project.	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Laban, her focus on stimulating human movement through the dynamic use of space, 
and Newlove’s evolution of the ‘efforts’ at Theatre Workshop, are of central importance 
here. Not only did Littlewood welcome this movement practice, but also she actively 
provided the experimental conditions where the craft could develop. Her actors, not 
unlike those working at the same time with Devine or Brook, become ‘co-investigators’ 
in quasi-scientific experimentation. She also imagined reflexive spaces within the Fun 
Palace as so-called ‘zones of quiet’ (706) which created a place for observation (a 
necessary feature of all laboratories, as we have seen). The opportunity to be a still body, 
amongst moving bodies, was an important factor in the practices of Laban (see Ullmann, 
1984), which evokes my own understanding of non-movement-in-movement. Stillness amongst 
activity – or observation within experimentation – not only produces a place for 
reflection and documentation, but also provided Littlewood with an opportunity for 
research activity. 
 It is therefore no surprise that ‘the Fun Palace excited a good deal of interest in 
the scientific world’ (706) and Gordon Pask’s Cybernetics Committee brought together a 
group of individuals that would might today be considered a transdisciplinary network. 
Price’s own statement in the New Scientist, alongside Littlewood’s, asserted that: ‘the 
activities designed for the site should be experimental, the place itself expendable and 
changeable’ (707). The brave assertion that: ‘the ephemeral nature of the architecture is a 
major element of the design, making possible the use of materials and techniques 
normally excluded from the building industry’ (707) seems radical to this day, as public 
buildings are regularly flexible but rarely temporary, outside of major sporting events22. 
Another unique feature of Price’s design is ‘the nature of enclosures’ (for there are 
some), in a structure without doorways, where it is imagined that ‘separate units’, 
‘inflatable enclosures’ and ‘boxes’ will be re-positioned by ‘a permanent travelling gantry 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The London 2012 Olympic Games made use of indeterminate structures, ironically in E15.	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crane spanning the whole structure’ (708). Furthermore, the site itself would provide an 
experimental site for architecture itself: ‘the whole complex provided valuable site-testing 
conditions for a wide range of materials, equipment and constructional techniques’ (708). 
By 1964, Price was considering a site at Mill Meads in the Lea Valley and referred 
the proposal to the newly formed Newham council. Thomas North (council architect) 
had decided that the site be used for a Teacher Training College, according to Littlewood 
(712). Price is quoted as stating that: ‘pilot schemes, parked temporarily on any available 
land, will be of great value as outlets for districts which lack modern entertainment and 
educational amenities. Pilots will also provide some specialized research for the main 
scheme’ (713). At this stage of the project’s near collapse, it was important that any 
temporary space would have a research function, and Littlewood allegedly ‘roamed far 
and wide, a land-hungry settler’ (713), assisted by the Thames Harbour-master. It was at 
this stage in her search that she considered other British cities, from Liverpool to 
Glasgow, and was persuaded to establish the Fun Palace Trust.23 
 I would like to address the tension between ‘fun’ and ‘labour’ in Littlewood’s 
descriptions of the Fun Palace. At the time, the word ‘fun’ had caused trouble for the 
project, but Jennie Lee (politician and wife of Ny Bevan) claimed to like the word, 
though for all the wrong reasons, according to Littlewood: 
 
I tried explaining the F.P. but the only thing she seemed to like about us was the word ‘fun’. She 
wanted everything to be ‘gay and colourful’ for the working people. I tried to explain that we’d chosen 
the word ‘fun’ almost as a provocation. I didn’t stand a chance with my work-play symbiosis (715). 
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  I use this level of detail about architectural space and geographical place, as it will inform the PaR 
material that follows in the next section. Our own choice to create Fail Better Fragments in the Humanities 
Studio at the University of Warwick (as opposed to a theatre venue in Oxford or London) was an 
ecological decision to revisit the company’s birthplace in order to experiment with an invited audience 
under subsided conditions. It had also been the Warwick Theatre Studies studio until 2008.	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As noted above, the ludic can also have philosophical validity (see Huizinga, 1949; 
Caillois, 1961; Sutton-Smith, 2001; Connor, 2011) and, for Gregory Bateson, play had an 
evolutionary significance as a ‘meta-communicative’ activity (1972). His relative Patrick 
Bateson characterized ‘playful play’ (with Martin, 2013) as a fun and creative way to 
learn, although its primary function is ludic. While play and fun are clearly different 
things, they are often coincidental in forms of human movement that are associated with 
cultural performance (e.g. dancing, enacting, improvising). Furthermore, Littlewood’s use 
of the term ‘fun’ as a provocation has a deeply political edge in a post-war landscape 
when rubble must be cleared in order to establish a playground. In that sense, Huizinga’s 
‘homo ludens’ must first survive, before she can play in post-war landscape. Indeed, for 
Gregory Bateson, there was a complex interrelationship between play and survival, which 
he evidences by comparing primate interactions (play-fighting monkeys) with human 
knowledge (why do we play?). ‘Fun’ – for Littlewood as much as Bateson – was part of a 
hybrid evolutionary process and a complex system of communication.  
For example, as part of her struggle to find potential sites for her ‘laboratory of fun’, 
Littlewood considered a space near the Roundhouse in Camden: ‘two patches of scruffy 
land, divided by a small road, with a railway bridge overhead’ (716). However, this 
became one of several aborted proposals. By this time, however, Price’s revised designs 
included ‘an adult learning area with teaching machines’ and ‘an open-air classroom’ 
(716). These features reveal the pedagogic discoveries that would be found via the 
fragmentary experience of play, within an architectural structure that privileged 
community interaction.24 During this period, Littlewood describes her regular work at Le 
Centre Culturel in Tunisia [as] ‘our only Fun Palace’ (1994: 736) and, from 1968 
onwards, she began focusing on community playgrounds in London. These temporary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ironically, Littlewood recounts how the local residents destroyed any possibility of this pilot project, 
whom she quotes via the Hampstead and Highgate Express (12.02.65): ‘the building would attract the most 
undesirable type of rowdy and hooligan from other areas’ (718).	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playgrounds became the only urban universities she would build during her lifetime. She 
later reflected that at Mill Meads ‘today in 1993 there is no sign of storm sewage tanks, a 
pumping station or any other structure so urgently needed twenty-eight years ago’ (739). 
I will conclude this section by considering Littlewood’s Fun Palace vision as an 
evolution of Laban’s movement praxis. Writing about Laban’s 1938 Choreutics, Valerie 
Preston-Dunlop argues that it: ‘enables people to look afresh at their own dance and 
movement heritage, ballet in particular, and see it not as a fixed lexicon of steps and 
positions but as a “living architecture”, that is, dynamic spatial forms with the potential 
for change’ (in McCaw, 2011: 176). Furthermore, in the 1938 text Laban wrote: ‘Empty 
space does not exist. On the contrary, space is a superabundance of simultaneous 
movements’ (in McCaw, 2011: 182). Littlewood’s ‘laboratory of fun’ was a new venue for 
this kind of human movement, making performance accessible to all. In her 1968 
interview, Littlewood stated that: ‘The theatre will become a university of the streets’, 
and such as dislocation of knowledge would produce a revolutionary mode of 
educational performance as public participation. As with Laban before her, the aesthetic 
heritage is a ‘living architecture’ that can transform the present through human 
movement. Littlewood had re-imagined this architecture with Price, but eventually found 
that she could also find it by clearing rubble from the streets of Stratford East. Her final 
published words on the Fun Palace claim that: ‘the design didn’t fit the rule book’ (1994: 
741), suggesting that 1960s London was simply not ready for a new model of public 
architecture. However, her hybrid evolution of Laban’s system for a new generation of 
theatre-makers has produced a lasting impact through projects such as the 2014 Fun 
Palaces project. This public event has since demonstrated the range and depth of public 
participation in both the arts and the sciences through play (see Fun Palaces website, 2015).   
In the documentary Everyone’s an actor, Shakespeare said (1968), Littlewood is shown 
working with local boys from Stratford East on an youth theatre project exploring real-
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life authority figures. During the film, she is seen devising new drama with the young 
people, which not only physically removed them from the streets, but also rehearsed 
alternatives for the intergenerational conflicts in their own lives. While it is tempting to 
position this work in relation to Boal’s ‘forum’ theatre, Littlewood’s insistence on 
commitment and discipline recalls Laban’s applied dance work with factory workers and 
actors in training.  These community regeneration projects with young people emerged 
from her Fun Palace side projects (e.g. Learn to Play), where she would encourage the local 
children to help clear sites strewn with rubbish and rubble. Once a site was cleared, it 
became a playground. Once it became a playground, it became a space for fun and 
learning. For example:  
 
In case Newham decided to see us off, I took the precaution of filming that site as we found it. We 
worked and played there, drew and painted, until Michael Holt, a maths teacher from Goldsmith’s 
College, came along. He had new ideas and set the children problems which they solved with coloured 
cubes, not too big to carry. (1994: 755) 
 
Littlewood had indeed founded ‘a university of the streets’ through the excavation of 
debris and without the need for Price’s structure. In clearing a place for play, she 
imagined a new form of public space, one that would: ‘activate personal and political 
awareness of relationships and social structures’ (Holdsworth, 2011: 216). Therefore, 
Littlewood’s playgrounds were not really places for pleasure alone, but pedagogic 
environments for imaginative action. This approach will be considered in the next 





III. PaR efforts: Fail Better’s playground 
This section will detail the Laban-influenced movement praxis in Fail Better Fragments 
(FBF), a performance installation at Warwick with the IATL Student Ensemble. The PaR 
experiments took place in one intensive week in April 2012 and c.60 participants 
attended the installation over one day. The scenography is unusual and particularly 
relevant to this section, so the original design has been included within the 
documentation (see Fragments design on CD-Rom). In response to the Endlessness 
experiments, we shifted our focus from the closed theatrical/scientific problem to the open 
playful/experimental question. In this section, I will focus only on Laban’s ‘efforts’ system 
as an accessible mode of performance experimentation through play. I will apply this 
system to participatory theatre, and use the notion of the ‘science playground’ that 
featured in the Fun Palace designs, which emphasized flexibility, freedom of movement 
and greater agency for the participant. Throughout my analysis I will suggest that these 
factors create greater permeability25 in performance. I will divide this section into three 
primary sub-sections (SPACE, TIME and WEIGHT), with an overview sub-section on 
FLOW. It will be helpful to recall McCaw’s table of Laban ‘efforts’ here: 
 
 Indulging Contending 
Space Flexible Direct 
Weight Light Strong 
Time Sustained Quick 
Flow Free Bound 
 
Table 3.2: ‘concept of effort’ (McCaw, 2011: 199) 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




i. SPACE (Phase 1) 
 
Figure 3.1: FBF (2012) 
 
Our ecological thinking, in literally recycling materials from previous productions 
as creative stimulus for new work, became a defining feature of this experiment. By 
choosing to play with the objects we already had in storage, we adopted a new devised 
approach (for the company), not unlike a writer returning to their abandoned 
manuscripts. I will develop this inquiry via the Laban attitude of SPACE (direct or 
flexible) in relation to our devising method. In these experiments we created liminal 
performance space out of the archive, and placed production materials in relation to each 
other. This generated transitional spaces (between one fictional world and another) that 
became a highly flexible environment for devising with the performers and developing 
new interactions with participants. 
For Laban, flexibility and directness are the measure of movement through 
space. Flexible (or indirect) movers: ‘apparently swim, circulate and twist most 
thoroughly through any possible region of space’ (McCaw, 2011: 226). Direct movers, 
however: ‘deal very sparingly with their moving space… take careful account of the 
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extension and expansion of their movements’ (226). In preparing for FBF, the ensemble 
made clear choices about each role, which then impacted on their construction of 
SPACE in performance. For example, each performer had to select two production areas 
in which to embody a role. This enabled an ensemble of six to play with twelve roles 
from ten separate dramas. 
 Hence our experiments with direct and flexible use of SPACE became essential 
modes of transition between each area. This also enabled the devising methods to 
oscillate between stable ‘roles’ (direct engagement with specific production areas) and 
flexible transitions when moving as performers (and, therefore, not ‘in role’) from one 
area to another. This produced a liminal environment that encouraged the audience to 
engage as participants. For example, when a performer began to make a transition 
between characters, they were able to transform flexibly to their next role, adopting a 
physically nuanced interaction with space. I consider this process permeable as we intended 
audience experience to be pervaded by character transitions, with the aim that their 
experiences of SPACE would become saturated by the multiplicity of production areas.  
The boundaries between characters and production areas were made deliberately 
porous and could be altered by the participants through free movement or shifts in 
focus. Our devising process had led to an understanding that these gaps in the fabric of 
performance produced dynamic encounters between participants. This increased 
flexibility in the piece enabled the participants to take a more direct role through 
movement. Laban imagines ‘easy movers’ as those who: ‘use a great deal of flexibility and 
twists in their efforts’ (226). Our participants seemed to enjoy a greater engagement with 
our installation, which was noticeable through their exploratory movements during the 
transitions. However, ‘there are others who deal very sparingly with their moving space’ 
(226), who would use directness as their main mode of participation. These participants 
were observed to follow the performers’ actions and only divert for material objects that 
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particularly interested them: ‘as if they had an aversion against the manifold extensions of 
space’ (226). In order to encourage these participants to engage more fully, we created 
the character transitions as permeable sequences that required the audience to make 
personal decisions about SPACE.  
The apparent tension between restriction and fluidity in the piece was crucial in 
relation to use of SPACE. The oscillation between directness and flexibility in the 
performers’ movement produced a spatial environment that participants could follow. 
This fluidity was facilitated by the permeability of the design, which connects to a major 
feature of Price’s vision for the Fun Palace. The reader may deduce from the FBF design 
(see CD-Rom), that SPACE was differentiated through the installation of various 
production areas from Fail Better’s archive. This enabled performers to wander in 
between a series of fictional worlds and devise multiple situations for performance. The 
eventual collaborative process of re-performing these fragments was completed with 
each audience when participants chose to make their own pathways through the archive. 
The indeterminate nature of our rehearsal process, using Laban ‘efforts’ throughout, 
allowed the piece to be finished in performance through interaction with participants. 
Each devised sequence was a re-performance of earlier experiments and a new 
improvisation with the material environment. I would suggest that the most tangible 
aspects of these variations concerned the pace of action and the speed of transition, 





ii. TIME (Phase 2) 
 
Figure 3.2: FBF (2012) 
 
Our audiences were invited into the installation as participants at one of five half-
hour performances over one day. Walking through the ‘Discords pathway’ (Figure 3.2), 
the participants were drawn into the centre of the Humanities Studio. The ensemble 
could then transition from the first production area to their primary character areas by 
moving in a shared ‘effort’ state. For example, in Figure 3.2, the body standing against the 
wall beyond the end of the pathway moved in a sustained, strong and direct way (Press) 
in order to draw the participants through the pathway and into the main installation. 
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Later in the piece, another performer’s slow movement from the ‘Lorca dressing room’ 
to the ‘Beckett desk space’ (see Figures 3.3 & 3.4) protracted TIME to encourage 
participants to follow him.  
As Laban wrote in 1947: ‘People moving with easy effort seem to be freer than 
those moving with obviously stressed effort. The latter seem to struggle against 
something’ (McCaw 2011: 225). Though Laban was addressing the ‘psychological aspects 
of effort control’, the following comment on is especially relevant to TIME in FBF: ‘It 
becomes gradually apparent that one of the main characteristics of effort is the presence 
or absence of rapidity’ (225). Laban defines this as ‘the struggle’ and ‘a fight against time’. 
In our experiments, the performers’ movement produced TIME (and SPACE) for 
participants. This became a tangible element of the FBF performances and can be 
understood in relation to Laban’s phrase ‘compound of effort’ where: ‘time, or speed, is 
one of the factors of which the compound of effort is built up’ (Laban in McCaw, 2011: 
225). As one feature of FBF was to experiment through play, the potential for the many 
functions of compound effort that emerged in participant movements was especially 
telling. Audience feedback indicates temporality was understood in a variety of ways.  
For example, protracted slowness compounded both TIME and SPACE 
attitudes so that participants could immerse themselves in the material archive by 
creating ‘gaps’ in performance when they could explore the fragments. For example, a 
performer could slow down TIME in order to pass the digital projection in the Echo and 
Narcissus area en route to the private desk space in the Diary of a Madman corner. 
However, TIME could quicken when rehearsed moments took place within the 
production areas, drawing the participants into one shared place. The effect of this was 
to establish a temporary moment of shared experience out of multiple personal journeys. 
By exposing the participants to ‘compounds of effort’, ensemble movement would 
influence the mood of the performance through rapidity or slowness. The effect of this 
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was to draw together (then rupture) the participants’ flow of movement. In order to 
more fully understand these compounds, the next Phase considers the ‘effort attitude’ of 
WEIGHT.  
 
iii. WEIGHT (Phase 3) 
 
Figures 3.3 & 3.4: FBF (2012) 
 
This sub-section demonstrates how heavy (strong) or light ‘compounds of effort’ 
enabled greater interaction with the material fragments in performance for participants. 
We wanted a physical permeability to accompany the experience of atmospheric diffusion 
of SPACE and TIME in the room.  The ability of participants to view the piece from 
multiple locations was an important example of this, as it increased the fluidity of 
movement and three-dimensional participation. We wanted participants to evolve equal 
access to the materials in the same ways as the ensemble, so we developed playful 
strategies for engaging them with physical objects. For example, the quills and lamp in 
the Diary of a Madman corner (glimpsed in Figure 3.3 through the window) could be 
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directly observed from a variety of angles and distances. However, the objects on the 
desks for Rough for Theatre II (in the foreground of Figure 3.3) could be viewed 
simultaneously, which created a visual parallel between the two production areas. A 
triangulation of images was also made possible if a participant looked through the Lorca 
dressing area from Play Without a Title (shown in Figure 3.4), where the actress applied 
make-up and consulted her script, straight through to the Rough for Theatre II desks (and 
beyond to other production areas). I would like to consider aspects of performer 
movement that conditioned the participants’ spectatorship in this situation. 
I have shown how SPACE (direct or flexible) and TIME (sustained or quick) can 
protract or condense action for the spectator. These ‘compounds of effort’ have been 
shown to affect the participants’ physical experience of FBF, and I will suggest here that 
the differentiation of WEIGHT was extremely valuable. A good example of this would 
be a performer transitioning from a light compound (e.g. Glide) to a heavy compound 
(e.g. Press). While participants more readily notice TIME and SPACE visually, the 
attitude of WEIGHT often feels somatically different in performance and invites an 
alternative form of participation. Moving alongside a performer in a Glide (light, direct 
and sustained) as s/he moves into a Press (strong, direct, sustained) alters the compound 
of effort, but it may not be immediately obvious how this has occurred. The heaviness 
that descends upon the performance of action was compelling when dealing with 
material objects. Laban would consider this transition in terms of gravity, where: ‘the 
person whose bodily energy is lacking seems to enjoy his weightiness and to relax happily 
in being immersed in the general gravity of nature’ (in McCaw, 2011: 225). We used 
WEIGHT as a physical force that could be enacted when the ensemble manipulated 
material objects on set. We defined this as the extent to which the performers were 
‘immersed in the general gravity’ of the archive.  
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This was most apparent in a state of character transition when I could observe 
the corporeal lightness of performers ‘dabbing’ or ‘gliding’ towards a fragment. However, 
once they had completed the transition towards the fragment, they sometimes could be 
seen to submit to the ‘gravity’ of the specific production area and its objects. For 
example, one performer abandoned the materials in the Lorca dressing area from Play 
Without a Title and focused upon the objects of the desks from Rough for Theatre II. As this 
performer made their character transition from Lorca’s director (in Play Without a Title) to 
Beckett’s bureaucrat (in Rough for Theatre II), the movement shifted from a Press to a 
Dab. Furthermore, in the liminal state of a transition (where light becomes strong and 
vice versa), I observed participants move into spaces vacated by performers so they 
could interact with the material objects that had just been set down by the ensemble.  
Just as Littlewood had planned to achieve in her Fun Palace, FBF aimed for 
performance that would produce differentiated meanings through the participants’ 
enhanced interaction with material objects. Nomi Everall’s FBF design clearly shows 
how material objects were arranged within production areas (see CD-Rom). In 
comparison, Price’s design details ‘scientific gadgetry… learning machines… 
laboratories…’ (Holdsworth, 2011: 213) in a ‘science playground’ that collapses 
boundaries between art/science, work/play and public/private. While the FBF 
installation did not directly reference Price’s architectural designs, they both encouraged 
similar patterns of movement, where different effort attitudes would enable varied 
participatory play with material objects. While we cannot know precisely how WEIGHT 
would have been used in the Fun Palace, there are clues in Littlewood’s writing and her 
subsequent practice with young people. Her ability to apply Laban’s ‘efforts’ to theatre 
practice, and then to apply that to community interventionism, demonstrates at least one 
evolution of Laban’s ‘efforts’ in performance practice. In our experiments, WEIGHT 
was expressed by performer responses to the strong gravitational pull of objects, scenery 
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and character, while it could be released through the disengagement from this force 
through lighter movement. The impact of this upon our performers was an atmospheric 
and forceful change in the bodily dynamics (like a plane landing suddenly or a 
rollercoaster gaining speed), which signaled the beginning of a character transition. In 
summary, the WEIGHT of movement was a third-dimension that combined with TIME 
and SPACE in order to promote permeable action. 
 
iv. FLOW (overview) 
 
Figure 3.5: FBF (2012) 
[See FBF video (silent) at 19m00s on CD-Rom] 
This sub-section will take a holistic view of FLOW during these experiments. As 
we have seen, the differentiations of SPACE (direct or flexible), TIME (sustained or 
quick) and WEIGHT (strong or light) produced ‘compounds of effort’ that encouraged 




The three effort-attitudes towards the time factor, weight factor and space factor do not, 
however, cover all the basic phenomena observable. Persons do not move either suddenly or 
deliberately, weakly or forcefully, flexibly or directly only. There exists another factor, flow, which 
can be observed in people’s movements, which together with the three factors mentioned above 
might give us a basis for a full account of effort phenomena. (Laban in McCaw, 2011: 226–7) 
 
I will draw together the temporal, spatial and forceful attitudes in relation to ‘the flow 
factor’. I have shown that FBF responded to Laban’s challenge that: ‘space is a 
superabundance of simultaneous movements’ (in McCaw, 2011: 182). This allowed 
audience members to un/consciously experiment through FLOW (bound or free) within 
the installation. The ensemble moved between flexible and direct uses of SPACE, but 
mainly worked within bound FLOW during the performance. This was especially 
apparent during rehearsed action though there were opportunities for participants to 
experiment with free FLOW during the character transitions. For example, the 
performer in the foreground of Figure 3.5 is shown to be undertaking a direct character 
transition from Spectator in Lorca’s Play without a Title to Hippolytus in Kane’s Phaedra’s 
Love. His scored and bound FLOW could be opened up into to free FLOW if 
participants chose to interact with him.  
I have already suggested that these gaps in the performance event can be 
understood as being permeable.  The fluctuation between bound and free FLOW of 
movement allowed TIME, WEIGHT and SPACE to shift dynamically during the 
performance. These moments of permeability are best understood in terms of FLOW: 
‘which can be free or bound, whatever velocity, space extension or force the movements 
might have’ (Laban in McCaw, 2011: 227). Where the participants followed an individual 
performer during a character transition they were bound by the rhythm of rehearsed 
action. Where they followed a character into a new production area, they were freer to 
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‘indulge in’ (Laban’s term) the FLOW of improvised action. Where the participants 
indulged their own movements around the space, choosing whichever fragments to 
interact with, they were momentarily in free FLOW as described by Laban: 
 
People who indulge in flow find pleasure in the unrestricted freedom of fluency, without 
necessarily giving much attention to the various shades of the time, the weight and the space 
development of the movement. Movements with free flow cannot be easily interrupted or 
suddenly stopped; it takes time until the moving person gains the necessary control over the flow 
to stop. Those persons who bind their flow will be able to stop at any moment.  
(Laban in McCaw, 2011: 227) 
 
This possibility of a completely free pathway through the performance event was a 
radical action adopted by very few participants. Most adopted a bound FLOW by 
following rehearsed or improvised performance (observing the action as drama). In this 
sense, most audience members ‘struggled against’ rather than ‘indulged in’ FLOW in 
performance. Laban’s distinction ‘struggle/indulge’ is a particularly useful binary 
formulation for reflecting upon the participants’ movement. Sometimes they seemed to 
be struggling against the character transitions or even the fragments themselves. The 
deliberate sensory overload within the installation was an important aspect of this 
struggle, as there was no permanent focal point, only a selection of distributed fragments, 
creating a tension between the archive (that which is retrievable materially) and the 





Figure 3.6: Post-FBF event (2012) 
 
This indulgence in, or struggle against, the FLOW of theatrical performance was 
accentuated by a final event in which an invited audience returned to the installation to 
participate in a play reading (see Figure 3.6). This opportunity enabled the archive to 
remain open to new activities (e.g. a group reading of Crave by Sarah Kane) to mark Fail 
Better’s tenth anniversary as a theatre company. The Kane Estate had given special 
permission for this reading to take place, and the network of bodies that appear in the 
photograph above show technicians, academics, practitioners, clinicians and students. 
While a play reading may seem a particularly conservative way of marking this moment in 
the company’s evolution, the collaborative way in which it was done is worth emphasis. 
The four Crave characters (A, B, C and M) were shared collectively, sub-dividing the 
assembled participants into four groups, and each group was allocated a space in the 
installation. Observing the audience interactions in this final stage of the event, and in 
the absence of differentiated performers, the participants appeared to display more 
freedom within the space and achieved higher levels of permeability.  
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Figure 3.6 shows this final act of collaboration in order to explore the space as a 
venue where readings and public events could take place. Before we dismantled the 
installation and returned the venue to its default empty space, we wanted to explore a 
temporary community within the installation. This instance of community, exemplifies 
the informal impact that a Fun Palace might have within an academic or civic space. 
Drawing upon Newlove’s Laban for All (2004), I would argue that these moments of 
community before/during/after performances might be useful examples of what 
Littlewood imagined as a ‘university of the streets’. However, I acknowledge here that 
notions of ‘community’ should be treated carefully when researching performance (cf. 
Read, 2013). In our case, by inviting the participants back into the space, and attempting 
to dissolve the hierarchical distinction between audience and ensemble, we produced a 
temporary community in an indeterminate structure. Our structure was not specifically a 
‘Fun Palace’, but an experimental playground nonetheless. In my next section, I will 
consider this indeterminate environment as a ‘laboratory of fun’, which has the capacity 
for rejuvenating education through collaboration (as in co-labour). For Littlewood this 
ambition was expressed as follows: ‘in the science playground… the wondering scholars 
of the future – the mystics, the skeptics and sophists – can dispute till dawn’ (1994: 704). 	  
IV. ‘A laboratory of fun’: experimental playgrounds 
Fail Better Fragments (FBF) responded to Clive Barker’s claim for ‘the actor as social 
scientist’, while paradoxically acknowledging that: ‘there is no such activity as “acting” 
[per se]. The actor presents aspects or images of human behaviour and interaction on the 
stage, through his presence and controlled relationships with other actors’ (1977: 211). 
As our experiments took place in one of the classrooms where Barker worked, the 
University of Warwick Humanities Studio, his words are particularly evocative here: ‘I 
will go to my grave believing that the actor could be the most important experimental 
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social scientist in the world’ (213).  However, there are more than happy co-incidences 
behind these reflections. Firstly, Barker also had a strong biographical and pedagogical 
connection to Littlewood (joining Theatre Workshop in 1955), reporting her as saying: “in 
order to be a creative artist you must risk failure”, and, “go out to fail, not to succeed” 
(1977: 3). Secondly, Barker’s Theatre Games (1977) is one of the first manuals of theatre 
practice to explicitly cover both ‘laboratory work’ (131, 149) and ‘the nervous system’ 
(219). Barker’s quasi-scientific approach is also resonant of his identity as Scholar/Clown: 
‘who not only understands the scholarly aspects of Drama and the Theatre Arts, but can 
put them into practice’ (215). This identity recalls both Laban’s work within movement 
education and Littlewood’s vision for ‘fun’ laboratories. Barker writes that: ‘areas of work 
I have outlined [in this conclusion] could some day, somewhere form the basis for a 
body of sociological, educational or theatrical research of a practice nature over a 
sustained period’ (218), and perhaps one such endeavor might be PaR itself. I will extend 
the notion of the Scholar/Clown in this final section, especially the problems it poses for 
experimenting (as a scholar) through participatory play (as a clown). 
Littlewood imagined a new function for playing within her Fun Palace vision, the 
‘acting area will afford the therapy of theatre for everyone… and perhaps find stimulus 
in social research’ (1994: 704). This theatre space – within a ‘fun’ laboratory, housing an 
indeterminate structure – made use of dramatic narrative to encourage social learning 
through play. In light of the PaR examples above, I am particularly interested that 
Littlewood made room for theatre within her futuristic vision. It is especially important 
that she envisaged this would have a therapeutic value for the participants. While the Fun 
Palace, like FBF, used performance strategies for participation (interaction, installation, 
informality), the conventions of event came from theatre practice (sets, props, 
characters). By emphasizing the therapeutic benefits of the acting area, Littlewood 
revealed that there was a future for theatre within participatory play. Indeed, through her 
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science playground and the learning machines within, Littlewood also exposed her debt 
to the European modernists, especially Stanislavski and Laban. Their systems, 
foregrounding physical action and (what is now called) ‘the embodied mind’, had clearly 
informed Littlewood’s abandonment of the theatre building in search of new forms of 
architecture for participatory performance. 
This shift out of old theatre buildings into new public spaces recalls my reading 
of Read’s Theatre in the Expanded Field (2013) in the introductory chapter. Finding a way 
‘to recover and retool theatre practices whose relevance to pressing contemporary 
dilemmas demands attention’, Read argues, via ‘the reactivation of previously excluded 
theatre practices through the genetic irritations of performance’ (xxxi). Read’s notion of 
‘theatre and (&) performance: one an abandoned practice for ever to be recited, 
resuscitated and reviewed; the other a gene, ubiquitous, endemic and constantly evolving 
its immunity to the theatrical medium’ (xxxiii) is relevant here. Littlewood’s 
abandonment of the theatre in the 1960s for a new form of performance practice 
(variously ‘a laboratory of fun’, ‘a university of the streets’ and ‘a science playground’) 
recovered the radical potential of theatre practice. Speaking in the 1968 interview, she 
imagined that these new participants would ‘find new forms in new places’ and ‘shall 
know that to dance is also to think’ (BFIB1064). Read suggests that: ‘we no longer need 
new buildings for the production and appreciation of new ideas, but can find ways of 
recycling or intervening in other realms and disciplines in an expanded field of 
performance’ (xxxvii). I would like to argue that Littlewood’s ludic projects (Fun Palace 
and Learn to Play) and contemporary performance practices (exemplified by FBF) 
‘intervene’ rather than represent. In doing so, they reject the established forms of 
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theatrical production and return to the ancient roots of drama (play, action, deed). 
Performance performs26 itself. 
I would suggest that these places for experimental performance function as 
playgrounds (rather than the traditional playhouses, that draw an ‘audience’). Just as 
Littlewood found herself clearing spaces for play in 1960s Stratford East, contemporary 
practitioners have to excavate cultural locations and negotiate public spaces in order to 
create performance work. In the case of FBF, this took the form of creating a temporary 
community to inhabit our archive through participation. With Endlessness, we vacated a 
theatrical studio in order to conduct scientific experiments with performance. Discords is a 
more problematic example, but the journey from the closed BeckettLab to the open 
Beckett and Brain Science workshop (via Discords) was an anti-theatrical strategy to promote 
participatory performance. Indeed, the PaR processes that have followed the three 
examples in this thesis have been far more interventionist in approach, and Fail Better 
Productions has not since performed in a traditional playhouse. As I will argue in my 
Conclusion, the PaR materials covered in these chapters have stimulated new creative 
processes that: ‘find ways of recycling or intervening in other realms and disciplines in an 
expanded field of performance’ (Read, 2013: xxxvii). FBF was the final stage of a process 
of recycling theatrical materials to evolve a transdisciplinary performance practice, which 
has since focused more on play than experiment. To cite Littlewood: ‘I’ve finished with 
putting on plays. I don’t like the theatre… at the moment I’m more interested in my 
children’s playground’ (in Holdsworth, 2011: 234) 
As I move towards a conclusion for this chapter, I would like to return to the 
apparent paradox of a fun laboratory, which I express as the playful/experimental problem. 
Littlewood’s Fun Palace participants (now activated as part of the 2014 project) have a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Perform (v.): c.1300 “carry into effect, fulfill, discharge,” via Anglo-French performer, altered (by influence 
of Old French forme “form”) from Old French parfornir “to do, carry out, finish, accomplish,” from par- 
“completely” + fornir “to provide” (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2014)	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ludic relationship to learning, though science playgrounds or therapeutic role-playing. 
The importance for these activities to be playful, as well as pedagogic, introduces a slight 
contradiction in her vision (to educate and entertain, if you will). While ‘playful play’ 
(Bateson and Martin, 2013) and ‘experiential learning’ (Kolb, 1984) are not mutually 
exclusive, they focus the mind on different outcomes: playing vs. learning. The various 
meanings of play will be explored further in the final chapter, but I would suggest that 
Laban, Newlove and Littlewood meant ludic play, rather than chaotic play. Ludus is rule-
bound, sporting and progressive, whereas other forms of play can be haphazard, violent 
and destructive. If Littlewood and Price had really wanted those wild forms of play in the 
Fun Palace, then the structure and its machines would have been destroyed by its 
participants. Although the Fun Palace (like FBF) was indeterminate, it was still highly 
regulated and ordered. Even children’s playgrounds are designed to eliminate the more 
chaotic forms of play. 
However, Laban’s ‘efforts’ system is more radical as it uses the ecological 
structures that he found in crystallography and re-imagines them around the human 
body. In doing so, he created the ultimate indeterminate structure (the shifting space 
around people) and put them in charge of their own movement choices. His movement 
vocabulary encourages playful action in pedagogic situations but only through a series of 
self-reflexive events. The term laboratory is therefore primarily metaphorical here. 
Littlewood’s final evolution of his system allowed her to reject the theatre (and its 
fetishized ‘empty space’) in favour of Laban’s ‘superabundance of simultaneous 
movements’ (in McCaw, 2011: 182).  Littlewood’s notion of the ‘science playground’ 
suggests that participants can immerse themselves in a ludic environment for the purpose 
of kinesthetic learning and/or physical education. I would like to suggest that this is only 
possible via the ‘effort attitude’ of FLOW, where bound action gives way to free-flowing 
movement. As I documented in the FBF experiments, Laban’s sense of FLOW 
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(indulging in/struggling against) affects the other attitudes of SPACE, TIME and 
WEIGHT. In order to argue that the evolution of Laban’s methods in both the Fun 
Palace and FBF articulates a new understanding of FLOW within performance events, I 
will draw upon one final historical account of Littlewood’s practice (Goorney, 1981) 
alongside a contemporary manual relating to Laban’s ‘efforts’ (Panet, 2009). This will 
allow me to draw together the historiographical and practice-based strands of this 
chapter to argue that experimental playgrounds can also be seen as laboratories. 
For Howard Goorney, writing in The Theatre Workshop Story: ‘Joan’s faith in the 
viability of the Fun Palace was not shared by her closest colleagues in the theatre, and 
they offered no support’ (1981: 134). John Bury went as far as to comment: ‘the actual 
experiment was those girls in that muddy hut outside the theatre. Gerry [Raffles] couldn’t 
see it coming to anything’ (134). However, in order to fully understand why Littlewood 
placed such a heavy importance on human movement, it is necessary to return to the 
holistic nature of the ensemble: 
 
There can be nothing wrong with a group theatre if all the members work for the same ideals and 
sincerely dare to express their beliefs in words, song and movement. But every member is also 
obliged to develop personally and individually and contribute with his ideas and criticism. If you 
then, as Rudolf Laban wrote, ‘are tackling fundamental problems as individual actors and the 
Group as a whole,’ the theatre becomes that true reflection of life it is meant to be. Theatre 
Workshop has always struggled for that truth. (1981: 195) 
 
In comparison, Fail Better used FBF to re-create their ensemble within a university 
community. This enabled some actor training to take place, but primarily it marked a 
significant change in our performance practice. This approach caused a rupture in our 
production processes (theatre), as the FLOW of experimental practice (performance) 
required open-ended processes. While FBF can be positioned in time as one week in 
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2012, one of the processes it instigated has become a durational ‘ensemble network’ 
which is deliberately future-orientated (Emerge, Warwick Arts Centre and IATL, 2014). 
My own practice sought to reanimate theatre practice through a greater awareness of its 
participatory capacity as performance. To reimagine each individual theatre experiment 
as part of a wider performance network would require a transdisciplinary version of 
complexity science that I do not have at my disposal. However, to begin to understand 
the human movement within experimental performance as a network of embodied 
action is possible here. From Laban, Littlewood drew practical methods but also 
ensemble values such as: ‘tackling fundamental problems as individual actors and the 
Group as a whole’ (in Goorney, 1981: 195). Littlewood’s response to Laban that: 
‘Theatre Workshop has always struggled for that truth’ (195), is also a challenge for our 
ensemble network, which I would characterize in terms of the permeability of 
performance. ‘Tackling fundamental problems’ simultaneously as individuals and 
companies, demonstrates one way in which theatre practices can be resuscitated within 
performance events.  
As we have seen, the permeable inter-relationship between participant and 
performer is made possible through free-flowing movement. Like Newlove’s use of 
Laban with Theatre Workshop, the ‘effort attitudes’ remain open to evolutionary 
epistemology through moving bodies trying to learn: 
 
The first point of immediate interest in effort study is the theory that movements are bound to 
evolve in space as well as in time – if one prefers to say so, in Space-Time – and that in this 
evolution of movement the weight of the body is brought into flow. (1981: 229) 
 
These free-flowing pathways produce knowledge in performance through movement. 
This knowledge becomes available to the ‘indulger in’ (participating in free-flowing 
movement), as opposed to the ‘fighter against’ (who struggles with the effort attitudes). 
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Laban’s phrase ‘the indulger in’ has a particular resonance for Littlewood’s theatre 
practice and her ludic projects. The Fun Palace would have provided a venue for 
‘indulgence in’ efforts so as to promote mental health and wellbeing. Her interest in the 
therapeutic benefits of participatory play has been described above, but I would like to 
suggest that it also informs Barker’s concept of the Scholar/Clown (1977: 215). Barker (via 
Littlewood and Laban) imagines the ‘actor as social scientist’ and the academic as 
Scholar/Clown, which both suggest a ludic relationship to knowledge and learning. The 
clown can (and will) fail; the scholar could (and should) more often. Indulging in 
experimental play, rather than struggling against it, allows the actor/academic to fail 
more readily and learn through error.  
 My own practice on Laban was drawn from the teachings of Bridget Panet, as set 
down in Essential Acting (2009), which constitutes a further evolution of Laban’s 
principles. Like Littlewood, Panet’s method combines Stanislavski and Laban, having 
learned this approach from Maxwell Shaw, a member of Theatre Workshop. Panet writes: 
 
In developing his Method of Physical Action, Stanislavski searched in vain for a reliable, 
systematic breakdown of behavioral movement and rhythm; I think we would have found what 
he was looking for in Laban’s analysis of action – the combination of the two provides, in my 
experience, all that the actor needs to be confident, to have a sustained feeling of truth in his 
acting, and to increasing his ability to practice and improve his craft. (2009: xvi) 
 
Panet’s pedagogic focus on the personal and professional development of the actor 
echoes Barker’s Scholar/Clown and Littlewood’s ludic projects. It is this legacy of practice 
that has informed Fail Better’s work with the Student Ensemble to develop 
transdisciplinary performance. As I have suggested above, indulging in FLOW is of 
central importance to these projects. For Panet: ‘flow is practical, structured, a 
thoughtful, considered action or an immediate response to a crisis; it is essentially a 
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building, creative process requiring form, outline and structure’ (200). Panet finds a 
function for Laban in the same way that Newlove evolved his ‘efforts’ system for 
Littlewood. The application of Laban’s movement praxis to new playgrounds and 
laboratories has been the lasting impact of Littlewood’s later period (1960s onwards), 
despite the whimsy of her late writings (i.e. Joans’ Book, 1994). Indeed Laban’s approach 
to movement also has been criticized for being somewhat mystical, though his poetic 
writings can also be metaphysically profound: ‘Together with Stir/Together in space, 
together in time/Stillness and Stir’ (Laban in Ullmann, 1984: 70). Through his direct 
influence on the scientific playgrounds and fun laboratories of the 1960s and after, Laban 
has shown practitioners how to distil movement through FLOW and stillness through 
stir (i.e. non-movement-in-movement).  
 As Goorney notes, when Littlewood’s group: ‘moved indoors in 1933, a radical 
new approach to the whole system of acting was needed… an intuitive process, a period 
of experimentation and trial and error – there were no guidelines to follow’ (1981: 158). 
The absence of guidelines in performance tends to inspire an experimental group to 
create their own rules. In short: Littlewood’s laboratory always resembled a playground. 
While the highly prescriptive methods of other post-war practitioners (e.g. Devine, 
Gaskill, Hall, Brook etc.) have come to represent a period of radical change in the British 
Theatre, I suggest that Littlewood’s early work (Theatre Union and Theatre Workshop) 
and her late work (Fun Palace and Learn to Play) were far more revolutionary. Her fusion 
of Stanislavski with Laban was particularly striking, and her knowledge of the latter 
‘before the war’ (158) and the recruitment of Newlove (after the war) enabled a profound 
engagement with corporeal training in the decades that followed. As Goorney testifies: 
‘with Jean’s help we were able to extend our range of efforts, rather than always falling 
back on those which came most naturally’ (159). In this state of: ‘fluidity and awareness 
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[cf. FLOW] the set eventually becoming an extension of the actors rather than a series of 
obstacles to be coped with’ (160).  
This final statement on the materiality of FLOW has a special resonance with 
FBF where an installation of physical objects and theatrical materials enabled (rather than 
inhibited) participatory play. Our experimental playground therefore produced a permeable 
event for a ‘superabundance of simultaneous movements’ (Laban in McCaw, 2011: 182). 
In practice, this multiplicity required a practical method for focusing energy in the space 
and between the participants. Laban’s ‘effort attitudes’ provided such a method, allowing 
us to experiment with theatrical form, but also to re-direct the flow of participation 
within the performance. We animated the archive as a repertoire (cf. Diana Taylor, 2003) 
and the materiality of the installation became ‘an extension of the actors rather than a 
series of obstacles to be coped with’ (Goorney, 1981: 160). The flow of movement in an 
experimental playground can therefore function as a laboratory for new patterns of 
human embodiment. It is through this channel that theatre practices can become 
transdisciplinary through performance events. In the Conclusion I will consider the flow 
of movement within performance as a form of playfulness. In order to articulate a new 
epistemology for play, I will compare and contrast Laban’s FLOW with 
Csikszentmihalyi’s ‘flow experience’ (1975).  




This is not a theatre. Smash down the doors, and that’s when we’ll see it for what it really is.  
(Garcia Lorca, 2008: 81) 
 
I. Three Problems in Per formance 
I return to Lorca’s Play Without a Title here to revisit the themes of my Introduction. 
‘This is not a theatre’ is the refrain of the Director in that play, and it could serve as an 
over-arching epigraph for the thesis as a whole. My Fail Better projects experimented 
with theatre, through theatre, on theatre, they did so to investigate performance and play. 
This Conclusion draws together my three performance problems in order to better 
understand the relationship between flow and play in PaR processes. While my chapters 
used specific examples from Fail Better Productions, plus the practices of Devine, Brook 
and Littlewood, I will focus here on questions relating to Beckett, Artaud and Laban. I 
will discuss the findings of Chapters 1–3 and re-cap the three problems behind this 
thesis. These problems can be understood as a tension between free/bound forms of 
flow, through which playful, theatrical and organic (freer) and experimental, scientific and 
mechanical (more bound) processes have informed the PaR.  
In each of the examples there has been an apparent paradox between a highly 
regulated disciplinarity (rehearsal, laboratory, archive) and an indeterminate playfulness 
(repetition, reflexivity, recycling) that I will anatomize below. I will show that 
‘playfulness’ can be understood as distinct from the generic ‘play’, which tends to involve 
some form of structure and rule-bound gaming. Conversely, I will return to ideas from 
my Introduction, where disciplinarity in the twenty-first century emerges as far more 
fluid and performative than previously assumed (cf. Frodeman et al., 2012). By troubling 
distinctions between disciplined practice and playful research, I will explore how my own 
examples of historiographical PaR respond to the complexity of PaR as ‘unfinished 
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thinking’ (Borgdorff 2012: 194). Ultimately, this indeterminacy in experimental processes 
is epistemic rather than ontological, as my research on the plasticity/reflexivity/permeability 
of performance (in Chapters 1–3 respectively) has aimed to show. The ‘different kind of 
failure’ (Eliot, 1940)27 that PaR generates has the capacity to gather knowledge for 
transdisciplinary performance studies. I will first detail the three problems as different 
‘kinds of failure’ (Ii) then I will consider ludic practices as ‘varieties of play’ (Iii) before 
concluding this section with ‘forms of embodiment’ (Iiii). This will establish the 
theoretical territory before I address each historiographical example in turn and in 
relation my own practice (II).  I will then investigate the interrelationship of ‘playful play’ 
and flow in a penultimate section (III) before offering a final reflection on PaR as 
transdisciplinary ‘unfinished thinking’ (IV). 
 
i. Kinds of failure 
It has been an aim of this thesis to demonstrate that historiography and PaR can 
become entangled in generative ways. I dealt with the discursive potential of this 
entanglement in my Introduction and I propose to disentangle Chapters 1–3 as follows: 
 
Theatre histories PaR experiments Discursive problem 
Devine ‘de-/re-humanises’ 
Beckett’s Play  
Discords re-uses Beckettian 
‘mechanisms’ 
The organic/mechanical in 
performance 
Brook ‘applies/betrays’ Artaud 
for the Theatre of Cruelty 
Endlessness repeats Artaudian 
‘laboratories’ 
The theatrical/scientific in 
performance 
Littlewood ‘adapts/evolves’ 
Laban for the Fun Palace  
Fail Better Fragments recycles 
Laban-like ‘efforts’ 
The playful/experimental in 
performance 
Table 4.1: Summary of Chapters 1–3 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Trying to learning to use words, and every attempt / Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure 




This table summarizes how three historical case studies have been positioned in relation 
to the PaR experiments, to generate three problems of performance practice, which I 
have called: a) the organic/mechanical problem, b) theatrical/scientific problem and c) the 
playful/experimental problem. I will move these problems on by first synthesizing them 
through similarities and then demarcating their differences. I will then draw upon 
theories of play and embodiment in order to support a holistic tension between the 
disciplined and the playful in performance. 
 The three problems identified above have some important similarities. In 
thinking about the organic and the mechanical, I have tried to understand a paradox that 
haunts my own practice and practitioners’ archives. It seems that at every level of analysis 
(theatrical, experimental, phenomenological), there has emerged an apparent 
contradiction between an organism and a mechanism (e.g. the process and the 
production). Perspectives from the life sciences, and neurology specifically, have 
provided the thesis with the opportunity to view this dichotomy as an interwoven 
example of ‘organic machinery’ (Ramon y Cajal, 1904; Malabou, 2008; Salisbury and 
Shail, 2011). Contemporary science has continued to translate complex biological 
mechanisms of consciousness (Damasio, 1999) and epigenetics (Carey, 2012) for a lay 
audience. These ‘popular science’ texts allow arts practitioners and humanities 
researchers to see their work from diverse viewpoints, and in the process, demonstrate 
how genetic mechanisms can be altered by organic events. This has begun to inform 
performance research in unexpected ways. Routledge Advances in Theatre & Performance, for 
example, includes several ‘scientific’ studies of theatre (i.e. Giannachi, 2009; Pitches, 
2009; Benedetto, 2010; McConachie and Hart, 2010) that focus on questions of 
biopolitics, psychology, cognition and sensation. 
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In the example of Devine’s production of Play at the Old Vic, there was a quasi-
epigenetic revolution playing out through experimental theatre. For Devine, rehearsal 
was ‘an organic process’ and Beckett’s play was ‘experimental work’. For Tynan, the play 
needed ‘re-humanising’ and the performers, for one critic, ‘bleep like electronic machines 
… like well-regulated mechanisms’ (RNT/PR/4/1/4). By comparison, the PaR 
experiment Discords attempted to reconstruct these performance conditions by devising 
an organic response to a mechanical score. I have attempted to position these processes 
within the interdisciplinary study of ‘neuroplasticity’ (cf. Malabou, 2008), where organic 
phenomena can affect bio-mechanisms. I re-iterate these examples here so that I can 
compare the organic/mechanical problem with the theatrical/scientific problem. 
 ‘Theatre and Science’, for Artaud, was a kind of ‘total physiological revolution’ 
which is a ‘supercharged compression of a body’ (1947, in Schumacher and Singleton, 
1989). I argued in the Chapter 2 that this ambition influenced Brook and other 
convenors of 1960s laboratory theatres. However, it is possible to refine this thinking still 
further. Nicholas Salazar-Sutil (2010) has argued that Artaud’s ‘decisive transfusion’ 
places special emphasis on blood: ‘a substance which continuously circulates and 
mediates’ (119). This essay demonstrates how a focus blood flow can subvert the 
conventional focus on mind-body that Artaud had rejected by 1936. Salazar-Sutil 
explains this as follows: what ‘Artaud had in mind was a passage or transfusion from 
mere recording organisms to bodies without organs, from corporeality to trans-
corporeality, where body and mind would finally be redeemed’ (119). He concludes that 
in this process of ‘transfusion’ (which was ‘geometrical, mathematical, organic’): ‘Artaud 
only succeed[ed] in drawing blood at his own self-crucifixion’ (124).  
Indeed, Artaud’s own experience of psychiatric distress could explain his fevered 
imaginings and delusions of grandeur (see Jannarone, 2011). Sadly, these biographical 
accounts of Artaud’s life clearly support the argument that his hyper-awareness of 
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embodiment was due to his own physiological fragmentation and disordered selfhood. 
Nonetheless, Artaud’s influence on theatre practitioners of the 1960s has emerged as a 
flawed attempt to open performance to phenomena beyond itself (science, philosophy, 
theology, anthropology). An ‘interdisciplinary turn’ in theatre studies was driven by 
scholars, such as Roach and Fischer-Lichte, who were directly influenced by the practices 
of the 1960s and this had led to a current hybridity in research methods. The use of 
perspectives from the sciences has produced research that could be framed as 
interdisciplinary theatre studies (as opposed to transdisciplinary performance studies). 
I have cited various examples of this within the thesis, for example: Shepherd-
Barr (2006), Kershaw (2007), Read (2008), Maude (2009), McMullan (2010), Nicholson 
(2011), Fleishman (2012), and Nelson (2013). In this multi-/inter-/trans-disciplinary 
shift, there has been a defense of performance as a learning medium (and research 
method), and the implications of this are two-fold: a) that performance, and more 
broadly, play could be more valued by the academy, and b) that science, and more 
broadly, epistemology needs more playful and performative systems to evolve. This was 
particularly true of the PaR experiment Endlessness, which would have been more 
successful had the artists and scientists been able to share the same process under the 
same spatial-temporal conditions. 
 For the experimental/playful problem, there has been a significant distinction 
between playfulness and experimentation, which I explored as a tension between 
participatory play and scholarly research (re. the Fun Palace and Fail Better Fragments). 
However, as Chapters 2 & 3 have shown, there can be playful forms of experimentation 
and experimental forms of play. This difference allows me to develop a more nuanced 





ii. Varieties of play 
I first make a distinction between spontaneous play and structured play, drawing 
upon the work of Roger Callois (1961), who distinguishes between paidia and ludus. In A 
Philosophy of Sport (2011) Steven Connor describes this difference in the following terms: 
‘paidia signifies the basic freedom of the instinct to play as indicated in activities involving 
improvisation and the delight in various forms of tumult, agitation and disorderly, 
unpredictable movement, and ludus signifies the development of rules in what we call 
organized sports’ (24). Connor’s sporting monograph places a particular emphasis on 
play, but he develops his argument further via Callois: ‘there is ilinx, which describes 
those kinds of games in which the pleasures of vertigo and disorientation are 
paramount… and then there is agon, characterized as “a combat in which equality of 
chances is artificially created” [Callois, 1961]’ (Connor, 2011: 24). It would seem that the 
wild and freer paidia and ilinx could be shaped by the rule-bound ludus and agon that 
would be a relevant frame to my own organic/mechanical problem. Furthermore, the ways 
in which Connor describes sport, as both a public ritual and a bio-medical challenge, calls 
to mind my theatrical/scientific problem. Indeed, by synthesizing these problems as one 
‘grand’ problem between the playful and the disciplined in performance, I can identify 
questions for future research. I would like to investigate the discipline/play problem more 
widely, though what Michael Anton Budd calls ‘body performance’ (1997: xv). 
While Callois imagines a continuum for play between paidia and ludus, and a 
spectrum for sport that moves from ilinx and agon, I propose a matrix for the study of 




Figure 4.1: Play matrix (after Connor, 2011) 
Performance as play manifests itself in many forms of human culture, but my primary 
play-form here will be paidia (spontaneous play/performance), alongside its rule-bound 
twin ludus (structured play/performance). These forms of play are those most associated 
with Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture (Huizinga, 1949), where: ‘play is to 
be understood here not as a biological phenomenon but as a cultural phenomenon. It is 
approached historically, not scientifically’ (ix). Huizinga’s contribution to the field of play 
studies was substantial, and I will show below (IV) how his ideas influenced 
contemporary play theory.  
By contrast, I will return to Robert Crease’s ‘scientific’ Play of Nature (1993) in 
order to reconsider ludic knowledge: ‘Play is here meant in the sense of an infinite, 
ceaseless activity that exhibits a myriad of forms in as many situations. Yet this play is 
not chaotic or random but governed by patterned, discoverable constraints’ (184). For 
Crease, that indeterminate force is neither ilinx (because it is not chaotic), nor agon 
(because it is ceaseless). However, his play does share some features of paidia and ludus 
through its ‘myriad of forms’. Crease uses theatrical performance to understand scientific 
method, and demonstrates ‘how the scripts change accordingly’ (184). His philosophical 
project is more critical of science than it is of theatre, and I would suggest that Crease 
had a limited working knowledge of performance practice. Nonetheless, his thesis is 
useful here for two reasons: a) play is revealed to have a central role in epistemology, 
Paidia	   Ludus	  
Ilinx	   Agon	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even in the epistemic processes of scientific laboratories, and b) scientific 
experimentation can be viewed as performance, in comparable ways to PaR processes.  
In Figure 4.1, the four varieties of play flow in each direction from a voided core. 
However, there are permeable boundaries between each of the four varieties. For 
example, the organic processes of paidia can flow alongside the mechanical structures of 
ludus, or the sudden violence of agon can draw from its chaotic twin ilinx. In the case of 
observing human play behaviour for epistemological purposes, these distinctions (and 
parallels) would be useful to notate movement or document the sudden explosion from 
one category to another. Plotting my PaR on this matrix has enabled me to consider the 
assumption that both play and experiment can be modes of performance. Firstly, I will 
argue that the three performance problems articulated above constitute different varieties 
of a tension between paidia (free play) and ludus (bound play), but I will not assume that 
paida is organic play or ludus is mechanical play, as I am keen to avoid, what the young Samuel 
Beckett called, ‘the neatness of identifications’ (1929). This would over-simplify the 
profound complexity of each process. However, I will now explore how these 
manifestations of play interrogate the experiments discussed in Chapters 1–3. 
The alternative forms of play that Connor anatomizes as ‘the disciplined 
fostering of agon’ and ‘the disorderly principle of ilinx’ (2011: 115) have a particular 
resonance within performance making, where discipline and disorder structure the 
temporality of devising processes and participatory projects. Indeed, one could imagine 
the vertigo-inducing ilinx being a desirable experience for 1960s participants at the Fun 
Palace (cf. Price’s radical design), or ‘the deadly earnestness of agon’ (183) being an 
inevitable feature of Brook’s RSC Experimental Group (cf. Jackson’s oral history). 
Indeed, the tension between ilinx and agon might prove a useful dichotomy when 
considering PaR, in which sometimes highly energetic practices can trouble research 
questions, while most disciplinary research does not currently make habitual use of 
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movement. Furthermore, the complex relationship between paida and ludus, regarding the 
disciplining of play, evokes the physical restrictions of Beckett’s Play and Fail Better’s 
Discords. In these examples, paidia (the freedom to play) was harnessed in the rehearsal 
process, in order to focus the performers’ energy as ludus (the development of rules). 
Connor, who has also written extensively on Beckett (e.g. 1988; 2010), captures a highly 
significant problem for embodiment in sport where: ‘the body is always up against, and 
going beyond, itself’ (2010: 18). This has a notable parallel in performance, where the 
body is also ‘up against, and going beyond, itself’. In my PaR work, especially Endlessness, 
the overflowing of the body into the environment, was a central feature of the 
experiment. In Fail Better Fragments we devised a permeable environment for both 
performers and participants. I will argue below that PaR, and my historical examples, 
create new forms of embodiment through performance practice and play behaviour. 
 
iii. Forms of embodiment 
Reconsidering the phenomenological body as ‘an ensemble of lived meanings’ 
(Carman, 2008: 109), allows me to explore my research findings for, and through, 
specific bodies. In these practices, the forms of embodiment have evolved significantly 
over the course of the research. In Discords, for example, the restrictions of a fixed 
wooden set conditioned the movements of the actor’s heads. In Endlessness, the tight 
spotlight of a lamp in total blackout limited physical space for the performer; and in Fail 
Better Fragments, where shared ‘effort’ (e.g. Press or Thrust) conditioned bodily movement 
within space. In each of these examples, different modes of embodiment were generating 
alternative meanings in performance. While these modes of embodiment could all be 
considered ‘playful’, the nuances of each movement and its quality produced different 
epistemological outcomes. From the historical case studies, I have come to understand a 
primary element of the thesis as corporeality, specifically the materiality of embodiment 
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and how this impacts upon performance process and its temporality (cf. Fischer-Lichte, 
2008: 75). To some extent, this has allowed me to de-mythologize celebrated 1960s 
processes by understanding the materiality of performance practice via rehearsals, 
laboratories and archives.  
In Chapters 1–3 I discussed the ‘genetics of performance’ (cf. Feral, 2008: 223-
233) ‘corporeal laboratories’ (cf. McMullan, 2010: 57), and ‘living architecture’ (cf. 
Preston-Dunlop in McCaw, 2011: 176). Each of these approaches to performance has 
adopted a broadly phenomenological approach, in which, in Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
terms: ‘my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or 
possible task. And indeed its spatiality is not… a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of 
situation’ (1962: 103-4). The body as a situated attitude has currency in contemporary 
scholarship on human embodiment (e.g. McMullan, 2010), and the situated-ness of bodies 
has become a central focus of PaR (e.g. Heron and Johnson, 2014). The body is no 
longer ‘an object in the world, but […] our means of communication with it’ (92). 
Therefore, my work on the body in rehearsals, laboratories, archives and playgrounds 
could be considered a phenomenology of practice. In each of these environments the 
body has been defined through its interaction with material objects and ‘epistemic things’ 
(cf. Borgdorff: 193). 
  In addition to the situated-ness of the perceiving body, experimental practice must 
always already be re-inventing its own histories (e.g. Warhol and the Living Theater in 
Harding, 2013). In staging an experiment with performing bodies, the researcher is 
recalling a previous material event known to its participants, but repeating it with a 
difference. This, in turn, draws upon Marvin Carlson’s understanding of ‘theatre as a 
repository and living museum of cultural memory’ (2003: 165). Indeed, I explicitly 
worked with the notion of theatre practice as living archive in Fail Better Fragments. The 
malleability of the body itself enabled these experimental performances to create research 
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outcomes, because the body was both receiver and transmitter of perception. For 
Carman: ‘As bodily perceivers, we are necessarily part of the perceptible world we 
perceive; we are not just in the world, but of it’ (2008: 133). This being of the world is 
crucial when considering the implication of PaR methods, for as much as my 
collaborators’ bodies are implicated in the research, my body is the fundamental locus of 
the research process. My body has not only been in archives, libraries, rehearsals, 
performances, workshops, conferences, installations and laboratories, but has affected 
those processes as I observed their material conditions unfolding. My being of the world, 
as I researched it, has a central significance for the thesis as a whole.  
 I will reconsider my own subjectivity by comparing the outcomes of PaR with 
their historical counterparts, thus: a) Devine’s Beckett/my Beckett, b) Brook’s 
Artaud/my Artaud, and c) Littlewood’s Laban/my Laban. Fundamentally, I am 
researching other practitioners through my own practice. My self-reflexivity as 
researching-practitioner can be seen as an artistic benefit (I have inherited a craft from 
other practitioners), but also an experimental challenge (I have not inherited this craft 
directly). The supposed objectivity of the researcher would imply that my distance from 
each process (through observation, controls, standardization) is more desirable and 
scholarly, compared with my total immersion in each process.  
However, the dual-viewpoint that has been afforded me (through/about practice) 
has enabled a new perspective to emerge. This perspective locates its objectivity in the 
re-iteration and the reflexivity of the experiments themselves. For example, the 
laboratory conditions enabled a controlled repetition of practices under the same material 
circumstances. The performances also enabled a re-iteration of experimental outcomes, 
but in the domain of public engagements and community participation. During this 
process of research, my own location as the only observer of these transitions, across five 
years of practice in different venues, has enabled me to make some research conclusions. 
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However, those conclusions were only possible through a sustained and solitary period 
of reflection, processing the documentation of events, and generating multiple drafts 
about the practices themselves. This became a second level of re-iteration, the creative 
dislocation of practices from their original context, alongside theatre histories and 
discursive paradigms. Ultimately, what emerged was an entirely new territory, navigated 
by my own subjective hunches, as much as my objective doubts.  
 
II. Historiographical PaR: three examples 
My claim for a hybrid methodology that positions PaR as ‘unfinished thinking’ 
embraces the messiness of trying to create knowledge through performance. Firstly, Jenny 
Hughes, with Kidd and McNamara, addresses ‘the usefulness of mess’ in ‘Artistry, 
Improvisation and Decomposition in the Practice of Research in Applied Theatre’ 
(2011). Secondly, Campbell and Farrier have more recently discussed ‘Queer PaR’ as ‘a 
fabulously messy business’ (2015: 83), in which they conclude: ‘Messiness here does not 
equate to methodlessness: by embracing failure, overflow and unruly erotics, these 
projects produce knowledge in ways that add to the field while raising questions about 
the functioning and ideological biases of the academy’ (87). By embracing the ‘mess’ of 
different approaches to epistemology, I am developing a form of transdisciplinary 
performance research that makes use of a variety of established tools (e.g. 
historiographical inquiry alongside creative practice). In each of the examples below, I 
will present new projects as concluding outcomes, in order to start mapping PaR futures 
and alternative trajectories for transdisciplinary performance. I will be developing the 
following model of transdisciplinarity in relation to PaR:  
  
Transdisciplinarity claims that disciplines cannot individually address the complex problems that 
emerge in society today, and consequently researchers need to work in teams and across 
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disciplines… These problems cannot be divided into areas that are ‘scientific’, ‘cultural’, ‘political’, 
or ‘societal’ since they are, from an ecological point of view, interrelated.  
(Daniel in Allegue et al., 2009: 153) 
 
i. Devine’s Beckett/My Beckett 
Chapter 1 outlined how Devine’s production of Play caused controversy in rehearsal. 
This controversy has been understood as symptomatic of Beckett’s mechanization of 
acting through a dehumanizing process of conditioning performers. I identified that 
Beckettian practice then and now employed ludic rules for game playing without fully 
asserting ‘the deadly earnestness of agon’ (Connor, 2011: 183). The strictures of the 
Beckett Estate in practice control the application of his rules and codes, rather than 
humiliating producers in combat. The anecdotal accounts relating to the latter are often 
embellished by theatrical communities and over exaggerated by the cultural media (e.g. 
‘Deborah Warner: “I’m no cowboy when it comes to text” in Gussow 1996: 100).  
As I have shown, Devine insisted on needing ‘guts’ for ‘experimental works’ (in 
Wardle, 1978: 208) and this sometimes sits unhappily with the Beckett Estate. While my 
own experience has been that the Estate can warmly support experimentation on 
Beckett, some have different experiences (e.g. ‘I am sometimes wary of how rigid the 
Estate has been in controlling the work’, An Interview with Ian Rickson, 2014: 98). 
There remains a problem with experimentation in relation to Beckett and performance, 
and this thesis has informed at least two PaR projects that address this through practice. 
The first is the Samuel Beckett Laboratory at Trinity College Dublin, which I do not 
need to fully articulate here, as it has been the subject of a special issue of the Journal of 
Beckett Studies (Heron and Johnson, 2014). 
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However, I would like to pay special attention to a second project here, the 
AHRC-funded Beckett and Brain Science (see Barry, Broome and Heron, 2014).28 In this 
project ‘Devine’s Beckett’ gave way to what I am playfully calling ‘my Beckett’, informed 
by Discords and the research into Devine’s production of Play. I will focus here on an 
interdisciplinary event in September 2012 at Warwick (which I co-organized with 
Elizabeth Barry), specifically my practical workshop, described here by one of the 
participants, Angela Woods: 
 
 
Through a series of brief and deceptively simple activities involving both the articulation of our 
own ‘inner monologues’ and readings from the play, Heron created a space of spontaneous 
revelation – about the relationship between thought and speech, prosody and affect, embodiment 
and linguistic sense-making, non-sense and modes of listening. By inhabiting Beckett’s text, even 
for a few minutes, we discovered aspects of its rhythm and its (refusal of) sense that might 
otherwise have eluded us, and were able, seamlessly, so it seemed, to reflect on how these 
discoveries could in turn illuminate the dynamics of the clinical encounter. Far from opposing, or 
even complementing, the intense scholarly work being pursued in Beckett and Brain Science, this 
interlude of embodied learning ‘spoke,’ so it seemed, directly to the questions at the heart of the 
project. (Centre for the Medical Humanities website, 2012) 
 
So ‘my Beckett’ is emerging as an applied Beckett, which is paradoxical in a performance 
tradition that rejects its own mastery, in ways described by Bersani and Dutoit as an ‘art 
of impoverishment’ (1993). This recalls McMullan’s account of: ‘Beckett’s paradoxical 
relationship to notions of authority and failure’ (1994: 206), which has informed this 
particular strand of inquiry. I suggest that this paradox can be elided with my own 
discipline/play problem (concerning the complexities of the mechanical/scientific/experimental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The full terms of the collaborative AHRC ‘Science in Culture’ project can be found online at Beckett and 
Brain Science (University of Warwick website, 2012) 
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and the organic/theatrical/playful). I will explore this tension in relation to the Beckett and 
Brain Science event in 2012. 
The day began with a devised performance, based on Beckett’s Not I, shown at 
an open developmental stage to a group of participants from the following 
constituencies: medicine, neurology, psychiatry, health education, philosophy, literary 
studies and drama. This enabled the work to respond to the presence of scientists and 
scholars in a proactive, as opposed to reactive, manner. The significance of this is that 
Beckett’s ‘de-humanization’ was actually used to promote academic debate within the 
medical humanities. The organic bodies of the performers confronted an 
interdisciplinary audience, and digital technology was used to heighten the mechanization 
of performers. Furthermore, the participants were then offered two modes of response: 
practice or discussion (pleasingly, there was an equal spread between the workshop and 
the seminar). Doctors-in-training were encouraged to take part in the practice-based 
workshop as we were keen to explore the impact of these methods upon clinical 
practice.29 When working on Beckett with clinicians, the paradox of discipline/play re-
emerged as a tension between medical diagnosis and compassionate care. The 
relationship with Mouth and Auditor in Not I (not unlike the heads and interrogative 
light in Play) became a pedagogic tool for participation. The participants explained that 
they find it difficult to balance their empathetic spontaneity as a human being with the 
strict scientific rigours of clinical practice; ‘imagine!.. not suffering!..’ (Beckett, 1986: 377). 
In the five years that divide my first formal PaR on Beckett from its unexpected 
outcomes in medicine, I would conclude that performance is always somewhat applied, 
stretching beyond itself like the phenomenological body in Merleau-Ponty’s theories of 
embodiment. When Judith Butler reads these theories, she sees that, ‘the flesh is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This led to the NHS Health Education (Kent, Surrey and Sussex) pilot project Beckett on the Wards, which 
took place between April and July 2013 (in four hospital trusts for multi-professional teams of consultant 
psychiatrists, nursing staff, simulated patients and health administrators).  
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something one has, but, rather the web in which one lives’ (2005: 181) and concerns 
herself with tactility in relation to human embodiment. She continues: ‘It is not simply 
what I touch of the other, or of myself, but the condition of possibility of touch, a 
tactility that exceeds any given touch, and that cannot be reducible to a unilateral action 
performed by a subject’ (2005: 181). I include her analysis here, as I would like to suggest 
the PaR enables a greater tactility across bodies of knowledge; in short, the research 
touches the practices of others. However, my rather optimistic conclusion comes with a 
warning from Butler: ‘This does not mean that we are all touched well, or that we know 
how to touch in return, but only that our very capacity to feel and our emergence as 
knowing and acting beings is at stake in the exchange’ (204). 
 I have argued that Devine’s Play, Fail Better’s Discords and new practices (e.g. the 
Beckett Laboratory at TCD or the Beckett and Brain Science workshop performances) have 
developed ‘a greater tactility’ when it comes to the enduring problems of Beckett in 
performance, and the organic/mechanical problem specifically. 
 
ii. Brook’s Artaud/My Artaud 
Chapter 2 concerned Brook’s misappropriation of Artaud’s writing in order to 
legitimize his ‘scientific research’ with the RSC Experimental Group in 1964. As I have 
shown, this case study demonstrates a tension between the theatrical and the scientific in 
experimental practice. While my PaR project Endlessness re-iterated the same problems, 
there have been two subsequent projects that respond to this problem more successfully. 
Firstly, I would argue that my practice within the AHRC Beckett and Brain Science project 
discussed above was directly informed by the Endlessness experiments. As I demonstrated 
in Chapter 2, the collaborative quality of the PaR is directly improved by the presence of 
scientists and artists in the same spatial-temporal process. We finally had the material 
circumstances to do this in the AHRC event and the projects that have followed. It 
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meant that my practice shifted from (closed) experimental performance to (open) 
transdisciplinary performance, and I will deal with this difference below.  
However, I would like to briefly discuss a second PaR project that has emerged 
from this period of research. From 2012–13, in the research and development process 
for Study (after Darwin), Fail Better worked on the biography of Charles Darwin in order 
to find a theatrical vocabulary for biological inheritance and the study of phylogenetics. 
Unlike Endlessness, where we experimented with staging the scientific method, Study 
moved towards a new understanding of scientific discovery in relation to mental health. 
During this process, we directly involved a science educator (RSC Teaching Fellow at 
Warwick), a computational biologist (MRC Functional Genomics Unit at Oxford) and 
the same Warwick philosopher and Oxford psychiatrist that had collaborated with the 
company members on Endlessness30. While Study was an outcome of Endlessness, the 
physical conditions had changed considerably (including the venue from Oxford to 
Warwick), and there was a return to theatrical conventions, such as plot and character. 
This involved beginning to develop a script (for theatre), rather than devise a score (for 
performance). I retrospectively understand this shift as a temporary return to 
interdisciplinary practice, before the more radical experiments with transdisciplinarity. 
Brook’s practice misused Artaud to move away from strict disciplinary work on 
Shakespeare towards collaborative interdisciplinary work with the RSC Experimental 
Group. Ultimately, he would abandon the RSC (c.1970) and search instead for an 
intercultural method at his CIRT in Paris.31  
The theatrical/scientific problem can therefore become a creative opportunity for 
radically changing the direction of one’s practice: ‘the act I’m talking about aims at the 
true organic and physical transformation of the human body’ (Artaud in Schumacher, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Respectively: Nicholas Barker, Christopher Ponting, Eileen John and Matthew Broome.  
31 I would suggest that in late period (since he remodeled the CIRT as the CICT, with an emphasis on 
creation rather than research) has been characterized as both transdisciplinary and transcultural. 
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1989: 216). Indeed, Artaud’s conception of the body implied an excessively 
transdisciplinary revolution, where: ‘any idea of theatre and performance is ruled out, as 
well as any idea of science, religion, and art’ (1989: 216). The 1960s practitioners were no 
doubt drawn to this transgressive call to abandon conventional forms, but Brook and 
Marowitz soon ran into the limitations of this approach. As Marowitz satirically noted: 
‘an in-group definition of ‘Theatre of Cruelty’ was twelve actors working for twelve 
pounds a week’ (in Williams, 1988: 34). Of course, Brook also warns that: ‘Artaud 
applied is Artaud betrayed’ (1990: 60), and my Artaud is an applied Artaud, and therefore, 
somewhat regrettably, betrayed. The betrayal of the Artaudian legacy is unavoidable 
when trying to apply his writings to performance practice. The core problem with 
Artaud’s cruelty is that it loosens its radical potency if we redefine it as ‘self-discipline’ (as 
his own textual revisions implored us to do). In contemporary PaR, it has been 
challenging to be at once ‘Artaudian’ and simultaneously participatory. In responding to 
this problem, my practice has attempted to recapture a specific materiality (of Artaudian 
embodiment) through theatre laboratories. I have argued that Artaud’s writings 
particularly endorse laboratory qualities (self-reflexive, meta-theatrical and re-iterative) 
due to his hypersensitivity to physiology. Alongside the many other practitioners that 
have used Artaud to serve a purpose, I echo Sheer echoing Derrida quoting Artaud:  
 
The theatre is a passionate overflowing / A frightful transfer of forces / From a body / To body. 
This transfer cannot be reproduced twice. 
(Artaud in Sheer, 2004: 45) 
 
This exhaustible resource of embodied transfer must surely take place at a specific venue. 
My thesis has spent a considerable portion of its time in the laboratory, as a venue where 
bodies seem to exhaust themselves in passionate overflow. Unfortunately, the theatre 
laboratory becomes one of the last remaining spaces where Artaud’s writings can be 
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rigously investigated. Just as Brook’s ‘scientific research’ and Chaikin’s ‘private 
laboratory’ re-imagined theatre practice as a site of experimentation, their subsequent 
shifts towards political engagement (as opposed to aesthetic monasticism) signaled a 
gradual disillusionment with Artaud’s vision. This shift from the ‘private’ space of 
ensemble experimentation to the ‘public’ space of participatory performance was also a 
shift within my own practice during this research process. Just as Chaikin’s Open Theatre 
experienced this shift as a ‘breakup of the group’, he was also attuned to the new 
possibilities this presented: ‘We have come to learn that the world cannot be shut out; we 
must examine the world within ourselves so that we can understand the way in which it 
is dictating our choices’ (1972: 156). 
 
iii. Littlewood’s Laban/My Laban 
The fourth chapter demonstrated the ways in which Laban’s thinking informed 
Littlewood’s Fun Palace and later ‘ludic’ projects (e.g. Learn-to-Play), creating a general 
praxis of movement in terms of social engagement. While Fail Better Fragments (FBF) 
made use of this movement praxis, for both audience and ensemble, the primary 
outcome has been a transdisciplinary method to facilitate corporeal movement for both 
performers and participants. FBF made use of Clive Barker’s description of Littlewood’s 
practice as: ‘a laboratory through which [she] was able to explore such qualities as time, 
weight, direction and flow – the qualities through which Laban characterised all 
movements’ (in Hodge, 2000: 119). I have extended this description of her ludic practice 
into a practical investigation (FBF) of her legitimate failure (Fun Palace), which evolved her 
vision: ‘from an alterative theatre venue, to a cybernetic learning machine’ (Lobsinger, 
2000: 132). In this short sub-section, I will give one brief example of how this research 
has influence my own collaborative practice, through the establishment of Emerge in 2014 
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(a developmental network for Student Ensemble alumni). Before I do so, I will 
reconsider the impact of Laban upon Littlewood’s practice.  
For Irving Wardle, writing in the Independent on Sunday (03.04.94): ‘Her dream of 
brightening up the life of East Ham with a Fun Palace was an embarrassment even to her 
supporters.’ In this article, Wardle was reviewing the idiosyncratic Joan’s Book – which I 
have drawn upon from extensively in Chapter 3 – and he claims: ‘Littlewood by that 
point [1963] had come to detest audiences. Everybody should participate, and that 
evidently applies to readers as well. But the book does what she wants’ (03.04.94). 
Wardle also states that: ‘the Littlewood actor mutated from a Laban athlete, into a classical 
realist, a clown technician, a spontaneous character improviser, a street trader; anyone 
who could get up and hold a crowd, and finally the crowd itself’ (03.04.94, emphasis 
added). The notion of the Laban athlete is significant for my argument that corporeal 
movement can be radically transdisciplinary. While the physical ‘limits of performance’ 
(cf. Blau, 2000: 307-320) have been extensively dealt with elsewhere (see also McKenzie, 
2001), I would like to address the extreme athleticism of Littlewood’s vision where 
performer and participant could play, compete and flow. In this sense, as we have seen 
from recent projects such as Fun Palaces (2014), her work is ‘a treasure-map’ (Wardle, 
1994) for future generations. My own PaR has tested this principle in practice, with a 
focus on the transdisciplinary applications of theatrical performance. 
 The Emerge Festival and Laboratory (Warwick Arts Centre and IATL, 2014) has 
enabled a network of Student Ensemble alumni and Warwick graduate theatre companies 
to return to the university for experimental projects with current students and 
community members. I initiated this project in order to make my work with the Student 
Ensemble sustainable and participatory. In convening this practice, I imagine the 
university campus as Fun Palace and encourage these emerging practitioners to 
collaborate with staff and students from diverse fields of research. This work already 
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involves six theatre companies ‘younger’ than Fail Better, namely: Dumbshow, Curious 
Directive, FellSwoop, Kill the Beast, Fat Git and Barrell Organ. This responds to Jen 
Harvie’s observation that artists are already subverting neoliberal models of production: 
‘First, practically, they are forming networks of affiliation and mutual support that 
challenge both individualism and hierarchies of power’ (2013: 107). This potential has 
emerged directly from our period as resident artists within the university (a dwelling). 
 To dwell (cf. Ingold, 2000: 186) within the modern university campus is to be 
shaped by disciplinary mechanisms, stimulated by interdisciplinary collaborations and 
seduced by transdisciplinary performance. The task for ‘scholar-clowns’ (cf. Barker, 
1977), such as myself, is to move towards a ‘university of the streets’ (after Littlewood), 
by providing community-experiences within the campus, and campus-experiences within 
the community. This will be greatly enhanced by a greater awareness of playfulness and 
flow, and an equality of opportunities to became a Laban athlete (cf. Wardle, 1994). 
 
III. From Playfulness to Flow 
In this section I will first consider how the state of playfulness can catalyze the 
transdisciplinary potential of flow.  Writing about Play, Playfulness, Creativity and Innovation 
(Patrick Bateson and Paul Martin, 2013), musician and author Pat Kane wrote: ‘play will 
be to the 21st century what work was to the industrial age - our dominant way of 
knowing, doing and creating value’ (viii). This extraordinary claim has a parallel in 
performance studies, where Jon McKenzie declares that: ‘performance will be to the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries what discipline was to the eighteenth and nineteenth, 
that is, an onto-historical formation of power and knowledge’ (2001: 18). Bateson and 
Martin are keen to differentiate between the myriad forms and functions of ‘play’ and the 
specific condition of ‘playful play’ that I will focus on here. In the PaR experiments 
described above, the transformative moments of flow (cf. Csikszentmihalyi, 1975) took 
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place during when performance was at its most excessive and playful. This recalls 
Zarrilli’s description of flow as ‘a complex set of subsystems or structures of 
consciousness', which involves ‘unlearning’ (2001: 40). Flow in a state of ‘playful play’ (cf. 
Bateson and Martin, 2013) can produce radical and transdisiplinary performances.  
There is a multiplication of knowledge(s) in playful states and flow experiences. 
Within ‘play studies’ (e.g. Huizinga, 1949; Bruner et al., 1976; Sutton-Smith, 1997), one 
object of study was the restless energy within most cultures, which Csikszentmihalyi 
(hereafter Csik.) in terms of flow: 
In a flow state, action follows upon action according to an internal logic that seems to need no 
conscious intervention by the actor. He experiences it as a unified flowing from one moment to 
the next, in which he is in control of his actions, and in which there is little distinction between 
self and environment, between stimulus and response, or between past, present, and future. 
(1975: 36)  
I will focus here on Csik’s specific understanding of the relationship between play, 
creativity and flow. Csik’s ‘flow experiences’ (1975: 36) are intrinsic forces within creative 
acts that can be studied, defined and even located. For example, rather than asking ‘what is 
creativity?’ Csik asks ‘where is creativity?’ thus locating it within a network of practice 
and pointing out that: ‘it does not happen in people’s heads’ (1997: 24).  
To some extent creativity has been positioned within this thesis as a research 
method, whereas my study of creating has led me to conclude that transdisciplinary 
performance has the capacity to disorientate knowledge(s) through complex movement. 
For Howard Gardner: ‘the key idea in the psychologist’s conception of creativity has 
been divergent thinking’ (1993: 20) which supports the notion of creative acts as subversive. 
There has also been a particular interest in creativity from the computer sciences – from 
the 1960s cybernetists to Margaret Boden – who studied the nodes and networks of 
complex systems. For Boden: ‘human minds are far too complex’ for a full scientific 
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understanding of creativity, ‘but not… too mysterious’ (2004: 322). From these thinkers, 
I have reconsidered divergence and complexity as specific modes of thought for creative 
practice. It is through the divergent and complex in performance practice that research 
methods can become permeable to new epistemologies. In short: creativity can be better 
thought of as ‘flow experience’ that produces knowledge(s).  
In Optimal Experience: Psychological Studies of Flow in Consciousness (1988) Csik is  
‘intrigued by the question of intrinsic motivation, I turned to the literature on play in 
hope of finding an explanation’ (5). He also draws upon Huizinga, Caillois, and Sutton-
Smith to conclude that: 
 
Play is clearly intrinsically motivated. Whatever its evolutionary significance and adaptive value 
might be, people play because it is enjoyable… My contribution to this literature in the late sixties 
was an article describing the historical changes in the way rock climbing has been practiced and 
experienced [Csik, 1969], and an embryonic model of the flow experience. (5) 
 
His research in the 1960s–70s revealed that: ‘despite the obvious difference between 
such endeavours as climbing rocks and writing music, a common set of structural 
characteristics was found to distinguish those patterns of action that produced flow from 
the rest of everyday life’ (8). He suggests this sense of flow concerns ‘optimal experience’ 
so we must distinguish it from Laban’s FLOW which describes an ‘effort attitude’ for 
human movement. However, I will compare these understandings of flow in order to 
challenge goal-orientated definitions of creativity. I will first argue that the objectification 
or commercialization of creativity is one of the greatest threats to creative processes 
themselves then I will attempt to outline an alternative understanding of ‘playful play’ 
within transdisciplinary performance. 
 The value of both Laban’s FLOW (c.1947) and Csik’s flow (1975) lies in their 
practical application. Unlike the totalizing vision of creativity as a mechanism assumed by 
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Boden et al., experiences of flow emerge through organic processes. For Csik: ‘The flow 
concept was developed as a result of sheer curiosity. It was the fruit of ‘pure’ research, 
motivated only by the desire to solve an intriguing puzzle in the mechanism of human 
behavior… it was very ethereal, bordering on the mystical’ (1988: 11). As for Laban, a 
mystical practice had lead to a series of applications for diverse human activities. This 
was especially true in the ways in which Laban’s ‘efforts’ (of which FLOW is part) were 
adapted for factory workers (with F.C. Lawrence) and school children (with Lisa 
Ullmann). It seems a similar evolution took place with Csik’s flow, where: ‘educational 
and occupational uses of the model seem to be the most urgent ones’ (12). This 
emphasis on accessible flow experiences – as play-literacy for all – recalls Littlewood and 
Price’s Fun Palace objectives as well as Newlove and Dalby’s Laban for All (2004). 
 My PaR projects aimed to make practical applications of flow for both 
performers and participants. However, my use of ‘flow experience’ is more organic than 
mechanical. For example, my comparison between Play (1964) and Discords (2010) 
identified a Beckettian form of ‘flow’ that forced the actor’s body in to a different 
relationship with itself. The Beckettian body, as argued in Chapter 1, acts as ‘organic 
machinery’ so that words could flow through the subject as if it were a vessel. In 
Whitelaw’s Not I, for example, Mouth is both receiving (from the brain) and transmitting 
(through the voice) an experience of flow. In Fail Better’s Discords, the vents (from which 
the disembodied heads emerge) created gaps through which movement could flow. 
Therefore, I have adapted both senses of flow/FLOW, to produce a new synthetic 
understanding of ‘flow’. I did so progressively in Chapters 1–3: through plasticity in 
Chapter 1, reflexivity in Chapter 2 and permeability in Chapter 3. Across these processes, I 
attempted to create a practical space for ‘flow’ in order to meet my specific experimental 
objectives. In each project, performance environments were constructed to include 
vents, voids or vacua so as to facilitate participation through rehearsal, laboratory and 
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archives. My approach also attempted to respond to experimental histories from 1960s 
British theatre practice, where Devine, Brook and Littlewood created environments for 
‘flow’. In each example, the NT Play rehearsals, the RSC ToC experiments and the 
proposed Fun Palace created spaces for radical play that implicitly combined elements 
from both Csik’s flow (a psychological state) and Laban’s FLOW (a corporeal effort). My 
PaR has fused these elements across three separate performance projects. 
However, Csik’s flow has since been co-opted by the ‘creativity studies’ 
community, a shift he has encouraged through publications such as Creativity: Flow and the 
Psychology of Discovery and Intervention (1997). Rather than simply positioning flow in relation 
to play theory, the ‘creativity turn’ in higher education has coincided with a neo-liberal 
and late capitalist approach to ‘knowledge production’. Within this division of labour, the 
artist-scholar is identified as resource to be managed, rather than a co-creator of 
knowledge(s). My concern here is that the invention of creativity (as an objectification of 
creative process) is a suspect and capitalist enterprise, one that de-radicalizes play and 
disciplines creative practitioners. I will return to this problem below via a closer analysis 
of Csik’s thinking and the introduction of ideas from Jen Harvie’s Fair Play (2013). 
 The claim that: ‘creativity is a central source of meaning in our lives for several 
reasons’ (Csik, 1997: 1) has encouraged some scholars to treat ‘creativity’ as an object of 
study in its own right (e.g. International Center for the Studies of Creativity at Buffalo 
State University). Csik gives two main reasons for this statement: firstly, that the more 
interesting aspects of culture issue from individual acts of creativity and, secondly, that: 
‘we are living more fully’ (2) when experiencing creativity as a process. Clearly his first 
comment discounts ecological approaches to non-human creativity (and indeed human-
animal interactions), his second comment draws directly from his work on ‘optimal 
experience’ and flow. It is the latter I will be concerned with here. For Csik: ‘Creativity is 
the cultural equivalent of the process of genetic changes that result in biological 
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evolution, where random variations take place in the chemistry of our chromosomes’ (7). 
Returning to my theatrical/scientific problem I note a tension here between a subjective 
notion of flow (a personal experience) and an objectification of those experiences as 
creativity (an evolutionary step).  
Using the now popular concept of the meme (cf. Dawkins, 1976), Csik argues that 
each unit of cultural evolution has to be re-learned by each generation, and that: ‘if 
enough of the right people see the change as an improvement, it will become part of the 
culture’ (7). The problem with this approach is that Csik repeatedly positions creativity in 
terms of its recognition by others in the same field, or its adoption within another field. 
While his initial definition of creativity as an intrapersonal process – of preparation, 
incubation, insight, evaluation and elaboration – later emerges to have a psychoanalytical 
resonance: ‘the creative person is one who succeeds in displacing the quest for forbidden 
knowledge into a permissible curiosity’ (100). However, a core characteristic of creative 
process emerges as personal enjoyment, in which flow experiencers: ‘described the 
feeling when things were going well as an almost automatic, effortless, yet highly focused 
state of consciousness’ (110). Furthermore, he claims that ‘there is no worry of failure’ in 
flow (112), and this perspective has been important for my thesis.  
In Chapters 1–3 I noted that performers and participants often described their 
experience in terms of playfulness, transcendence or liberation. I have been particularly 
interested in the paradoxes of these states, especially when these freedoms seem to have 
emerged from intense structure. However, in Beckett, Artaud and Laban’s practices, 
there were specific conditions of human embodiment where the risk of failure (or actual 
breakdown) signaled an important phase in the creative process. For Csik: ‘the reason 
that failure is not an issue is that in flow it is clear what has to be done, and our skills are 
potentially adequate to the challenges’ (112). This disappearance of self-consciousness is 
an important feature of flow and so: ‘the activity becomes autotelic’ (113). 
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I would suggest that Csik’s work on the autotelic [activity for its own sake] is far 
more resonant in relation to flow that it is to creativity. If we are to believe that creativity 
is a thing that can be measured, studied, prodded and exploited then it is not really 
autotelic, rather it would be exotelic (goal-orientated activity). Unfortunately, ‘creativity 
studies’ has already co-opted flow for the growth of the so-called Creative and Cultural 
Industries, which make the creative processes (which should be autotelic) pro-social and 
exotelic. From my own experience of researching this thesis, I have witnessed attempts to 
de-radicalise play by turning it towards public service (e.g. Cultural Olympiad, 2012) and to 
discipline creative practitioners within ‘neoliberal’ models of production as 
‘artrepreneurs’ (Harvie, 2013: 62).  
 Harvie ‘focuses on the potentially detrimental effects of hegemonic expectations 
imposed on artists to model entrepreneurialism in ways that both indulge and inherently 
celebrate neoliberal capitalism’ (62–3). I concur with Harvie’s assessment that this harms 
artists and artistic cultures in three ways: ‘One, it insists that art prioritizes self-interest 
and individualism. Two, it requires art to acquiesce to creative destruction as an 
apparently inevitable by-product of innovation… And three, it obliges art relentlessly to 
pursue productivity, permanent growth and profit’ (63). I would also argue that – unlike 
Laban’s FLOW and Csik’s flow – such ‘artrepeneurialism’ exposes artists to a different 
kind of ‘flow’ (economic and fiscal flow). It goes without saying that this submission to 
market forces clashes with the work of Devine, Brook and Littlewood in the service of 
Beckett, Artaud and Laban retrospectively. However, as performance practice is also 
densely material, most of the projects discussed in this thesis were entwined with socio-
economic forces beyond their control. One important criticism of PaR has been that it 
forces artists to work within the business priorities of the UK research councils (cf. 
Allegue et al., 2009; Nelson, 2013). Instead, I have demonstrated how artists might 
subvert the dominant orthodoxies of neoliberal capitalism, by focusing on process and 
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flow. My focus throughout on practice recalls what Richard Sennett has so eloquently 
referred to as ‘craftsmanship’ (2009). In this model, failure is about learning to make, 
learning to play, and learning to flow.   
 
IV. PaR as ‘not-yet-knowing’ 
‘Flow’ is crucial to the experience of conducting research through practice. For 
Laban: ‘People who indulge in flow find pleasure in the unrestricted freedom of fluency, 
without necessarily giving too much attention to the various shades of the time, the 
weight and the space development of the movement’ (McCaw, 2011: 227). PaR artist-
scholars have the radical potential to become such people. They conduct research 
through: ‘movement with free flow [which] cannot be easily interrupted or suddenly 
stopped; it takes time until the moving person gains the necessary control over the flow 
in order to stop’ (227). In a sense, I had to temporarily stop moving in order to produce 
this thesis. However, I used the memory and documentation of flow experiences to 
inform my own non-movement as a researcher, and once I mastered this new form of 
interaction, I re-searched for the archival and historical flow experiences of others. This 
thesis emerged between 2012–15 when my own practical movement stopped, and when 
the practices of 2009–12 could become more fully thought. In this final section, therefore, 
I will draw on Borgdorff’s notion of artistic practice as ‘unfinished thinking’ (2012: 194) 
alongside the notion of ‘not-yet-knowing’ (2012: 194) which he draws from Rheinberger, 
in order to conclude with a revised understanding of laboratory theatre as 
‘transdisciplinary performance’. 
Within an international context, as I hope to have shown, PaR is a diverse and 
hybrid methodology. The IFTR working group alone has an international reach across 
every inhabited continent on the globe. Maybe, as Clov says to the anguished Hamm in 
Beckett’s Endgame: ‘Something is taking its course’ (1986: 98). So, what precisely is taking 
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its course, and how will this inform future research through performance? 
Fundamentally, I have been dealing with venues and processes for experimentation (i.e. 
various forms of ‘laboratory’) and the play-spaces that may emerge at those venues and 
through their processes. In my Introduction I argued that the trans-discipline of PaR is no 
longer ‘at the crossroads’ (Conquergood, 2002), but now could be described as engaged 
in an ecological ‘entanglement’ (cf. Chiew, 2011). This, I argued, was as a result of the 
unique conditions of embodiment practiced by PaR methods in transdisciplinary 
performance studies. As a result of my analysis – through practice – of histories and 
procedures of experimentation, I aimed to identify three dichotomies in performance 
practice. While the organic, theatrical and playful has frequently been set in opposition to the 
mechanical, scientific and experimental, I intend finally to draw these oppositions together into 
a combined statement on how ‘transdisciplinary performance’ might be constituted in 
relation to my own practice. 
The physical cultures under investigation in this thesis have been researched 
through praxis. In using this word I am at once dispensing with theory and returning to 
Schon’s ‘knowledge-in-practice’ (1983: 69). Nelson makes particularly good use of this 
term in his 2013 PaR in the Arts, where he states:  
 
Intelligent practice is at the core of my model and a practice is characteristically submitted as 
substantial evidence of the research inquiry… Reflection on the kinds of knowledge practitioners 
bring to their workspaces is a useful starting-point to establish what knowledges are in play, and 
much remains to be understood, through research, of how arts practices function. (40) 
 
In relation to my thesis, I would respond to Nelson’s model in the following ways: a) the 
PaR projects detailed in Chapters 1–3 have demonstrated the intelligence of practice 
within their own contexts, b) digital documentation of these projects has been submitted 
alongside this in order to support the written elements, c) the knowledge(s) brought into 
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each process has been clearly identified through the writing and evidenced by the 
documentation, and d) the historical case studies have provided a context to understand 
the arts practice. However, I believe something more interesting has happened alongside 
these rather pedestrian objectives and outcomes, as it would also seem that real bodies 
have been changed through practice. My practice also has been transformed from 
devising theatre to experimental performance. Nelson goes on to identify: 
 
The rigour involved in different aspects of the dynamic process [which] differs from that of the 
traditional (positivist) scientific method but is consonant with more modern conceptions of 
scientific knowing (such as complexity and emergence), as they have developed in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries. (46–7) 
 
If scientific methods are moving towards new epistemological metaphors, such as 
complexity and emergence, then the transdisciplinary potential of performance has a 
genuine opportunity to contribute to epistemology. As Kershaw has stated: ‘the project 
[TRANSNET, Henry Daniel, 2009: 148–162] patently modeled a transdisciplinarity 
through which the conventional binaries of bodies-technologies, cultures-disciplines and 
arts-sciences may be confounded’ (in Allegue et al., 2009: 16). 
As I have shown above, one such shared metaphor is entanglement, and so my 
praxis attempted to unloosen some of the knots of 1960s experimental theatre. However, 
just as the 1960s marked the beginning of an interdisciplinary turn within the academy, 
so PaR can be understood as a contemporary transdisciplinary turn within the knowledge 
economies of neo-liberal capitalism. By privileging practice and legitimating failure, 
performance research can become genuinely participatory and accessible to a wider 
public, perhaps more than ever before. This comes with some problems, alongside the 
copious rewards, so that notions of rigour and discipline are often contested in these new 
venues and play-spaces. Nelson’s ‘anticipation, preparation and “sixth-sense” awareness’ 
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(47) is not enough here. A more radical approach to practice is required, perhaps in line 
with Borgdorff’s conception of ‘artworks as epistemic things’ (2012: 193). Drawing upon 
the work of Rheinberger, he argues that: 
 
An experimental system thus involves the realization and articulation of epistemic things that 
derive their propelling force in the research from their very indeterminacy… Similarly, within 
artistic practices, artworks are the hybrid objects, situations, or events – the epistemic things – 
that constitute the driving force in artistic research. (193) 
 
I began to view my performance projects (‘the epistemic things’) as indeterminate, and 
potentially transdisciplinary, knowledge when I processed their documentation alongside 
archival materials from 1960s experimental theatre (as Chapters 1–3 have shown). By 
submitting my own practice to the enduring problems of theatre history, I was able to re-
articulate PaR as ‘unfinished thinking’ (Borgdorff, 2012: 194) in performance studies. My 
research went through a sustained period of contemplation (using both digital 
documentation and historiographical evidence) in order to be more fully thought. By 
placing the PaR documentation in juxtaposition with the archival materials from the 
1960s, this ‘thought’ slowly expressed itself as my ‘three problems in performance’. In a 
final phase of thinking, that took the form of both writing and practicing (wright-ing, if 
you will) I produced this thesis. Borgdorff warns us that: ‘artworks as epistemic things 
can never become fully transparent, and it is this structural lack of completeness that is 
the fuel and the motor of a creative, constructive practice’ (194). Even if that is the case, 
it is important to recognize that knowledge can emerge through the ‘not-yet-knowing’ of 
transdisciplinary performance. 
 
Is this ‘not-yet-knowing’, a form of knowing?  
That is the question. 
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